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IE.

COMPLETE STATEMENT OF OPINIONS AND BASES THEREFOR
A.

Introduction

This report discusses the history of metal mining and processing in the Upper Clark
Fork watershed. In the context of that history and based upon the historical record, I have
the following opinions as to the roles of private and public enterprise in the exploration and
development of hard rock mining, milling and smelting in Butte, Anaconda and Philipsburg,
Montana:
First, the Federal Government was an active, involved partner1 in the settlement of
the West and the development of the region’s resources. That involvement extended to
Montana and the mineral resources of the upper Clark Fork River basin.
Second, the Federal Government was the owner of lands on which mining, milling,
and smelting took place.
Third, the Government gave two forms of economic activity a special and unique
status: agriculture and mining. Both were given privileged treatment by the Federal
Government. It could not have been otherwise; each was identified as absolutely essential to
the Government’s Constitutional mandate to legislate for the common defense and the general
welfare.
Fourth, myriad sourdoughs, partnerships, syndicates, and corporations contributed to
the environmental history of the Upper Clark Fork River Basin. Although they may have
been the largest, The Anaconda Company’s were not the only mines, mills, and smelters.
Fifth, the flood of June 1908 was an extraordinary event, unmatched by any other
"acts of God" in the Clark Fork drainage during the time in question.
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Sixth, there are distinctions between and among the roles of the Government as
regulator, protector, property owner, and sovereign which have an important historical
component.
Finally, lawyers speak often of "successor liability" and of "predecessors in interest."
So do historians. The only difference is that lawyers are usually referring to persons or
corporations, while historians are more concerned with successor and predecessor generations
of people in a context of seamless historical continuity. As historians are acutely aware,
every generation of Americans claims an inheritance from previous generations. That is as it
should be. Too often, however, the "beneficiary generation" claims only the assets and
rejects the liabilities. History requires context. The past must be judged by its standards and
values; not those of the present. The past is historically situated and it cannot be detached
from that context.2 As the philosopher of history William Dray has written
There may be limits, however, in the name of fairness, to judging what was done in
the past by reference to values that were not accepted, or even known, at the time. It
may seem hardly fair, for example, to judge a Roman who indulged in infanticide
entirely by the standards of North American middle class society...It would...be a
departure from objectivity as fairness to praise or blame past actions and activities
without taking seriously into account differences in circumstances, knowledge, and
outlooks of past and present.3

B.

The Federal Government and the Mining Industry
1.

The Government as a Partner in Western Development

Federal involvement in the settlement and development of the vast public domain
began with the Constitution of 1789:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution...4
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There are important historical lessons in that preamble.
First, the people established the Government, not the other way around. The
Government does not simply speak for the people, it literally stands for them. It is
unimaginable without and indistinguishable from them. As he did with so much else,
Lincoln put it best: ours, he said, is a Government of the people, by the people, and for the
people.5 This is not to say that Government and people are synonymous, that nothing in the
form of law or language distances the one from the other. It is, however, to say that there is
an obvious and close symbiotic relationship between the people and the Government they
formed to protect and advance their interests. The Constitution created a historical
partnership between the Government and the people. As with any partnership, this one
involved the expectations that each of the contracting partners had of the other, as well as the
remedies available to either should the partnership agreement be broken. From expectations
realized comes behavior. Behavior, in other words, is historically conditioned; the people
came to expect and assume that the Government would deal fairly with them, that it would
continue to meet its obligations to insure justice, tranquility, the general welfare, and the
blessings of liberty. The people operated on those assumptions and expectations.
Second, and following from the first, this Government was established for designated
reasons, among them insuring domestic tranquility, providing for the common defense, and
promoting the general welfare. Since the assignment of responsibilities without the means to
meet them makes no sense, the people then gave to the Government certain limited powers
and resources. Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution is largely given over to the
enumeration of those powers: "to borrow money...to regulate Commerce...fix the Standard
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of Weights and Measures...declare W ar...raise and support A rm ies..." and more. But
Section 3, Article IV extended the list: "The Congress," it states, "shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States..." The "Territory" in question consisted of the
public domain, lands to which the Federal Government held title, the free gift of the states
that had claims to them in colonial charters.6 In 1789 that territory and property-the
Public’s Domain-consisted of some 880,000 square miles; it would be added to substantially
in the years to come. Ownership of these lands, along with the exclusive right of disposal,
conveyed no mean or inconsequential power.
The Constitution both called the Government to its duties and gave it the means to
meet them. Providing for the general welfare was one duty; the power to dispose of the
public domain was one means of achieving it.7 To the ear of the historian that sounds a lot
like the Government was made an active partner with the private sector in the pursuit of
agreed-upon goals. If, for historical example, the common defense required the raising of an
Army and the declaration of war, then the Government’s partnership responsibility was clear.
If the general welfare required the imposition of tariff duties, or the borrowing of money
through the issuance of Government bonds, or the coinage of money in Government mints,
then the partnership responsibilities were as manifest.
It would be disingenuous of me to pretend that these were not contentious issues~to
pretend that the rights and responsibilities of the states vis a vis those of the Federal
Government were not a part of this history. Were I ever tempted to such pretense, the
memory of the Civil War and the 600,000 plus Americans who died in it, would bring me
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back to historical reality. It was precisely because the Northern and the Southern people
disagreed on how the general welfare was to be provided for, and by which agent of
Government, that the war came.8 But even a cursory look at the Constitution of the
Confederate States would indicate that the South did not contest the notion of the
Government as partner, only the way in which the Republican Party chose to define and act
out that partnership.9 The war was then partly the result of a fundamental disagreement on
the meaning of the Constitution.10
But the war also worked a Constitutional revolution. Consider, if nothing else, the
fact that before the war the plural verb "are" was always used when reference was made to
the United States: the United States, people said and believed, are a great nation. After the
war, the singular verb found favor: the United States is a great nation. More is at issue here
than syntax. The Federal Govemment--the unam to be made e pluribus—garnered increased
responsibilities, and powers, after the war. The Constitution was changed, both officially by
amendment and "unofficially" by common consent, to reflect these changes.11
Of immediate importance here, of course, is the question of Western lands. Whatever
laws were passed dealing with those lands had to have been passed with the general welfare
and other responsibilities assigned to the Government uppermost in mind. To that same
untrained ear, this sounds like the Government was made the trustee of the public’s domain
and given the responsibility to manage the lands held in trust for the greatest good of the
entire American people. If then, for another historical example, it was believed that the
general welfare would be best served by the revenues consequent upon the sale of the
agricultural lands of the public domain, then the land laws would reflect that belief. If later
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it was determined that the domestic tranquility--and the general welfare—would be advanced
and preserved if restive Eastern laborers were encouraged to take themselves and their
mutinous hostilities to the West, then the Government would be obliged to provide that
necessary encouragement by amending the laws and giving the land away as a free
homestead.12
Mineral, grazing, and oil and coal lands presented the Government with even more
options. The public domain containing those resources could be sold, leased, or claimed.13
The emphasis could be on direct revenues to the Government, indirect revenues arising from
policies facilitating and promoting private development, or, as with most minerals, by
policies that combined these and other methods of disposal. The land laws in all cases were
evidence of both the Government’s trusteeship responsibilities and of the changing ideas of
how best to express them.14
Before the vast national domain could be effectively managed, the Government needed
some rough idea of the extent and nature of the lands it held in trust. Even before the
Constitution had been ratified, the Government, under the Articles of Confederation,
determined that certain lands were of sufficient importance to the general welfare to be
withheld from sale or distribution. By the terms of the Land Ordinance of 1785, one-third of
all gold, silver, lead, and copper mines were reserved to the Government. Obviously, the
withholding of lands on the basis of the resource they contained required that those resources
be located and the lands surveyed. This task fell to the Surveyor-General, the first in a long
line of Government agents overseeing the Government’s property.15 Clearly, the laws
governing the distribution of public property required that resources inventories be taken.
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They also required maps. The Surveyor-General, located within the General Land
Office, did some of it; the Survey of the Coast mapped the coast lines. The Army Corps of
Engineers was charged with mapping for internal improvement in 1824 and was joined in
1838 by a separate Corps of Topographical Engineers. To each of these Federal agencies,
add the offices, under various headings, of state geologists and topographers.16 Indeed, on
balance, the states were more active before the Civil War than the Federal Government in
conducting and funding geological surveys.17
His states’ rights sentiments notwithstanding, it was Thomas Jefferson who
commissioned the best known and most important of the armies of exploration. Lewis and
Clark were not private free-lancers; they were recruited, instructed, outfitted, and paid by the
Federal Government. They were sent to explore some lands that were not yet part of the
Government’s public domain—an early instance of international trespass on a grand scale.
But Jefferson was aware that the extent of the trans-Mississippi country and its vital
significance to the future of the Republic required the best equipped, best led, and best
educated team Federal money could buy. Lewis and Clark were told to look for a "passage
through the garden," in other words, a trade route to the Far East that traversed productive
and arable land. Specifically, they were told to observe, collect, map, draw, describe, name,
and account for everything they saw—every bird, tree, flower, insect, animal, human,
mountain, plain, gully, river, stream, and ore body they encountered.18
Lewis and Clark’s expedition may have been the most ambitious, but it was certainly
not the only such Federally sponsored exploring and mapping party sent into the public’s
domain. The two captains of discovery were followed by Pike, Long, Wilkes, Fremont,

Warren, Powell, Wheeler, Hayden, King, and Hazen—not to mention the less well-known
heads of the various railroad surveys of the 1850s. All were commissioned by Federal
officials; all were charged with making intelligible to an eager and interested Government the
extent and character of the nation’s enormous and diverse empire in the West.19
According to an 18th century observer of American life, the "two basic industries of
man" are agriculture and metals mining.20 Fanning came first, but both "played a
fundamental role in the development of civilization. "21 Farming also came first when
Americans considered the uses to which their domain might most profitably be put. Fanning
was not something a person did for a living; it was what defined that person. But the
number and prosperity of farmers was also what defined the nation which sustained them—
and which, in turn, was sustained by them. Farmers, said Jefferson, were "God’s chosen
people if ever He had a chosen people."22
This was not campaign rhetoric, and Jefferson spoke for hundreds of others of his
countrymen. At issue was not just providing food. "It is too soon yet in our country,"
Jefferson said, " to say that every man who...can find uncultivated land, shall be at liberty to
cultivate it, paying a moderate rent. But it is not too soon to provide by every possible
means that as few as possible shall be without a little portion of land. The small landholders
are the most precious part of the state.1,23 And the nation had best insure these farmers a
decent competence. It was in the general welfare. Jefferson believed that the public domain
had to be disposed of in a manner that would advance the political ideas he believed in, as
well as the peace and justice of the society he lived in. More was at stake than growing
com. Thomas Hart Benton, a Senator from Missouri, was of similar mind. America’s
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farmers must be land owners; the national soul was at issue. "Tenantry," he wrote in 1836,
is unfavorable to freedom.
It lays the foundation for separate orders in society, annihilates the love of country,
and weakens the spirit of independence...The freeholder, on the contrary, is the
national supporter of a free government and it should be the policy of republics to
multiply their freeholders...We are a republic, and we wish to continue so:
then...pass the public lands cheaply and easily into the hands of the People...24
Benton meant cheaply and easily; indeed, he meant free, as in "without charge." He
considered giving land away a bargain for the Government; gifted land was "sold for the best
of prices; for a price above gold and silver...a price above rubies." Giving the land away
would not fill the Federal Treasury with money. But Benton clearly saw the Government as
a direct beneficiary of a policy of free land.25
Not everyone agreed with Jefferson and Benton. Some critics, like Hamilton, argued
for the sale of the public lands as a source of direct, Government revenue. Others, mostly
Southern planters, thought that freeholders were the congenital enemies of slavery and that
their numbers should be reduced, not increased. These same Southerners were also
suspicious that any land giveaway would force the Government to impose tariff duties, an
indirect tax that fell disproportionately on Southerners. These were matters of frequent and
acrimonious debate.26
The first laws dealing with the disposal of arable, non- mineral lands, reflected both
this political conflict and the compromises that attempted to defuse it. There were some very
contradictory forces at work: the Government would benefit economically from the sale of
the public lands, but if the price was too high, then the Government might find itself
imperiled politically and impoverished socially. If the lands were too cheap, however, or if
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given away, some feared the depopulation of the Atlantic seaboard. Similarly, if the
minimum acreage was too great-three to six square miles was proposed—then individual
settlers would have to buy their lands from the speculators and land companies with enough
money to afford tracts of land of that size. It quickly became obvious that disposing of the
arable lands of the public domain was not going to be easy.27
Sale of the public’s lands, moreover, as surely as their free gift, would end the
Government’s ownership and control of those lands. It had, then, to make sure that the
method of disposition provided it with economic and non-economic benefits of real value—
that is, value sufficient to justify the abandonment of its ownership right.
The Land Acts of 1784, 1785, and 1796 were essentially "Hamiltonian" in intent: no
credit, large tracts, relatively high per acre cost. The Treasury was enriched, but the lands
fell to speculators and land companies. This first, stumbling effort to dispose of agricultural
lands did not adequately discharge the Government’s responsibility. On May 10, 1800 a new
land law was passed, with a distinctly Jeffersonian caste. It offered liberal credit terms,
reduced the minimum size of a purchase to 320 acres, and set the price per acre at $2.00.
Little noticed at the time was the effort of at least one representative to have the principle of
preemption written into the law. Preemption meant that "squatters" illegally living on
Federal lands had what might be called the right of first refusal. In other words, it legalized
and rewarded what was technically trespass.28
The Land Act of 1800 represented a significant shift in the Government’s definition of
its trust responsibilities. It made land available to families of modest means and increased
thereby the nation’s stock of moral capital. The law worked reasonably well. Only the credit
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provision occasioned conflict; too many settlers were defaulting. In 1804, the minimum
price and acreage were reduced, but the credit system was kept and the number of defaulting
settler/speculators continued apace. As the prominent historian, Roy Robbins, put it:
"As for those settlers who could not meet their payments, the Government
chose to grant them relief rather than allow them to forfeit their lands. After
1806, in fact, relief acts came to be passed almost as regularly as annual
appropriation bills."29
At that, as Robbins writes, though "the credit system may not have brought much money into
the national treasury, . . . the settlement of the West [occasioned by it] was of incalculable
value to the country."30 But, weary of extending relief, in 1820 Congress passed a new
Land Act that abolished the credit system. It also cut the price to $1.25 per acre and the
minimum acreage to 80.31 The spirit of Jefferson still lived.
In the meantime, thousands of land-hungry Americans continued to spread out over
unsurveyed lands without so much as a "by your leave" to the nearest land office. These
squatters were, according to one of their many critics, "lawless rabble" who were cheating
the government out of the best tracts of public lands.32 For those like Thomas Hart Benton
who believed that maximizing the economic returns minimized the political and social, the
issue of cheating was of particular moment. Nuanced arguments about trespass and the
benefits of ownership ignored both reality and what some perceived to be a Constitutional
mandate. The reality was that Americans believed that their national inheritance included the
natural right to settle the land. Had Jefferson not said as much?
The mandate was to dispose of the nation’s property in the interests of the general
welfare. A too vigorous defense of property rights against trespass would subvert that
mandate. In 1841, Benton introduced his "Log Cabin" bill establishing "squatters’ rights",
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or the right of settlers, however illegal their settlement, to buy the land with which they had
mixed their labor for the minimum price. Robbins called the 1841 Preemption Act which
arose out of Benton’s bill a "Frontier Triumph," a victory of western interests over eastern.
But it also represented a victory of the increasing number of non-westerners who defined
Government benefits in terms of the long-range development of western resources in the
national interest rather than the amount of hard coin in the Government’s vaults. By the
1840s eastern employers were beginning to understand that easy access to western lands
might drain off some of their work force, but it would also feed more cheaply those who
remained. Since the massive immigration of impoverished Irish began about this same time,
the Government’s decision to use the land laws to open up the West seemed wise and prudent
and very much in the general welfare.
Interestingly, organized labor agreed. As early as 1828 The Mechanics’ Free Press,
the nation’s first labor newspaper, asked Congress to grant to the people the right to settle all
the public lands by occupancy rather than purchase.33 Not unexpectedly, Benton agreed.
The "poor people" of America "wish to go to the West and get land; to have...their own
fields, orchards, gardens, and meadows..."34
Benton left unstated what the poor people might do if their right to the land was
denied, though there were slightly ominous implications to his statement. In 1844 Horace
Greeley was more explicit. "The public lands are the great regulator of the relations of
Labor and Capital, the safety valve of our industrial and social engine; and woe to this
people should [those lands] be alienated, or suffered to be absorbed by the few."35 Other
contemporaries suggested the spectre of social tumult and revolution.
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By the early 1840s,

following serious economic dislocations in 1819 and 1837, a certain urgency attached to the
disposal of the public domain; the western lands had become a counter-revolutionary devise,
the balance wheel of American society, the guarantor of the domestic tranquility.
Once again the Government had been called to its partnership responsibilities. It
answered with the passage in 1862 of a series of laws with far reaching implications. The
most important of these was the Homestead Act. By the terms of this momentous law,
settlers could enter upon 160 acres of the public domain’s agricultural land, file a homestead
entry, live on and improve the land for five years, and receive full title conveyed by patent
without charge. This, literally, was free land, "land for the landless, homes for the
homeless," as the more excited homestead advocates put it.36
There would be amendments to the Homestead Law in subsequent years, but the
principle of free land would survive well into the 20th century.37 And the reasons for the
passage of the Homestead Act would persist as well. The Government had always taken its
constitutional responsibilities seriously, had always known that it was accountable for the
general welfare and the common defense. As the partner of the people who had created it,
the Government had to manage the people’s business, including the disposition of the
people’s lands. The Homestead Act thus marked, as the Director of the U.S. Geological
Survey put it in 1913, "the final abandonment of the policy of disposing of the national
domain as a means of providing public revenue."38 It did not, however, represent the
abandonment of the Government’s public trust. It meant, rather, that the Government
determined that greater benefits accrued to it and to the general welfare if it disposed of the
national public domain free of charge.39

14

2.

The Government and the Railroads

But the Congress wasn’t finished. The Homestead Act had opened up Lewis and
Clark’s garden; the means of passage through it, however, remained to be built. But not for
long. The story of the Federal Government’s active and open partnership with the
transcontinental railroads has been well and frequently told. Suffice it to say for now, in the
words of Robbins, that the "largess," the "munificence," the "fostering care," of the Federal
Government was never on such full display as when it dealt with the railroads.40
Even before the Civil War, the Federal Government had evinced a certain
openhandedness in its dealings with railroads. Huge grants for rail construction were made
to the states. Eventually this policy of state grants was replaced by direct land grants to
railroad corporations.41 In 1862, not long after it had passed the Homestead Law, Congress
passed legislation authorizing the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific Railroads to construct
and maintain a railroad line from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean. The U.P. and
the Central Pacific were to build and run a line that ran from "somewhere" through
"nowhere" to "somewhere else," with the purpose of developing and exploiting that nearly
2,000-mile wide swath of economic "nowhere" in the middle. Private companies are not
prepared to shoulder the full costs of development, particularly when development meant the
peopling of a hugh expanse of plains, mountain, and basin that some at least had dismissed
as a great desert.42
Realizing this, the Government agreed to assume some of the risks. The railroads
would be built across and through Government land-and so the Government gave the land to
the railroads: more than half the non-mineral lands for ten miles on either side of their
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tracks. The construction of the railroads would be enormously expensive—and so the
Government gave them all the timber land along the route and issued bonds constituting a
first mortgage on the whole line. In 1864, the grant was doubled and the conditions for
repayment of the loan were changed. By the terms of these two acts, over 40 million acres
of land were given to the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific railroads and more than $60
million was lent.43
The precedent was set, and other railroad corporations were quick to line up and seek
the Government’s favors. The Government obliged. All told, after 1850 the Federal
Congress gave 38 million acres to twelve states and at least 180 million acres to 16 railroad
corporations (another estimate placed the total at 215 million). Almost 40 million acres of
that was to the Northern Pacific, a significant percentage of them in a twenty-mile wide
swath across Montana. On June 30, 1883 the Government was owed a grand total of $102
million by four railroad corporations. There were some critics who pointed out that giving

.

land to railroads in advance of homestead entry mocked the very principle of the Homestead
Act, but generally the Homestead and Railroad laws were considered compatible, if not quite
mutually reinforcing.44
Such generosity could be justified only if the railroads met the conditions of the grants
and continued to behave in the public interest. Some of the lines did neither, and by 1870
there were clamorous demands for the forfeiture of some railroad lands. For the next twenty
years, the demands grew in intensity until in 1890 Congress passed a law which declared
forfeit, confiscated, and returned to the public domain all "unearned" grants. It is worth
pointing out that this confiscation was of lands transferred to the railroads; obviously the
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Government did not believe that it had surrendered sovereign authority over these lands. It
had given the land away, to be sure; fee title had been conveyed to private corporations. But
the Government had given the land away for a purpose. Should the purpose not be met, the
Government clearly felt it had the legal authority to reverse the entire procedure. Almost
half of the lands deeded to railroad corporations were restored to the public domain by the
general forfeiture act of 1890.45 I will have occasion to return to this point later.
3.

The Governm ent and Imm igration

The Civil War Congress was still not through. In 1863, President Lincoln asked
Congress to consider
establishing a system for the encouragement of immigration. Although this source of
national wealth and strength is again flowing..., there is still a great deficiency of
laborers in every field of industry, especially in agriculture and in our mines...This
noble effort demands aid, and ought to receive the attention and support, of the
government.
This was not quite the same as saying the Federal Government should play the role of labor
contractor for private enterprises, but it was perilously close.46
The following year, Congress established a Bureau of Immigration with instructions to
make known in the favored parts of Europe the advantages of emigration to America. Just as
in encouraging Americans to move from east to west, the Government had basically only to
make known the terms of the Homestead Act. For Europeans, free land was a far more
powerful lure than any of the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution; for eastern
Americans, free land was the surest, if not the only, way to secure those freedoms. In either
case, as George Otis Smith of the U.S.G.S. stated in 1913, the "purpose of the laws relating
to the agricultural land is to promote the settlement of the public domain.1,47
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Obviously, there were numerous private beneficiaries of that policy. Agricultural
settlement meant that railroads, already the target of Government largess, had more traffic,
main street merchants had more customers, real estate agents did, quite literally, a land
office business. There may have been some few who clung to the belief that giving land
away deprived the Government of immediate and much needed revenues, but the majority
understood that in the long run the partnership between the Government and the people was
in the best interests of both.
To summarize, this historical context makes clear that the Government was an active
participant in the settlement process. Some have argued that it could not have been
otherwise, given the Government’s ownership of the lands. I am impatient with that
argument. It could have been otherwise.

The requirements of the Constitution could have

been met in different ways; indeed, different ways were tried. But ultimately, the policy that
most commended itself to Congress and executive alike was one of Government
"cooperation," "munificence," "largess," and "fostering care." The Government promoted,
facilitated, induced, encouraged, and generally did whatever it could reasonably and
constitutionally do to forward the settlement of the agricultural lands of the public’s domain.
History speaks loudly and in unequivocal language on this point: the Government was
a partner in the settlement of Western lands. The Government’s "fingerprints" are to be
found everywhere. If environmental damage accompanied this settlement, and clearly it did,
then the Government must look to its own "predecessors in interest," i.e. previous
administrations.
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There is much in the historical record to indicate that the Government thought of
itself as an owner as well as a partner, and that as owner, it had the right to recover fee title
from partners who violated the contract. How else can the General Forfeiture Act of 1890
be read? What other interpretation can be applied to the conditions and restrictions placed on
homestead entries or railroad land grants? How else to describe the Government’s post
settlement involvement in lands it has already transferred except by reference to an owner
protecting its property as well as its investment?
The Government had clearly established the principle of legal trespass. The "right"
of preemption, defmed by an early historian of the public lands as "the right to settle on and
improve unappropriated public lands and later buy them at the minimum price without
competition,"48 was transformed into law in 1841. It represented a kind of general amnesty
by which individual trespassers were pardoned by the owner of the lands on which these law
breakers had squatted. Preemption or "squatters’ rights, or "adverse possession, to use a
more legal analogue, meant that the owner of the lands was willing to allow trespass upon
conditions acceptable and profitable to the owner.
The Government had also established the precedent of assuming some of the risk
when an enterprise was vital to the general welfare but was also developmental, expensive,
and/or unlikely to produce profits soon enough to suit private investors. The classic example
is grants of land and long term loans to railroads. Every industrializing nation dealt with the
private-public partnership and the shared assumption of risk in different ways depending on
the resources at the disposal of the Government and the nature of the risk. In the United
States, the resource was land and the risks were those that attended the settlement and
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development of that land. The partnership took the form it did because of those particular
circumstances. The "profits" that accrued to the Government as owner and partner were not
limited to direct revenues in the Government’s coffers. Profits take many forms. Some are
financial, some are not. Some are immediate, some are not. For Governments, particularly
those resting on the will of the people, the non-financial and long- range benefits are often
far more important, and recognized to be such, than those which provide immediate
revenues.
One looks in vain for any reference to the protection of the natural environment in
any of these laws. Indeed, the only time the environment is discussed is in the context of the
exploitation of it—putting it to use to the greater glory of the American people, the firmer
foundation of the American Government. The vast majority of Americans of this earlier
generation did not have an ethic that embraced what we would call environmental awareness,
treading lightly on the earth. These are contemporary values, and though historians do and
should employ them, the application of contemporary values to earlier generations who lived
not so much in violence of them as in complete ignorance of them, who would have found
them literally inconceivable, produces bad history.

4.

The Government and its Mineral Lands

Prior to 1849, the Federal Government’s land policy was clearly driven by the need
to promote the settlement of the nation’s agricultural lands. This does not imply any absence
of Governmental interest in the metal bearing-lands in its ownership; it sent its surveyors to
find mineral lands, withdrew them from agricultural entry, retained ownership of some, and
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sent its own agents to manage them.49 Still, there was a difference in the way the
Government approached the two basic industries. There had to be.
Agricultural lands were nearly everywhere, a kind of moveable feast. But mines
were where you found them, fixed in place and finite in richness. Finding them required
more than just wandering around; exploiting them more than just felling trees and sinking a
plow. In addition, the Government had different expectations for both mines and miners.
Mining lands were supposed to yield something to the Government that owned them.50 In
the case of gold and silver mines, they were expected to produce the things from which
money was made. In other words, no Government official, during these early years anyway,
ever spoke of miners as many had spoken of farmers. America’s agricultural land laws were
crafted to produce farmers—not just crops of com and wheat. The same was not the case
with mining law. Their purpose was to produce immediate wealth—for the nation as well as
for the private parties who dug the ore. Miners had no Jefferson to speak for them; there
would be no rhapsodic references to miners as the chosen people of God, and no mineral
land laws similar in intent to the Homestead Act.
If an early policy regarding mineral lands could be said to exist it was expressed in a
Congressional resolution of 1839 that requested the President to prepare a plan that would
take into account the "amount of revenue to be derived from them, . . . their value as public
property, and . . .the equitable claims of individuals upon them." The question, in other
words, was not entirely unlike that regarding the disposal of other publicly owned lands.
The Congress wanted a policy that would be of greatest benefit to the Government. That had
been the issue with agricultural lands as well, and it translated into simple terms: sell the
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lands or give them away? Use them to raise revenue or to promote immediate settlement and
development?
In this context, it is worth noting that the Preemption Act of 1841 provided that "no
lands on which are situated any known . . . mines shall be liable to entry..."51 Preemption
was, almost literally, a give-away; trespass was made legal; and the lands were sold cheaply.
As for the mineral lands, fixed and finite, they would be leased, trespass would not be
tolerated, and the Government would count its benefits in terms of cash sales. Mining was
one thing; agriculture was a quite different-and better-thing.
The lease policy, however, was not without its critics. In his 1845 Message to the
Congress President James Polk stated boldly that
The present system of managing the mineral lands. . . is . . . radically defective.
More than a million acres of public [mineral] lands. . . have been reserved from sale,
and numerous leases upon them have been granted to individuals upon a stipulated
rent. The system of . . . leases has proved to be not only unprofitable to the
Government, but unsatisfactory to the citizens...52
The key reference was "unprofitable to the Government." Leasing meant rents, continued
public ownership, and direct cash payments to the Federal Treasury. It did not, however,
according to Polk, serve the general welfare. Polk wanted the lands "brought into market and
sold,...reserving to the Government an equitable percentage of the gross amount of mineral
product..." As for those miners then "resident" on Federal lands, the "preemption
principle..." ought to be extended to them "at the minimum price established by
Congress."53
In 1846 and 1847, the Congress passed three mineral lands acts which incorporated
most of Polk’ suggestions; it rejected his idea of royalties. These acts, abolishing leases and
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substituting cash sales, represented, according to one 19th-century expert, "a radical change
in the method of disposition of mineral lands on the public domain.. . M54
In January 1848 gold was discovered at Coloma, California. California was a long
way from Washington D .C.; it was neither a territory nor a state. Gold and silver bearing
lands had to this point in American history not been much of an issue; they had been
withheld from entry. Now and suddenly the United States was about to find itself the owner
of the richest gold lands on the planet-and without a policy to manage them.
A policy would have to be found. No one disputed that once the mines in California
were on Federal lands and that the Congress had the "Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting..." them. More to the point, no one disputed that
the definition of "needful" included providing for the common defense, promoting the
general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty. We may argue over how well the
Congress used its powers in discharging its responsibilities, but not that the Congress had the
power and took seriously the responsibilities.
President Millard Fillmore called the Congress to its duty in 1849. He had a hard
time making up his mind on the method of disposal, but he was consistent in his insistence
that the Government benefit from California’s gold. Maybe, he suggested, the gold lands
should be leased; that would "promise the largest revenue to the Government..." But leasing
had not worked well, and the rents would be hard to collect from such a distance. Better, he
concluded, that they be "divided into small parcels and sold ,.."55
Secretary of the Interior Thomas Ewing proposed a more elaborate and more fully
considered plan. He stated unequivocally that the United States owned the California gold
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lands and the gold thereon. Unfortunately, "no existing law puts it in the power of the
Executive to regulate these mines, or protect them from intrusion..." This was unacceptable
to Ewing, for reasons he carefully noted: The gold provided "no remuneration, direct or
indirect, to the Government or people..." The lands had to be disposed of "so as best to
promote the public interest..." The land had to be divided
in the best manner practicable to promote the general interest and increase the value
of the whole...The division, disposition, and management of these mines [must]...be
made a source of considerable revenue...It is due to the Nation at large that this rich
deposit of mineral wealth should be made productive...
The Government must also furnish to those who came to control these mines "such scientific
aid and directions as may enable them to conduct their operations not only to the advantage
of the Treasury, but also with convenience and profit to themselves." Finally, Ewing
suggested the establishment of a branch mint near the mines, that the U.S. Government
might more surely benefit from the first of the great California dreams.56
Secretary of the Interior Ewing was proposing a partnership between the Federal
Government and the private miners of California gold. As with all partnerships, both parties
would bring something to the enterprise, both would benefit from its success, and both would
expect the other to behave in a predictable fashion. In fact, few of Ewing’s specific
proposals became law. The point, however, is not that Ewing or Mason established the legal
/

blueprints for the new mining laws; only that they were thinking in terms of both the greatest
possible benefits to the nation and the partnership role of the Government in realizing those
benefits. The mining laws changed; those underlying principles did not.
For the next fifteen years, the U.S. Government allowed miners’ law to govern the
California gold fields. These local laws governed the scores of California mining camps and
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towns and regulated the size and conditions of mining claims. They assumed both civil and
criminal jurisdiction, dealing with everything from stealing a mule (a capital offense) to
throwing "dirt, stones, or other obstructions," to "turning the course of rivers and
streams."57
These California codes "gradually spread to the adjoining States and Territories," but
none of them from whatever district ever disputed the legitimate ownership claims of the
Federal Government. In fact, they "gave no absolute title to the m ine..." to anyone, but
continued the tested and honored American principle of legal trespass.58 The laws of the
various districts also severely limited what had to be done to hold a mining claim and what
could not be done lest the claim be forfeited. The claimant had a possessory right only and
had that only so long as he worked the land as a mine; he could not farm or raise cattle on
it; neither could he develop it for town sites or residences. It made legal the occupation of
the public’s domain, but only in the interests of developing the mineral resources on or under
that domain. The Government let these local miners laws stand, not because it had no
interest in its mineral lands, but because its interests were so completely protected by the
laws in place.
After statehood but before the passage of the 1866 Mining Law, the California courts
and legislature declared the codes binding in all matters relating to the possessory title to
mining claims.59 Two other 19th century experts on mining law wrote that the California
courts, in order
to give a legal title to those who under these customary regulations were mining upon
the public domain, adopted the fiction that the first appropriator of the public mineral
land had a license to mine from the government, and if, [the miner] complied with the
regulations...that license was protected as a property right."60 (emphasis added)

The codes, in other words, were not sufficient to establish ownership in fee. After all, no
money had been paid for title transfer and no mining Homestead Act had been passed~or
was likely to be. But the ground was not important except as a place to put mine buildings;
what was on or under it was all that mattered and in the management of that resource, the
mining laws were ideal. Thomas Donaldson put it best in his 1883 Government document on
The Public Domain: These laws "sprang from the sterling good sense of the American
miner...They...protected and controlled the possession, and provided for the distribution of
hundreds of millions of dollars of property, and affected the people of a half million square
miles of territory."61
Donaldson’s next statement defines the historical issue: "The Congress of the United
States, by the act of general mining, July 26, 1866, and the supplemental act of May 10,
1872, confirmed these local usages. ”62 The Mining Act of 1872, which incorporated the
acts of 1866 and 1870, was based on Western miners’ laws developed in the 1840s and 50s.
Thus, it included the principle of occupying and developing the resources of land that did not
belong to the miner claiming it. It moved the matter one large step by giving to the claimant
the option of securing full title to the land at a later time by cash purchase. This was the
preemption or "squatter’s rights" idea applied to the mineral lands. Indeed, according to a
recent U.S. Government publication, the Act of 1866 legalized "what would otherwise be a
trespass."63
Since it makes no sense that persons can trespass on their own land, this statement
from a Federal Government publication makes explicit that the Mining Acts of 1866, 1870,
and 1872 did not remove the Government as the owner of the land on which a mining claim
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was filed. The historical record is filled with references to the fact that the Government
continued to own the land to which claimants had only occupational and possessory rights.
At issue are the Mining Laws of 1866, 1870, and 1872. Each permitted American citizens—
as well as those who intended to become citizens—to file a claim on Government land,
whether surveyed or not, for purposes of locating, exploring, developing, and exploiting for
profit the mineral resources of the claimed ground.
There were, first of all, some minimum and incidental fees associated with filing the
claim. Moreover, holding the claim required that the ground be shown to contain a valuable
deposit of minerals and that it could be profitably mined, requirements that made
transparently clear that the Government wanted paying mines, not environmentally sensitive
ones. To tie patentability to profitability clearing discouraged~if it did not outright prohibit—
miners from spending any money on protecting the environment. The claimant had also to
spend $100 in cash and labor in developing the property as a mine. At a time when the
average industrial worker made less than $500.00 per year, that was a lot of money. The
claimant had also to be in actual possession of the site. The miners could also file a claim
for five acres of land not contiguous to the mining claim and not on mineral lands for the
construction of ore-processing facilities.

Full title to these mining and processing claims

could be purchased by the original claimants (or by parties to whom they had sold their
claim) from the Federal Government for from $2.50 to $5.00 per acre. The title was to be
transferred by patent. The law did not require a claimant to patent the lands; theoretically, a
claimant could continue his legal trespass indefinitely.
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Careful readers will detect in these laws clear echoes from the 1841 Preemption Act:
legal trespass, occupation and improvement of the resource, and first option for cash
purchase. But the similarities go beyond these. There are also some compelling similarities
in the historical context. The principle of preemption marked the abandonment of the idea
that Government benefits from the disposal of its public domain were best defined in terms
of the revenues to be derived. The Government, in other words, did not reward squatters in
1841, give agricultural land away in 1862, or allow and reward later trespassers on its
mineral lands simply because it was in a benevolent mood.
Two of the three major Mining Acts were identified as "laws to promote the mining
resources of the United States." The Government wanted to promote the development of its
mineral resources, and it turned private industry loose as the instrument of that development.
It even understood that some miners and mining companies might turn a dollar or two in the
process. But the Government, and the entire people whom that Government represented and
whose interests it was constitutionally required to protect and advance, would benefit from
the development of these mineral lands. And it was in that context that it opened them to
claim and location settlement.
There are other similarities between 1841 and 1866-72.

In the former year, the

United States was just beginning to pull out of the most wrenching economic depression in its
history. Anything that might stimulate the settlement of the Western lands was seen as
contributing to that recovery. In 1866, the country faced a fiscal problem no less severe.
The Union had been preserved, but at enormous cost—economically, politically, and socially.
The national debt was, by the standards of the day, enormous. But, by those same
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standards, a national debt was a national reproach. Honorable Governments paid their debts.
It made no sense to preserve the Union against the Confederacy and then squander it by
playing fast and loose with the public purse.64
The mineral lands would prove to be of huge significance in paying off the debt.
Even before the war was over, the Congress began to consider how best to use the gold and
silver bearing lands of the West. During times of peace, it was possible to argue that the
greatest benefit would result from letting nature take its course. But the Civil War changed
that, and the administration began looking for some way to realize income from the western
lands.
The possibility of taxing mine production was considered. Some in Congress even
proposed that the Government appropriate the mines and either operate them or supervise
their operation. Others thought of reserving title to minerals and requiring the claim holders
to pay an established tax on profits. None of these suggestions ever became law, but they
indicate that Congress knew that it held title to the lands--indeed, that it had the power to
own and operate the mines.65
The war had scarcely ended when Secretary of the Interior John P. Usher pushed
again for turning the mineral lands into an immediate source of revenue. He estimated that
200,000 to 300,000 men were mining precious metals on the public lands "without any
authority of law," and "paying nothing for the privilege." That was trespass on a grand
scale, but it came at a time when, as Usher went on to say,
the existing financial condition of the Nation obviously require[d] that all our national
resources and the product of every industrial pursuit should contribute to the payment
of the public debt. The wisdom of Congress must decide whether the public interest
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would be better promoted by a sale in fee of these mineral lands, or by raising a
revenue from their annual product. ',66
I have found nothing to indicate what Usher thought of the "wisdom of Congress" in passing
the Mining Act of 1866. He likely considered the law unwise; it neither sold in fee nor
taxed the annual product. He would not have been the only one of that persuasion.
But the majority of lawmakers was of a different mind. By 1866, the argument over
the relative advantages to the Government of disposal by sale and disposal by gift was more
than a half century old. The lands at issue were mineral rather than agricultural, but the
debate was couched in the same terms once employed by Hamilton and Jefferson.
Senator William Stewart of Nevada spoke for those who believed that large returns,
even if indirect and deferred, were preferable to small returns however direct and immediate.
Those returns, moreover, were not just financial. Like many others, Stewart felt that more
was at stake than balancing the books. Debts had to be paid if the national honor were not
to be besmirched. Stewart minced no words. He wished "to affix the indelible stamp of
infamy upon that timorous or wicked class who would raise the dishonest cry of
repudiation..."67 As another believer in "moral money" put it, "Atheism is not worse in
religion than an unstable or irredeemable currency in political economy."68 Obviously,
people felt strongly on this point, as the rancorous debates over gold, silver, and greenbacks
would indicate.
The author of the post-Civil war Mining Laws, Stewart had much experience with
western mining. He knew of the risks, knew that mining rocks in place in underground
lodes required massive infusions of money and men, and knew, as a consequence of both that
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it would "not do to sell the land in advance of discovery. ...It would be a national calamity
to adopt any system that would close [the western] region to the prospector. "69
It is worth looking closely at Stewart’s words. Miners understood that veins of ore
did not conform to triangulated survey techniques. Ore veins apexed on the surface but then
proceeded below ground, widening, narrowing, dividing, crossing and undercutting other
veins and always at angles unknown and unpredictable.70 The surface of mineralized lands
could look like the next El Dorado. The underground reality could reveal a vein making
right turns, left turns, and U-turns and ending up with most of its riches under the claim
adjoining the apex claim.71
The days of greenhorns wandering around tripping over gold nuggets were over.
Mining was a high-risk/high reward enterprise of great importance to the general welfare. If
that sounds a lot like my previous definition of transcontinental railroads—going from
somewhere through nowhere to somewhere else—it should. Mining and railroading were
both "developmental" enterprises. Once the "nowhere" in the middle had been developed,
the railroads could to a certain extent stand on their own; once the quartz lodes had been
found and the mines, mills, and smelters built, so-to a certain extent—could the mining
companies.
At issue was whether private railroad and mining companies would or could wait out
the developmental stage of their enterprise. The issue can be debated endlessly. The
important point historically is that the Government did not think so and, with such vital
national interests at stake, determined to form a partnership with both. For railroading, the
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partnership meant land grants and loans; for mining, it meant a free shot at prospecting, the
right to explore and develop without having to buy the land.
The intent, then, was for the Government to share the risks and thereby encourage
capital and exploration work that would otherwise find other and safer investments. If the
claimed land proved out, if sufficient valuable minerals were found, then the claimant could
file for final patent and own the land. If it did not prove out, then the claimant could decide
not to patent and walk away. The law further acknowledged the uncertainty of mining by
providing that if homesteads had been established and no mines discovered on designated
mineral lands, the mining claimants could exercise commutation and preemption rights and
purchase the land at $1.25 per acre. Government ownership derived from and was continued
for reasons of shared risk.72
In all of this, the Government surrendered none of its ownership rights, including the
benefits that arose from that ownership. By this time in our national history, the
Government had become well used to indirect benefits, had come to know, in fact, that using
the land to raise revenues actually worked against the general welfare. California gold and
Comstock silver poured into the economy; the national debt shrank. The Congress
understood the connection. Indeed, the Congress had anticipated it.73
In 1868 Rossiter Raymond, one of the best known mining geologists in America, was
appointed Commissioner of Mining Statistics and charged with compiling data on all of the
West’s producing and potential mines. The Federal Government’s involvement in this
enterprise is itself of significance, but of greater interest is that Raymond was assigned to the
Treasury Department. It was the Treasury that dealt with the redemption of greenbacks, that
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coined and minted money, and it was the Treasury that had to pay off the national debt and
save the nation’s honor. The Secretary of the Treasury understood perfectly the way the
lines of private and public interest intersected. In his instructions to Raymond he noted
specifically "the special needs of the great mining interest [and] how it can be encouraged
and rendered most productive..." He did not mean "most productive" to private mining
interests. The Secretary wanted to know "to what extent and in what instances government
might properly lend its aid to facilitate the development of the mines..." The Secretary’s
purposes, however, were uniquely and exclusively governmental. Productive western mines
could "arrest the present annual decrease in the production of bullion. "74 Bullion was
money, coin of the realm, and the realm took a direct interest in finding money.
A year later, in language as unequivocal as it was revealing, President Ulysses S.
Grant told the American people in his inaugural address that
It looks as though Providence had bestowed upon us a strong box in the precious
metals locked up in the sterile mountains of the far west and which we are now
forging the key to unlock, to meet the very contingency that is now upon us.
Ultimately it may be necessary to insure the facilities to these riches, and it may be
necessary also that the general government should give its aid to secure this access.75
In the context of the 1866 Act to Promote the Development of the Mineral Resources
of the United States, Grant’s reference to the "key" to the "strong box" does not require
much sophisticated analysis. Forcing miners to buy the land before they knew--or even had
reasonable right to suspect—that the land would pay, would foreclose on exploration. Wise
nations did not waste Providential gifts.
There were still some who disagreed. Rep. George Julian of Indiana opposed
Stewart’s bill in 1865 and sought its repeal in 1870. Julian wanted to subdivide mineral
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lands into small tracts and sell them at public auction.76 Obviously, he wanted to terminate
the partnership and remove the Government as owner of the unpatented mining lands.
Julian’s efforts failed; the Congress actually voted to extend the 1866 law to include placer
claims.77 The partnership, including Government ownership of the lands, remained intact.
For the first time, the miner of the gold and silver so necessary to square the Civil
War debt and keep the country’s honor intact came in for favorable comment. The miner
was still not quite on the same level of social value as the yeoman farmer, but he was getting
close. Americans began speaking of mining, as they had always spoken of agriculture, as
one of the "basic industries." Miners—like farmers—were members of the "producing
classes"; they created real wealth by doing honest labor, coaxing the earth to give up its
treasures. But the American miner was more than just an honest toilsmen. His workshop
was in the great mountains of the distant West. He was a pioneer. One member of the
Senate Committee on Mines and Mining argued that the nation must deal generously with
those who would develop its mineral resources; they were "brave men who have established
a high civilization on the far-off Pacific." Their "hearts, in the nation’s trials, beat so true,"
and they should be made to feel that the government was not their "master, but [their]
brethren and friends."78
The government’s mining laws were drafted with the object of promoting the mining
interests of the West. As noted, that meant sharing some of the risks by allowing the
development of the land to precede ownership of the land. But, as always, more was at
stake than mining gold.
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Pioneering went through stages, and the first of them was a bit rough and tumble.
Permanent communities needed to replace mining "camps"--the very word connoted pitching
and breaking. Families did not live in camps; they created and required homes. Let other
settler nations develop their resources by sending out armies of single men to plunder both
the resources and themselves. America, so the dream had it, would insure that its resources
provided the opportunity to build new homes. And this, according to California Senator
Aaron Sargent, is what the locator/claim provisions of the 1866, 1870 and 1872 M ining
Laws would do. "The effect," Sargent promised, "will be that our mining population will be
attached to the soil, that they will be changed from the nomadic, wandering character which
they now have to settled communities..."79
State and territorial governors, including Montana’s Sidney Edgerton, were at least as
friendly. In an 1864 speech, Edgerton praised the "all enduring energy and patient research
of the hardy miner." From them would come the "wealth that is to sustain [the
Government’s] credit and redeem its promises... every miner...is an ally of Government."80
T.A. Rickard, a mining engineer and a champion of Western mining, agreed. He described
the miner as "not only the pioneer, but he left marks to show his way; he blazed the trail for
civilization. "81
Duane Smith, a leading historian of Western mining, describes the pioneer miner: the
miner was no pariah or environmental vandal, but rather the fmest and fullest expression of
the intrepid pioneer. Smith goes on to explain: "... the keystone conviction [was] that
mining and the success of America marched inseparably, hand in hand, and that the industry
bestowed only bounties. Cursed indeed was the state or district that did not have mineral
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deposits."82 Western mining underwrote and carried the American economy; gold and
silver paid the bills; copper transported the electricity that powered the factories.83 And, as
Duane Smith reminds us, "Nowhere was there any mention of environmental concern."84
5.

The United States Geological Survey

The ultimate test of ownership might well be what the Government did after the
passage of the Mining Act of 1872, on the logical assumption that if someone walks like an
owner and talks like an owner there is a good probability that someone is the owner. In the
historical case before us, good probability becomes absolute certainty. My reference is to
the formation in 1879 of the United States Geological Survey.
Some of the material that follows was taken from the 1980 publication of Mary C.
Rabbitt, Minerals. Lands, and Geology for the Common Defense and General Welfare, vol.
I. Before 1879: A History of Public Lands. Federal Science and Mapping Policy, and
Development of Mineral Resources in the United States Rabbit provides not only some
historical information but also a real indication of what one branch of the United States
Geological Survey thought of its historical responsibilities.
Given the importance I attach to the U .S.G .S., I will state my basic thesis at the
outset. The Government was a partner with private miners. The partnership took the form
of the Government permitting the miners the right of legal trespass on Government owned
lands. The Government brought to the partnership the land on which the enterprise took
place. But like all partnerships, the Government’s arrangement with private mining interests
was expected to benefit both parties, and both parties had, then, a responsibility to look after
the business and see that it profited. The question is the method the Government chose to
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look after its ownership interests and protect its property. A broad and not very subtle hint
is provided by the following sequence: The Mining Law of 1866 was passed on July 26; two
davs later, the Congress appropriated $10,000 for the collection o f "reliable statistical
information concerning the gold and silver mines of the Western States and Territories." The
Government was inventorying its assets, as any good and prudent owner would.85
As discussed previously, the classification of Government lands required a study of
those lands to determine their resource values. Both the Federal and the State Governments
engaged in these reconnaissance surveys. In the 1850s, as the interest in a transcontinental
railroad grew, the Government commissioned survey teams to seek out the best route for the
projected line. Then, after the Civil War the Government sponsored four separate surveys.86
There were good and compelling reasons for this flurry of activity. Careful, disinterested
science may have been among them--but so was economic development. The West of the
immediate post-Civil-War era was unfamiliar terrain, a land of mystery and contrast, a
geographical conundrum. It was also, however, the place of California gold and, by the
1860s, Montana, Idaho, Colorado, and Nevada gold and silver. The Mining Laws were the
Government’s answer to the question of the disposal of the mineral lands in this Great West.
The four surveys were the Government’s agents in the field, the protectors of its property,
the advance agents of its future investment.87
The tangled story of these four surveys need not be retold here. Suffice it to say that
in 1879 the Congress consolidated the work of all four into one central Survey located in the
Department of the Interior. Mary Rabbit makes the interesting observation that the formation
of the Survey was a belated acknowledgement by the Government that mining was as
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important as agriculture; America’s farmers were recognized in 1862 with the formation of
the Department of Agriculture. The U.S.G.S. was the miners’ turn.88
Senator Abram Hewitt of New York offered a more detailed statement of the point in
1878. Rabbit identified him as the "author of the legislation creating the Geological Survey,"
and he remained one of its staunchest legislative allies. It would be hard to imagine a more
forceful statement of the partnership role of the Government in the development of Western
mining than that offered by Hewitt. He was speaking in the Senate in support of his motion
to create a united Geological Survey.
Nations become great and independent as they develop a genius for grasping the
forces and materials of nature within their reach and converting them into a steady
flowing stream of wealth and comfort...W ithout a sound knowledge of the facts of
nature it is not possible to develop a healthy material growth. It was this conviction
which gave birth to the national surveys, and disjoined as they have been no man can
estimate the value, scientific and material, of the results already achieved.
He continued, offering up some remarkable references and images:
What is there in this richly endowed land...which may be dug, or gathered, or
harvested, and made a part of the wealth of America and of the world, and how and
where does it lie? ...It is to the solution of these questions, the greatest of all national
problems, that the scientific surveys of the public domain should be directed. For the
manifold wants, for the daily and hourly need of the Government and the people, a
comprehensive and accurate survey is now deemed to be a necessity. The need of_a
thorough survey for the wise organization and distribution of American industry is jn
the future as imperative as a constitution on which to found our laws,89
Essentially what Hewitt was saying was that the Geological Survey should roam the West
exploring, studying, seeking out ore bodies and marking them with large and conspicuous
"bullseyes." The bullseyes marked the spot. Dig here!
"Captains of industry," Hewitt went on, agreed entirely with the partnership he was
proposing—small wonder. But Hewitt was no corporate shill. It was vital to the general
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welfare and the common defense-as vital as the Constitution itself—that Governments
manage "these immeasurable elements of national wealth [and]...place...the elements of
future prosperity upon the firm and enduring basis, of truth and knowledge, from which they
cannot be moved so long as the Republic shall endure. He sat down to thunderous
applause.90
The first Director of the new United States Geological Survey was Clarence King, a
preeminent mining geologist. Hewitt had pinned much on the Geological Survey; King’s
task must have been a daunting one. In his first report, King concentrated almost exclusively
on the mining industry because, as he said, it was "most directly applicable to the material
development of that great extent of mountain territory opened up by the Pacific Railroad."
King’s reference to the mountains and to the Pacific Railroad are instructive. The railroad
was to serve the needs of both agriculture and mining. The formation of the Geological
Survey marked, then, the transition from an overwhelmingly agricultural economy to an
industrial one, a transition that quite literally could not have occurred without the active
involvement of the Federal Government. There may be more important transitions in
American history, but there cannot have been many. This unremarkable historical argument
serves as a kind of leitmotif of Rabbitt’s Government-sponsored account of the first century
of the U .S.G .S.91
It is probably not necessary to add that mining men from every part of the West were
listening when Hewitt and King spoke, that expectations began to form in their minds, and
that they began preparing to act on those expectations. Mines, mills, and smelters would be
built on those expectations; vast sums of money would be invested, the lives of millions of
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people would be impacted. There are undoubtedly "successors in interest" to these early
mining companies who wish that their predecessors had not listened so attentively~or at least
had not believed so thoroughly—as the Government entered into this partnership. But in
fairness to those 19th-century mining m en-and Marcus Daly must surely be counted among
them—the Government did sound sincere and it did speak clearly and often.
Joseph S. Wilson, the Commissioner of the General Land Office, had said as early as
1868 that "The proper development of the...mineral wealth of the country is a matter of the
highest concern to our people."92 But it was Clarence King who made clear exactly what
"matter of highest concern" meant. In his 1880 Report, King offered a lesson in what would
now be called the speculative philosophy of history. It was quite a lesson.
In the history of the United States, whatever may be the final adjustment of the
machinery of National government—upon one great field of American activity, the
pride of to-day and the judgment of the future will agree. That field is the
development of our material resources. In the industrial conquest of a continent the
tide of victory has never ebbed. In possessing ourselves of this broad, virgin area,
we have shown a power unprecedented in the slower past—to discern, to seize, and to
utilize the national wealth with which the United States is so liberally endowed. With
an energy never relaxed, with an originality which has revolutionized and improved
nearly all industrial methods, we grasp the problem of material development, and
grasping, solve it...93
Believing as he did that the development of natural resources was more important and
more determinative even than the "final adjustment of the machinery of National
government," it should occasion no surprise that King saw it as "his duty to bend the
energies of the Bureau...to the production of immediate results of strictly practical value...94
King had a ready answer for those who might argue that this was not the proper role of the
Government. It "can never be refuted," he said, "that the Federal Government alone can
successfully prosecute the noble work of investigating and making known the natural mineral
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wealth of the country [and the] current modes of mining and metallurgy...95 As long as the
Congress continued to fund it, the U.S.G.S. could continue to "carry forward this work and
contribute powerful aid to the mineral industries."96
No responsible Government official had ever said anything like that about any other
industry! Com and wheat were important; so was cotton; so were hides and furs. But gold,
silver, and copper were special, and the Government afforded them a special and unique
status. And the mining men continued to listen.
King’s Report probably made its way to Montana by 1881. Marcus Daly was getting
ready to convert some mining properties in Butte from silver to copper and to build a stateof-the-art smelter to reduce the copper ores. In order to carry out that dream, Daly had to
persuade Lloyd Tevis, James Ben Ali Haggin, and William R. Hearst to invest many millions
of their dollars in the enterprise. Daly had to have been worried about a number of aspects
of his plan—water, power, markets, labor force-and he had to have wondered whether he
would be able to allay the doubts and fears of his potential backers. This was nervous work,
a high risk business. About one thing, however, he was not worried. He knew where the
Government stood.
King only headed the survey for two years, but none of his successors departed
significantly from the standard he had set. John Wesley Powell, who immediately followed
King, told the American Institute of Mining Engineers in 1882 that "the great agencies of
government" complemented the work of the mining engineers. Engineers (Powell called
them "scientific artisans") had to have a sound basis in structural geology if they were "to
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develop individual mines and...discover the sites of ore-bodies and other valuable deposits,
and to develop the machinery for the working of mines, and metallurgical processes..."97
There were few references even in Powell’s reports to what would now be called pure
geology, few references, for example, to geology as a method of inquiry, or to using geology
to date the age of the earth. Government-sponsored geology existed for one reason: to draw
bullseyes on the ground. The examples are legion. In 1887, T.A. Rickard said that Samuel
Franklin Emmons’s monograph on the Leadville, Colorado district
...gave the mining companies a series of maps that to the mining engineer were as
charts whereby he steered the course of his exploration...98
Ten years later, a Memorial from the Colorado legislature to Congress made the same point.
"Let the Survey stand between them (the prospector and the mining engineer) and nature,
demonstrating...where the prospector may and where he may not prospect to advantage for
this or that valuable mineral."99
Mary Rabbit quotes the 1894 remarks of then-director Charles Walcott: "The survey
should be carried on as a strictly scientific investigation, with the view of aiding in every
possible manner the development of such material industries as are affected by it."100
When King selected Walcott as one of the Survey’s first employees, he assured "the mining
interests" that Walcott "will use his best efforts to carry out the work to the advantage of all
the mining communities in the country. " Walcott understood that the Federal Government
owned the mining lands that had not been patented; understood that, as its contribution to the
partnership, the Government made these lands available to private interests; knew that the
Government expected to benefit from this arrangement; and as surely as Clarence King, saw
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his agency’s role as the guardian/inspector of the Government’s property and the protector of
the Government’s investment.101
The "mining interests" saw it that way, too. In 1897, for example, Senator George
Perkins of California proposed a commission consisting of the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, the Commissioner of Labor, and the Director of the Geological Survey "to
determine the best method of ascertaining all the facts of general importance relating to
mines and mining within the United States..."102 The inclusion of the Commissioner of
Labor is instructive and relates back to my earlier reference to the Government as labor
contractor for the Western mines. The Minine and Scientific Press endorsed Perkins’s idea.
This industry organ did not expect much from the Commissioner of the General Land Office
but a great deal from the Director of the Geological Survey: "The exceptionally good work
that he has done while in that office, in making the survey of value, from an economic
standpoint, to the mining industry, gives promise..." Walcott "appreciates the value of the
work that can be done to aid mining...no money spent can bring larger returns, nor add more
to the wealth of the country, than upon the economic work of the geological survey."103
Obviously, Montana’s mining interests were not ignored in all of this. At the moment
of its statehood, the Federal Government gave to Montana 100,000 acres of the public’s
domain "for the establishment and maintenance of a school of mines. "1(M There had been
some Congressional discussion of the advisability—and constitutionality—of establishing a
national university of mining. Other nations had them; there were many who thought we
needed one.105 The Congress, however, was averse to the notion; military academies were
one thing, a United States Academy of Mining and Allied Sciences another.106 But the
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Morrill Act was already in place. The Federal Government was providing land for the study
of the agricultural and mechanical arts, and similar land grants to the mining states for state
mining schools suggested itself.
The Montana School of Mines ("Tech") was founded in 1895. The school opened in
1900 and graduated its first class in 1903.107 In 1910, Congress created the Bureau of
Mines and in 1919, Tech entered into a working relationship with both the Bureau and the
Geological Survey.108 Tech’s service to the mining industry of the state is undisputed.
As for the Geological Survey itself, Montana, particularly the Butte district, was a
frequent field for its research efforts. Samuel Emmons, the Survey’s leading mining
geologist, was in Butte in 1891. He returned four years later accompanied by Director
Walcott. In 1896, W.H. Weed was assigned to Butte to do detailed areal surveys. He would
spend most of the next four years in and around the Montana mining capital, becoming the
Survey’s "copper expert."

By then, of course, Butte was preeminently a copper town,

producing 270,738,489 pounds of the red metal in 1900 alone. And by then, the Metals
Division of the Geological Survey had identified copper as more important economically than
either gold or silver.109 It is uncertain how long Weed stayed in Butte after his field work
ended in 1900. It is certain that he was still publishing papers about Butte and its copper
mines as late as 1912. Little wonder that Montana Senator Thomas Carter thought of the
U.S.G.S. as the "best Geological Survey conducted by any government in Christendom."110
It is important that the General Survey’s story not be left in the 19th century. In
1902 the U.S.G.S. published Contributions to Economic Geology. It was 449 pages long
and contained 59 contributions from 33 geologists. All told, there were ten reports on
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precious metals, nine on copper, and four on lead and zinc. It was distributed free of
charge.111 Its usefulness to the mining industry was obvious. In her openly celebratory
centennial history of the Survey, Mary Rabbitt offers up this summation of U.S.G.S.
activities during its first 25 years from 1879 to 1904. She allows that the values of 1904
were not the same as those of 1980 but that "from the viewpoint of 1904, the following
achievements were considered noteworthy: a topographical map of 929,850 square miles;
1,327 atlas sheets; geological mapping of 171,000 square miles; 106 geological folios;
discharge rates of all the important rivers; classification of 110,000 square miles of lands as
forest, grazing, desert, or cultivable."112
That’s quite a list by the standards of any era. But Rabbitt concludes, presumably
from the viewpoint of pre-CERCLA 1980, that
...o f all the work of the Geological Survey...its immediate value to the people was
best shown by the aid extended in developing the mineral resources...in which the
people, as well as Federal and State governments, were interested. . ." 113
The Geological Survey, for its first 100 years had no trouble understanding that the people
and the Government were not distinct entities; that the Government and the people were the
partners of private mining interests; that the Government owned the land on which these
mining interests were doing business; that the Government directly benefitted from that
partnership; and that it was—and is—sophistry to deny any part of that historical record.
The Engineering and Mining Journal also knew what the relationship was. It wrote in
1904 that "in no other country has economic geology been applied to the development of
industry with such beneficent results as in the United States, and no geological survey has
contributed so much to the practical application of the science of geology in mining
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operations as has the [Geological Survey]"114 This is a striking statement in large part
because of its reference to other countries. Of all the industrializing nations of the late 19th
and 20th centuries, the U.S. was thought the least dependent upon the Government’s
"fostering care." That presumption may, in fact, be true—in all cases except mining. In that
area the partnership was close, durable, and mutually beneficial.
It is also important to point out that this partnership was not some kind of "frontier"
aberration that the United States abandoned upon reaching its post-frontier maturity. In fact,
the 20th century witnessed a spiralling expansion of public/private partnerships. In this
context, the U.S.G.S. was ahead of its time, and when Director George Otis Smith spoke the
language of partnership in 1913 and 1914, he did so in terms that would have resonated with
Clarence King as surely as they did with Progressives of Smith’s own era. It was the work
of the Survey, for example, that led to the 1912 amendment to the Mining Law of 1872
allowing for claims on lands with no obvious surface mineralization; Survey bullseyes
marking the spot were now located underground.115 In 1914, Smith published another
bulletin entitled Our Mineral Reserves: How to Make America Industrially Independent.
Needless to add, industrial independence was something devoutly to be hoped for, especially
when much of the rest of the world was at war. The Geological Survey was indispensable in
achieving it. As Smith put it in 1915, "the development of mineral resources is of nation
wide value and the promotion of their best use properly . . . a national duty."116
I have spent considerable time discussing what the Mining Laws and the U.S.G.S.
had to say about mining. Brief mention should also be made to what the Mining Laws and
the U.S.G.S. declined to say about mining. There is no reference in the Mining Laws, no
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reference in Mary Rabbitt’s two volume history of the U .S.G .S., no reference in the
documents generated by the Geological Survey that I have consulted, to the issue of what the
Federal Government thought about the disposal of mine, mill, and smelter wastes, other than
a few references that the Federal Government thought the states, territories and local mining
districts ought to deal with that issue.
It is possible that the Federal Government was determined to show a proper restraint
in respect to the rights of the States. It is possible. It is not likely. What is likely is that
the Federal Government understood the need for mines to flourish in order to achieve the
manifest destiny for the West and accommodated the particular needs for industrial pursuits
over preservation. Since the Federal Government was confident that local authorities shared
this view of economic viability, leaving the matter to local authority was entirely consistent
with laws "to promote the development of the nation’s mineral resources." Until quite
recently, there were no laws to protect the purity of the nation’s water, and only a few to
protect the economic interests of downstream users from the despoliations of those upstream.
Indeed, promoting clean water interfered with the promotion of mining. The Government
knew this. In 1901 and 1905, after the formation of Federal forest reserves, it passed laws
granting rights-of-way "...for...ditches, flumes, pipes, tunnels, and canals for mining
purposes and for the purposes of milling and reduction of ores."117
The above reference to Federal knowledge of state policies and attitudes is also
deserving of some attention. There is no indication that the U.S.G.S. did not study Western
mines, mills, and smelters as thoroughly as Western mining men studied U.S.G.S. reports.
W.H. Weed, by way of obvious and conspicuous example, was in Butte off and on—mostly
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on--for twelve years. He made copious notes about metals operations in and around the city.
He had full access to those mines, mills, and smelters regardless of whether they were on
patented or unpatented land.118 How could the U.S.G.S. have done its jo b -a job the
mining industry desperately wanted it to do—unless its field men had access to mines, mills,
and smelters?
The historical record makes an absolutely compelling case for Government ownership
of Government lands subject to unpatented mining claims. So do the following specific
examples. First, the Government put severe restrictions on what must occur on claimed
land, and it made abundantly clear what could not occur. The claimant had to mine the land;
he could not do anything else. Second, the Government had the clear right to evict from the
claimed land anyone who was not doing what the Government required by law to be done.
This included miners who did not put in the requisite amount of time and money, as well as
those who left the claim without clear intention of returning. Upon eviction, the claim was
forfeited and the land opened up to new and more obedient claimants.
Third, the Government clearly distinguished between "priority of title" and "priority
of possession." The former, which accompanied the patent, was superior to the latter, which
accompanied the claim. In cases of conflict, patent trumped claim every time.

As section

14 of the 1872 law put it, " . . . where two or more veins intersect or cross each other,
priority of title shall govern..."119 In another case from 1882, the Secretary of the Interior
overruled his Commissioner of the General Land Office in the matter of the right of Rico,
Colorado to file a townsite claim versus the rights of three stamp mills operating on
unpatented mining claims within the "city limits" of the proposed town of Rico. The
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Secretary made his point clearly: The mill owners had no rights that Rico and the Federal
Government were obliged to respect for the simple reason that the mill owners did not own
the land on which their mills were placed.120
The Government relied on this same reasoning in 1910 in a suit against Anaconda
Copper Mining Company (ACMC) for damage allegedly done by ACMC’s smelter
operation. Specifically, the Department of Justice demanded that the Anaconda Company
quit killing the Government’s trees with the sulfur dioxide emitted from the smelter’s stack.
The Government, in other words, was a plaintiff seeking relief for damages to timber
resources on land it owned. An investigation of the lands for which the Government asserted
its ownership and pled for damages turned up no fewer than 30 unpatented mining
claims.121
There is one other piece of specific evidence for Government ownership. Since this
is a Montana case, I will again tell a Montana story. According to the Revised Statutes of
the Territory of Montana, 1879, "mines and mining claims" would not be taxed unless held
under a patent from the United States."122 The same rules obtained after statehood.
According to the Montana Constitution of 1889, Section 2, "the property of the United
States...shall be exempt from taxation..." This was not a matter that occasioned debate;
states could not and cannot tax Federal property. Section 3 elaborates on what this
exemption meant. "All mines and mining claims, both placer and rock in place..., after
purchase thereof from the United States, shall be taxed at the price paid the United States
therefor..."123 The states could tax the buildings on the claims; they could tax the
machinery, and, if they wished, the ore drawn from the mines.124 But, in the plainest
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possible language, the States could not tax lands subject to unpatented mining claims because
the Federal Government was the owner of the land.
Federal officials, moreover, were fully aware of this exemption—as it applied to
Montana or anywhere else in the West. George Otis Smith called specific and critical
attention to it in 1914, pointing out that "until patent is issued no taxes are assessable by the
State and many producing mines refrain from patenting in order to avoid taxation." There
are no data for 1914 on this point but in 1880, of more than 200,000 claims filed, only 5,281
had been patented. There may have been other reasons for so many miners to allow the
Government to continue to own the land, but tax "evasion" had to have been among the
major ones.125 Smith believed that "a limit to the number of years that a claim may be
held pending the institution of patent proceedings would correct this abuse."126
Whether the Mining Acts "abused" the states is doubtful, in large part because the
same laws that denied the state the power to tax lands subject to unpatented mining claims,
turned over to those same states a far greater and more important power. Let the Law of
1866 speak to this point:
...in the absence of necessary legislation by Congress, the local legislature of any
state or territory may provide rules for working mines involving easements, drainage,
and other necessary means to their complete development; and those conditions shall
be fully expressed in the patent.127
In other words, laws affecting the disposal of mine, mill, and smelter wastes and tailings
were left entirely to the states and territories.
Montana took especially seriously the reference to "complete development," and in
both Territorial and State codes gave to miners, whether working Government land or their
own, the right to build and use flumes and ditches at their mines and mills "to carry water
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and tailings therefrom." The state used various means to convey this right: eminent domain,
water decrees, easements, and rights-of-way. All were used to the same purpose: to provide
"outlets, natural or otherwise, for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter
from mines."128
The consequences of that State policy were predictable-and known to the Federal
Government. I will offer only one example. In 1900, John Boyle, State Inspector of Mines,
reported on "the growth of the mineral industry," which he said "has been little short of
fabulous...enough to make the name of Montana famous in all lands..."

As to the costs of

this fabulous growth, Boyle was nonchalant. His report was about the Butte district through
which Silver Bow Creek made its way. He described the creek as "a...small sized stream,
loaded beyond its carrying capacity with refuse of tailings from the reduction w orks."129
Later state and Federal officials would describe in greater detail what "loaded beyond its
carrying capacity" meant. The point here is not that Boyle and these others were evil men or
even that they didn’t know any better. The point is that they were incapable of thinking any
differently.
6.

Sum m ary

This discussion of Government ownership of Western mineral lands subject to
unpatented mining claims and partnership with mining interests is based on the historical
context. In the first place, the Government routinely defined benefits in non-economic
terms. In fact, the Government had the wisdom to distinguish between short-term rewards
from simple direct sales of its landed estate and the much greater rewards that came from a
more careful and considered disposal strategy. One fact remains clearly defmed in the
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history of U.S. public land policy: the Constitution gave to the Congress the right to dispose
of the lands, and required the Congress to do so in the interests of the general welfare. No
historical purposes are served by setting up phony distinctions between direct benefits to the
Government and benefits to the nation as a whole.
In the second place, the historical record is filled, as I have shown, with
Congressional and Executive references to the economic advantages that accrued to the
Government directly from the development of Western mining lands. Recall President
Grant’s allusion to California gold as a strong box, the gift of a kind Providence that would
allow the Government to meet an immediate and pressing contingency. The debt in 1869,
when Grant spoke of contingency, was a national debt: the money was owed bv the
Government; the shame of repudiation would fall on the Government. These are not
inconsequential considerations.
Third, the idea of allowing private parties to occupy and develop Federal lands prior
to owning those lands did not arise in 1866 full grown from the head of Zeus. President
Polk in 1845, Thomas Donaldson in 1883, and David Sheridan in 1977—Federal officials all-made the historically compelling point that among America’s most striking jurisprudential
innovations was the creation of the concept of legal trespass on potential mining ground, the
application of the preemption principle and the local miners’ laws of the 1840s and 50s to the
mineral lands of the Federal domain. The Government did not have to handle the disposal of
mineral lands in this fashion; it could have sold or leased the land; required royalties, or
even held its title and run the mines itself. Each of these and other options were explored,
but the careful judgment of the Government was that its own and the nation’s interests would
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be better served by allowing squatters with picks and shovels to claim and dig holes on the
public’s domain.
This leads to my fourth point. The Government understood that it had to be a partner
if certain interests were to flourish. The "fostering care" of the Government involved using
the landed heritage of the American people in the immediate and long-term interests of those
people. Land would be given to railroads—though not so irrevocably that the "gift" could not
be forfeited and revoked; the Government was acting as the partner, not the patsy. The right
to use the surface of the land in order to explore for subsurface treasures was given to
miners—but with certain clear conditions, just as there were conditions applied to railroad
land grants.
It is the worst kind of history to deny the obvious parmer/owner status of the
Government in order to impose civil liability for what was once not only legal but openly
encouraged. There is a present mindedness about all of this that is troubling to historians.
The Government should not behave in such a contradictory manner.
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C.

The Players -- Sourdoughs, Partners, Syndicates and Corporations

To place early mining and mineral-processing activities in the Upper Clark Fork
River Basin in the proper historical context, one needs to explore what happened on
Government-owned lands under State and Territorial laws which not only allowed the use of
the streams and rivers for waste disposal, but actively encouraged such use. The authors of a
State Report prepared for the Clark Fork Basin Project (CFBP) in 1988 begin with an
important and interesting historical fact: "The Clark Fork of the Columbia River had been
seriously polluted even before Montana achieved statehood. Historical accounts of the early
mining camps indicate the upper Clark Fork and many of its tributaries were used as sewers
for mining and smelting byproducts and domestic waste" (emphasis added).1
The CFBP report might also have added that State and Federal agencies knew about
the use of waterways as sewers, had the authority to prevent such use, and quite purposefully
chose not to use that authority; that, in fact, the State and Federal Governments actively
encouraged mining companies to convert Western rivers and streams to sewers. The report
is true: the Clark Fork River and its tributaries were, indeed, "seriously polluted" before
Anaconda ever left a corporate footprint in the area.
1.

Early Placer Mining in the Upper Clark Fork Basin

The story of mining in Butte-or anywhere else in the United States—properly begins
with an account of European dreams of New World El Dorados, of cities with streets paved
with gold, and of the efforts of kings and courts to find and exploit those literally treasured
places. It would then move to an account of the decisions of the Congress of the young
American Republic to base the nation’s monetary system on gold and silver and, as a
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consequence, to encourage in every way possible the discovery of those metals. That full
accounting is clearly not possible here. But this much should at least be said: the early
placer gold mines and primitive quartz silver mines along Silver Bow Creek and the other
tributaries of the Clark Fork River in Montana were part of a centuries’ old story of
private/public partnership in the great bullion hunt.2
The Butte chapter of this story began in 1856 when Caleb Irvine came through the
Summit Valley and noticed that some unknown prospector had attempted to sink a shaft.
What Irvine and the other early Butte miners were doing in the Summit Valley and why they
thought it might contain metal deposits of value is worth discussing. These men had no
training in metallurgy or geology. No exploratory holes had been dug, no experts had taken
seismic or other readings. The Summit Valley looked promising to them because of surface
mineralization. They knew there were metals because they could see them; if they weren’t
careful, they might have tripped over them. As the historian Michael Malone writes, " . . .
the earth bore unmistakable signs of a metal presence: green and blue carbonates of copper,
the rusty brown discoloration of iron, the brown and black stains of zinc and manganese," all
of this in addition to quartz ledge outcroppings "whose obvious metal content caused them to
thrust beckoningly above the eroding country rock surrounding them. "3
They also knew metals were present because after months of roaming through
Montana valleys filled with grasses and wild flowers and coursed by clear, snow-fed streams,
the Summit Valley had to have looked strange to them. There were grasses and flowers in
the Summit Valley, too, and the stream, later called Silver Bow, had to have set the flora off
nicely. But there were also bald spots in this valley where surface mineralization prevented
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any vegetation from taking root. The Summit Valley did not hide its treasure; finding it did
not require the massive capitalization of an Anaconda Company. This was not a place for
poets and artists; this was a place that literally begged to be mined.4
And mined it was. Irvine’s initial discovery led to nothing permanent, but by 1864
other gold seekers had wandered into the valley and up the gulches and small creeks tributary
to the Silver Bow. There were not many of these argonauts. Butte City had a population of
a few dozen, while maybe 150 people spent the winter of 1864-65 in Silver Bow City, seven
miles to the west. The next two years witnessed what passed for a gold boom. Unlike silver
and copper, gold exists in what the mining engineer T.A. Rickards called "its native state."5
Gold-bearing ores may have needed primitive milling, but they did not require any roasting,
smelting, or refining. Miners with little or no money and using the crudest methods could
both mine and transport gold. Those mining methods included panning, sluicing, dredging,
and the use of hydraulic hoses, each of which involved a heavy use of water. Carrying it
was even easier, usually involving wagons or horse back. It was, as Rickard says, "the
pioneer phase of mining." That did not mean it was the environmentally benign phase.
The entire channel of Silver Bow Creek for the seven miles from Silver Bow City to
Butte, was worked by four-man teams of placer miners, operating at 200-foot intervals. By
1867 all 500 of Butte’s residents and the vast majority of the maybe 5,000 who lived in the
vicinity, were engaged in placer gold mining on Silver Bow Creek or one of its tributaries.6
Many of these thousands hauled gravel, often from some distance, down to the creeks. They
built ditches and flumes at considerable expense and effort. Silver Bow Creek was placered
almost from its head to the mouth of Brown’s Gulch—where gold seekers made a right-hand
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turn and worked Brown’s and Hail Columbia Gulches. Others worked Camp, Soap, Fish,
I

and Moose Creeks as well as German Gulch. With the exception of a few, every one of
these many hundreds of mining operations used the land and water of the Upper Clark Fork
Basin to store or carry away their wastes and tailings.7
This booming and frenetic pace was the rule in other parts of the Clark Fork Basin as
well. Merely to list other placering and lode mining sites makes an indelible impression. In
what became Granite County there were mine operations on Basin, Quartz, Bear, Big
Springs, Upper and Lower Willow, Welcome, Brewster, Bear, Harvey, Flint, Henderson,
Gold, Dunkelberg, Little Gold, Royal Gold, Boulder, Warm Springs, and Antelope Creeks
as well as Princeton Gulch. Some of these operations—those on Gold and Flint Creeks, for
example—were vast and long-lived.
The streams of Deer Lodge County were less heavily worked, but at that, there were
placering operations, some of them extensive, at the old Cable Mine, at Georgetown Lake,
and on French, Dry Gulch, Mill, Clear, Lost, Dry Cottonwood, and Oro Fino Creeks.
What became Powell County was, of course, the site of Gold C reek-the first gold
strike in Montana—which was worked eventually with hydraulics and dredges and
considerable heavy equipment. It was also the site of large dredging operations well into the
1940s. Other placering operations were located on Pioneer, Pikes Peak, Willow, Race
Track, Caribou, Ontario, Telegraph, Gold Canyon, Beaver, Snowshoe, Carpenter, Ophir,
Three Mile, Washington, Jefferson, Chicken, Deer, Chimney, Wasson, Nevada, Moose,
Youmame, and Douglas Creeks, as well as American, Spring, Rocker, Mike Reinig, and
Buffalo Gulches, and the Little Blackfoot River.8
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Clearly, there were hundreds of placer operations in the Upper Clark Fork Valley;
they involved thousands of miles of rivers and streams. But whatever was done, whenever
done, and for however long done, the wastes, sediments, and tailings of these hundreds of
operations were deposited in or near the main stem or tributaries of the Clark Fork River.9
They had a profound and lasting effect on those rivers and streams and on the embankments
and hillsides that bordered them.
Here is a time to allow contemporaries to speak for themselves. A.K. McClure was
the editor of McClure’s Magazine and an inveterate traveller. In 1867 he journeyed 3,000
miles through the Rocky Mountains and reported on the present and future prospects of this
new part of the American empire. He encountered no mining operations in Montana "until
Silver Bow Creek [was] reached, when the murky waters tell that it is employed to aid the
miners . . . ."10 Five years later in 1872, James Garfield, then a Congressman from Ohio,
visited the Montana diggings along the Clark Fork, a river he described as "permanently
ruined by the miners. . . as muddy as the Missouri. Before the discovery of gold, it was as
clear and pure as any mountain stream could well b e."11
Garfield’s comments have greater resonance when some of the placering activity on
that stretch of the Clark Fork is described. The Engineering and Mining Journal provided an
important description of the July 1872 Gold Creek diggings, 60 miles downstream from
Butte:
Not less than forty hydraulics are running in the immediate vicinity of Yamhill and
Pioneer City, making a small river of Gold Creek, which carries tons of soil, clay,
etc., down to Hell Gate [the Clark Fork] daily, and the prospects are that this stream
of mud will continue its course in that direction for a score of years to come.
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The story mentioned that some farms and ranches were affected by this stream of mud "but
the mines have to be worked . . . even should a few acres of land be covered up on the
banks of Gold Creek . . . ." 12
These are important references. But as valuable as all of them is the testimony of
George Irvin given in 1905 in the case of Hugh Magone v. the Colorado Smelting and
Mining Co.. et al. The case was a suit brought for damages for tailings deposited on the
p laintiffs land during high water. Irvin was a witness called to testify to the condition of the
Clark Fork River prior to the full scale-operation of industrial mining, milling, and smelting.
He had come to Butte in 1866, long before the deep mines had even been begun. Listen to
Irvin: " . . . From 1866 to 1872 . . . there might have been, up and down the stream [Silver
Bow Creek], fifteen hundred m iners." All of them were using sluice boxes, and the tailings
from the sluices went "down the stream of course."13 By the time the creek reached the
town of Silver Bow
you had a good rolling stream of tailings, and when you got to the mouth of German
Gulch they were reinforced with an equal amount. The Deer Lodge River in the Fall
of 1866, was clear enough to drink out of . . . and then with the first sign of Spring
the river would rise and become roilly and would commence its transport and transfer
of tailings down the stream. In the Spring of 1866, at places . . . you could wade the
stream without getting your boots wet, walking on the tailings.14
These were major waste and tailings deposits.

"The tailings for five years," Irvin went on,

"was of such a serious nature that it overflowed land and created sand bars. . . . The tailings
. . . from 1000 feet of placer ground would be equal in my humble judgment as a placer
miner, in one season, to the contribution of Butte for one year of all of its concentrators." 15
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Taken together, the testimony of Irvin and other Butte "old timers" provides
historians with information rarely available from such contemporary sources. The
impressions are powerful and indelible: the Upper Clark Fork Basin in the 1860s and 70s
was a scene of almost frenetic activity. Thousands of miners were panning, sluicing,
dredging, ditching, digging, and dumping. A complex hydrological system was carrying
away (away to where was scarcely known and never asked) tons of sediment, tailings, and
heavily charged water. The rivers and streams were described by Irvin and others as "roily,
thick, discolored, muddy, dense, and the color of reddish mud." "I have seen it thicker in
the placer mining days," said Irvin, "than it has ever been since, and thicker than it would
ever be if all the smelters of the United States dumped into it."16
Irvin’s exaggeration would have been of importance only to a scientist; for those who
lived through those days, it must have seemed that way. C.S. Warren, another of the
witnesses in the Magone case knew only that people "did not try to catch any fish in Deer
Lodge [Clark Fork] River." There might be a brief time in the Spring, before the placers
started up again, when the waters would be clear, "but as a rule it was ruined from the time
I knew it for a fishing stream."17 It should again be noted that the Anaconda Copper
Mining Company, incorporated in 1895, had nothing to do with this era of Montana’s mining
history.
The effects of these placering operations, including the use of high powered
hydraulics, were felt from the head of Silver Bow Creek to the mouth of the Big Blackfoot
River. And they were felt for at least 130 years.18 It must not be assumed that these were
only small-scale operations engaged in by "sour-doughs" with grub stakes and a bit of gold

68

in their "pokes." Many were serious operations, and they yielded serious profits. In 1871
Rossiter Raymond, one of this nation’s most respected mining experts, counted 48
"prominent" placer and 26 hydraulic companies in Deer Lodge County (Silver Bow County
was part of Deer Lodge County until 1881); the 48 placers had constructed 280 miles of
ditches carrying 20,000 inches of water. Total cost of operations was almost $500,000; total
yields were $1.17 million. Costs of the hydraulic operations were not given, but the 26
companies knocked down hillsides that contained more than half a million dollars worth of
gold.19 All told, T.A. Rickard reported that Montana’s placer diggings turned up
$12,000,000 in gold in 1867 alone; more than $150,000,000 in gold up to 1876.20 These
numbers are for the entire Territory, and, although most of the gold came from the Alder
Gulch diggings, Raymond’s 1871 report indicated that the Upper Clark Fork contributed
heavily to the total yield.
Of course, there were no contemporary assessments of the environmental
consequences of this placer mining. As a 1977 Federal Government Report notes: "Needless
to say, the environmental impacts of mining were not a consideration in those days."21
Irvin provided us with an estimation of the effects of placering on the upper Clark Fork
Basin. The historian Otis Young offers this historical perspective for the West generally:
Hydraulic mining dealt effectively with remarkable quantities of low grade gravels,
but had the drawback of putting into circulation vast tonnage of slickens, or sluice
tailings. The easiest and cheapest way of disposing of this effluvium was to drain it
into the nearest major watercourse.22
For the placer mining at issue here, that watercourse would have been the Clark Fork
River. Add dredging to the placering operations and the results were even more
spectacularly destructive. Young called the filled ground of a dredging system "utter
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desolation . . . a vast reach of irregular, shingly wasteland which was unfit for any
purpose."23 There was undoubtedly a lot of "shingly waste land" along Silver Bow Creek
during the thirty years from 1865 to 1895.
The same can be said of the Philipsburg district. As already noted, there was
considerable placering on Flint Creek and its tributaries. The placers were not as extensive
as those on Gold Creek, one drainage to the east, but extensive enough to attract
considerable attention-and to occasion considerable damage.
In 1873, the New Northwest reported that the Deer Lodge Ditch and Mining Co. had
begun diggings near New Chicago in the Flint Creek Valley. "They have taken up 160 acres
of bar, which has 30 to 50 feet of gravel. . . . They have also purchased two ranches~280
acres-for a dump." A fluming system was also being designed for clearing the dump.24
Near by, the Winchell Company was hard at work building a reservoir on the Flint Creek
hills. They figured they would need it: "They have two hydraulics piping on a fifty,-foot
bank of gravel, running off about four tons of dirt per minute."25
That is a lot of dirt, but it was nothing compared to what the Little Giant hydraulic
system could do. Two of these technological marvels were at work on Flint Creek placers
by 1874. The New Northwest was impressed:
We have expected much of [the equipment] but it surpasses all our expectations. It is
mining in earnest. . . . Compared to it the ordinary hydraulic is childs’ play . . . It
will bring into development hundreds of thousands of acres of ground not available
heretofore, and really we believe begins the era of big mining in Montana. . . . With
the Little Giant, 400 inches of water is brought down with 250 feet pressure and is
thrown through a four-inch nozzle. . . . It was knocking out boulders the size of
pumpkins as though they were marbles, and moving. . . twenty times as much earth
as the old method. . . . Its power is amazing; we believe it would knock any
ordinary house to pieces at fifty feet in half a minute. . . ."26
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For the next twenty years, Little Giants ripped and tore at the embankments of Flint Creek
and its tributaries.

Much gold was unearthed in this fashion. As for the earth itself, and

the water used to blast it away, they found their way as sediment and tailings into the river
system.
The effects of placering in the Upper Clark Fork Basin were significant. Two of the
most respected mining historians in the country use the words "tailings" and "slickens" to
describe the water-borne wastes from these placering operations and the deposition of those
wastes along streams and rivers. Much of this waste not only antedates ACMC, but
antedates quartz mining in general. I would point out as well, using the language of Duane
Smith, that
The federal government aided and abetted its citizens...in these wasteful
practices....encouraging] mining in so many direct and indirect ways that the miner
cannot be blamed for assuming that W ashington would support him in his actions.27
For all their expense and labor, the placer miners of Silver Bow Creek never had the
success of those early pioneers along Alder Gulch. By 1870 it was clear that if the treasures
of Butte and the Summit Valley were to be exploited, it would not be by placering. Quartz
lodes would have to be found and claimed. Deep shafts would have to be sunk; ores other
than gold-bearing would have to be mined.
This was a form of mining different in every particular from placering. It required
many thousands of men skilled in the use of black powder and dynamite as well as hammer
and drill and power drills. It was these thousands who would "get the rock in the box."
And hundreds more would hoist these thousands. Add to the army machinists, cable men,
plumbers, carpenters, electricians, tenders, time keepers, watchmen, shifters, foremen,
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metallurgists, chemists, and geologists. And, of course, the ore had to be transported, milled,
concentrated, smelted, and refined. The mine water from those operations were often
precipitated and the minerals further refined. All of this required the hiring of thousands
more. In sum, this was mining and mineral processing that required many large and wellfilled purses.
Again, merely to list the mining and smelting operations in Butte is to give some
indication of the vastness and the complexity of these industrial operations. Since the ore
bodies were so badly fractured, and since the apex provisions in the Federal mining laws
permitted large underground mines to "emerge" from postage stamp sized surface claims,
maps of the mining claims on the Butte Hill came to resemble a jigsaw puzzle constructed by
a sadist--or a fool. If this puzzle were to be crafted in such a way that claim and title
transfers over time could be shown, it would come to resemble some perverse historical
Rubic’s cube, a riddle within a riddle, undecipherable by even the most patient.28 Mining
claims included, but are not limited to, the Rainbow lode mines, Mountain Chief, Parrot,
Original, Colusa, Gambetta, Michael Davitt, Asteroid/Travonia, La Plata, Burlington, Late
Acquisition, Great Republic, Alice, Moulton, Valdemere, Magna Charta, Bluebird, Minnie
Healy, Parnell, Mountain Consolidated, Rarus, Anaconda, Never Sweat, St. Lawrence,
Fredonia, Selfrising, Nettie, Bell, Belmont, Anselmo, Kelley, Buffalo, Little Mina, Mountain
View, Badger State, Modoc, Elm Orlu, Black Rock, Tramway, Caledonia, Silver King,
Belle of Butte, Diamond, Leonard, High Ore, Speculator, Hattie Harvey, and Gem. Those
are a small percentage of the mining claims east of Missoula Gulch. They represent silver,
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copper, and zinc producers, though trace elements, manganese, cadmium, and even gold,
were also mined.
The tons upon tons of ores taken from these mines had, of course, to be processed.
It is at this point that the historical record must be fully understood. Quartz or lode mining,
though not as destructive as hydraulics and dredging, can create what might be termed
aesthetically uninspiring landscapes. Mine yards and mine dumps, ore bins, lumber piles,
hoisting frames, scattered machinery, random collections of sheds, huts, change rooms, and
smoke-belching generating facilities are not the stuff of romantic images. The novelist
Gertrude Atherton said that Butte resembled "a gigantic ship wreck."29 She was being kind.
Mining towns are ugly, and Butte was the greatest mining town on earth. Dashiell Hammett
said that Butte was "an ugly city. . . set in an ugly notch between two ugly mountains that
had been all dirtied up by mining."30
The history of the processing facilities of the upper Clark Fork Basin is almost as
tangled as that of the mines themselves. It could not have been otherwise. Mines, except
for placered gold, hid their treasures inside what was called "country rock," gangue, or
waste rock. High grade ore contained a large percentage of the sought-after mineral; low
grade a small percentage. But twenty was a large percentage, which meant that most of what
was being hoisted out of Butte’s mines would be discarded in processing. Some of this waste
would literally go up in smoke; some was impounded; some was left in large tailings dumps;
some was disposed of through flumes and ditches which ran directly or indirectly into the
nearest natural waterway. The processing of ores was not environmentally benign.
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The Federal Government knew that. The Mining Laws of 1866, 1870, and 1872
permitted claimants to file claims on five acres of non-mineral land for purposes of
constructing mills and other processing facilities.31 As noted, the disposal of mill and
smelter wastes was left to the will and whim of territorial and state governments. In the case
of Montana, that meant that Butte’s mills and smelters operated without let or hindrance.
They could and did dump their wastes wherever they wanted, whenever they wanted, and in
whatever quantity they wanted. It made no difference if the waterway that carried these
wastes was interstate or intrastate; navigable or non-navigable; filled with fish or left sterile
by earlier placering operations; on private land or public; slow and meandering or rushing
wildly down mountainsides. Mining companies could use it to dispose of their processing
wastes.

The State had no interest in regulating the disposal of these tailings. The Federal

Government understood that. That understanding was a part of the pact; it was central to the
partnership between the government and the developers of the nation’s mineral resources.
There was not a mill for every mine; only the largest and best producing mines had
their own milling or smelting facilities. Smaller mines paid a fee to have their ores treated.
Butte had many hundreds of mines; it had fewer than twenty mills and smelters. But that
number was more than enough to wreak environmental damage to both the air and the water.
The gigantic ship wreck of a city was also a place of "appalling surface barrenness" from
"the sulphur and arsenic fumes of ores roasted in the open or belching from the smelters."
Clyde Murphy, another Butte novelist, saw Butte as "a black and yellow jungle of smelters,
roasting ovens, cranes and stacks which breathed out yellow, acrid smoke."32
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Atherton’s reference to ores roasted in the open applies to the practice, common in
Butte until the 1890s, of heaping up piles of ore and firewood in the streets or open areas of
the city and then burning off the sulphur rock. There was no roasting furnace, no smoke
stack, just a blocks-long, ten- to fifteen-foot high, six-foot wide heap of slowly burning
rocks. People gasped for air, suffered from spontaneous nose bleeding, and died at rates
seldom reached in epidemics; arc lights turned on at midday; hack and transom drivers ran
into one another. It must have been nightmarish; a living industrial hell.33
The effect of these smelting operations on Silver Bow Creek and the Clark Fork River
was equally devastating. Hundreds of thousands of cubic yards of tailings poured, oozed,
and slid out of the mills and smelters. During the dry season, these sediments piled up in
the tailings yards, i.e., land adjacent to the mills and smelters and set aside for that purpose.
But during downpours or freshets the tailings began to move down the steep side hills of
Butte into Missoula Gulch toward Silver Bow Creek and the Clark Fork River.
Atherton and Murphy did not write about these tailings; but others, including many
Federal Government officials, did. In 1891 Barton Evermann did a reconnaissance of
Western Montana waters for the U.S. Fish Commission and described Silver Bow Creek as
having "the consistency of thick soup, made so by the tailings from the mills in [Butte]. No
fish could live in such a mixture. . . ."34 There was no reproach intended by Evermann.
He was simply reporting. So were the scores of Federal mineral surveyors who, as required
by the Mining Laws, looked after the Government’s property, roaming freely over the public
lands subject to unpatented mining claims.
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A few select quotes from the surveyors’ reports are sufficient to leave an indelible
impression. In 1881, a government surveyor described a lode mining claim just north of
Butte as covered "20 feet deep. . . [by] the tailings from the Alice Mine. . . . "

One of the

comer location stakes was "covered up by tailings from [the] m ine...."35 In 1885 a
government surveyor described a placer claim filed on ground near Butte. Part of the claim
was "covered by tailings from placer diggings. . ." Another portion was "covered by
tailings from the Dexter Silver Mill." These deposits had "not only destroyed all traces of
vegetation . . . but [had] also filled up the placer excavations . . . " and buried large portions
of the creek.36
Slightly more judgmental was a complaint brought by patent applicants in 1891. The
claimants filed an affidavit with the Federal Government in support of their request to speed
the patenting process. The ground they sought was down stream from three of Butte’s
largest silver mills and several of its largest concentrators and smelters. The mills and
smelters were "constantly discharging large quantities of tailings,. . . an immense volume of
mill tailings. . ." which ended up on the claimant’s land. They did so "freely" and quite
legally. Still, these tailings were a bit of a "nuisance," an "annoyance.”37
A number of witnesses in the Maeone case, including George Irvin, also spoke to the
issue of tailings. They were asked what they remembered about old Butte mills. Irvin, at
one point in his testimony, repeated what he had said about placer tailings and then added
that when the placering ended, left-over tailings made their way into Silver Bow Creek where
they "were reinforced . . . by the silver mills and the concentrators."38
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Other witnesses made the same point. Every examination concerning a silver mill
included the question: "And where did it discharge its tailings and slime?" And the answer:
"Into the Silver Bow Creek" or into Missoula Gulch, a Silver Bow Creek tributary. "It was
roily and muddy all the time. . . . The bluestone, (copper sulphate) . . . salt and sulphuric
acid would pass out into the tailings in the water."39 There were variations on this litany,
but none that carried the story beyond where Irvin left it: silver mills of various sizes, using
various processing methods, processed Butte ores and washed the refuse either directly into
Silver Bow Creek or into one of the gulches that fed it.
There is an old and bad habit in Montana. It is easily summarized: whenever
anything unpleasant happens, regardless of the nature of the unpleasantness, the well
practiced response is "the Anaconda Company did it." There is a kind of corollary to this
idea: "and they did it all by themselves." These are comforting notions. They allow an
almost total evasion of responsibility. If the Company did it, and if it acted without
accomplices, then the C om pany-or the nearest thing to it-m ust pay. This report has
attempted to break down those notions. ACMC did not act alone; indeed, like all miners, it
acted in close concert with an accomplice—the very government that now attempts to hold
ACMC’s successor entirely responsible for the clean up of wastes left by individuals,
companies, and governmental agencies with which neither ACMC nor ARCO had any
association and over which neither had any control. It is time now to deal more specifically
and in greater detail with the first part of that "formula for evasion": who did do it?
Part of the answer has already been given. Placering operations over the course of at
least 30 years and along the entire Upper Clark Fork River did significant damage to the
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ecosystem. So, as has been suggested in a general way, did the mills and smelters of Butte.
It is to their histories that I now turn.
2.

Early Butte Silver Mills

Reduction facilities of one kind or another appeared early in Butte’s mining history.
There was a smelting furnace for copper in Butte as early as 1866; there was another one
with stamp mill attached built in 1867. A silver quartz mill was on line by 1868. There was
a lull between 1869 and 1874 while Butte "converted" from gold to silver and copper, but by
1876 the "camp" was producing significant quantities of silver and copper ore and the
construction of reduction works began in earnest. Some of these facilities had brief histories-mining was a high risk enterprise. But whatever their life span, most of these facilities
operated for varying numbers of years on Government- owned lands; none engaged in
clandestine activities—mills and smelters are hard to hide; all generated massive amounts of
tailings; and none was ever operated or owned during its operation by ACMC.40 I will
discuss them in roughly the order they began operation, beginning with silver reduction
facilities.
a.

The Davis Mill (Old Lexington)

In the issue of November 16, 1867, the Montana Post carried a story about the stamp
mill and furnace being built by "Messrs Hendrie and Ray" on the Baltic Lode Claim
(Government land) near the comer of Broadway and Arizona streets in Butte.41 Originally
designed to work gold quartz, the facility almost surely was closed by 1869 or 1870.
Sometime prior to 1876, General Charles S. Warren acquired the Lexington mines and the
idled mill which he sold to A.J. Davis, one of early Butte’s more aggressive mine plungers.
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Davis converted the property to a silver quartz mill of five and later ten stamps to work ore
from his Lexington Mine. Known as the Davis and later the Old Lexington Mill, it began
operation by January of 1877. Under Davis’s ownership, it was a steady producer.42 In
1880, thirteen years after Hendrie and Ray had filed the claim, Davis patented the land on
which the mill stood. In 1890, the Butte City Council approved a petition to condemn the
mill and it was dismantled and sold the next year.43
As for the tailings generated, they found their way into an unidentified gulch—labeled
on later maps an "open sew er"-and from there into Silver Bow Creek. Not all of those
tailings got away—at least not by 1905; in that year, a civil engineer testified in court that the
tailings around the Old Lexington Mill were sixteen feet deep.44 By the mid-1880s, the mill
seems also to have been processing its own and other mill tailings, including those from the
other Lexington Mill in Walkerville.45
In 1881, A.J. Davis sold the mill, mill site, and other mining claims to a French
syndicate, the Societe Anonyme des Mines de Lexington. In 1884, the mill was leased and
managed by Donohue and Moore; the next year it was operated by the Zelia Lease
Company. Later lessees included Reynolds and Co. and Kellogg and Melvin. In 1886 the
Societe Anonyme sold the mill back to Davis, who in turn sold the mill and mill site to the
Butte and Boston Mining Company two years later in 1888. The B&B held the by-now
abandoned mill only until 1891 when it sold off the mill equipment, though it retained the
site. In 1910 ACMC came, through long and labyrinthine process, to own the site, but at no
time did the Company operate the Davis Mill, and never did it own the site while the mill
was operating.46
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b.

The Centennial Mill

1876 was a busy year for reduction facilities in Butte. In February, prior even to the
start up of the Davis Mill, John How, an experienced Butte quartz miner, formed the
Centennial Gold and Silver Mining Company and fired up the Centennial Mill on the
unpatented Mary Ann lode mining claim. The Mary Ann claim was also very near Silver
Bow Creek, downstream from the Davis Mill, below the mouth of Blacktail Creek and just
above the mouth of Missoula Gulch. John How never did file for patent on the ground.47
The Centennial was designed to work custom ore of all ore classes found in and
around Butte. Originally equipped with five stamps, each capable of treating a ton of ore per
day, the Centennial also had a steam engine and boiler, a concentrating pan, settler, four
amalgamating barrels, one roasting oven, and one retort. Later that summer, the Centennial
added two more pans and a double reverberatory furnace, and by early 1877 the mill was
reducing an average of four tons of ore per day.48
Bedeviled by breakdowns and inefficient operation, and chronically in debt, How’s
Centennial Gold and Silver Mining Company leased the mill to several parties, including
Thomas Manning, et al., who held claims against it. In 1877, How formed a new company,
the Butte Milling Company, cleared the debts against the mill, and once again took over its
operation, this time under the Butte Milling Company. In August of 1878, ownership of the
mill passed to John C. Rainsford and William Mayger; three months later Rainsford bought
out Mayger. In 1879, after he had sold a one-half interest to Henry S. Clark, he added five
more stamps and a third amalgamating pan, doubling the m ill’s capacity. The land on which
the mill sat was still unpatented.49
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Bad luck and bad judgment continued to dog the Centennial and in November of 1880
the property was offered up "for sale or lease at a bargain." In 1882, a patent was finally
taken and in 1885, the Multnomah Milling Company had either bought or leased the facility
and was doing custom milling. In 1900 Franklin Farrel of Ansonia, Connecticut backed
Orrin Peck of Chicago in a scheme to use the Centennial to work low-grade ores and
tailings. This effort appears also to have failed, and by 1901 the mill was reported to be in a
complete state of decay.50 From this point forward, the mill’s ownership and operating
history—if, in fact, it had one—are unclear. But one thing is clear: ACMC neither operated
nor owned the Centennial Mill or its mill site during the time of its operation.
Not so for the Federal Government. From 1876 to 1882 the Centennial Mill operated
on Government-owned land and dumped its tailings onto Government-owned land and into
Silver Bow Creek and Missoula Gulch, the banks and watercourses of which were
Government-owned. The Centennial is not a major player in Butte’s history, but it had ten
stamps, and (when they were running) they smashed up tons of rock. It had concentrating
pans and a roasting oven and other and various forms of reduction hardware. It may have
been a maverick and stumbling facility, but it operated for more than a decade, reducing
mostly silver ores and throwing the wastes away.
c.

The Dexter Mill

Just north and a little west of the Centennial Mill, on the east bank of Missoula Gulch
sat the Dexter Mill. Originally known as the Farlin Mill after its founder William Farlin, a
Butte original and one of the best-liked men in the camp, the Dexter also began operation in
1876—though not with Farlin at the helm.51 The mill site included portions of three
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separate mining claims, one patented in 1880; a second in 1882; the third in 1893. A bit of
simple arithmetic would indicate that the Dexter operated on government owned-land for up
to seventeen years.52
Farlin had begun construction on borrowed money in late 1875. Costs soared,
creditors grumbled, money dried up and before the mill could open, Farlin had been forced
to convey the property to J.K and William Andrews Clark by a Deed of Trust. The Clarks
were to Finish and operate the mill "for the benefit of the parties in interest," i.e., Farlin’s
creditors, the Clarks included. They opened the Dexter on June 1, 1876. It began as a tenstamp, dry-crushing mill, the first ten-stamp mill in the district, adding five roasting furnaces
in its first year of operation. By early 1877 it was running the ten stamps, four
reverberatory furnaces, two combinations pans, two settlers, an agitator and a retort, enough
hardware for 10 to 12 tons of silver ore per day.53
In the Fall of 1877, Farlin, still deeply in debt, lost the Dexter to J.K. Clark at a
sheriffs sale-neither the first nor the last time a mining man gave way to a banker. With
Clark money behind it, the Dexter prospered and grew, reaching a 30-ton-per-day capacity
by the mid-1880s. The Clarks ran the mill through 1889, at one point leasing the facility to
Marcus Daly for treatment of silver ores from Daly’s near-by Anaconda Mine. It had been a
major producer for Clark, and a major contributor to his many millions of dollars. By 1890,
however, the Dexter was abandoned and the following year a newspaper story reported it
was being used as a bam .54
The Dexter was a relatively important mill. It processed tons of silver ore and, by
Butte silver mill standards at least, it had a long life. For that entire life, its owners operated
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on unpatented Government-owned land, which meant they dumped their tailings on, through,
along, and over that land. The Dexter was one of the many mills that did not impound its
tailings. According to contemporary observers, all of the wastes were eventually distributed
into Silver Bow C reek.55 At no time did ACMC own or control any aspect of the Dexter
operations.
d.

The Burlington (Young and Roudebush) Mill

The Burlington Mill was located on the M apleton Lode mining claim in the Gimlet or
Granite Gulch area 3/4ths of a mile west of Butte.56 It was completed and began operations
in early 1877 and continued until 1880 or 1881. Its owners during its entire brief operating
lifetime were William Young and Hezekia Roudebush. The Burlington mashed both gold
and silver quartz with from four to eight stamps depending on how sufficiently (or, and more
likely, insufficiently) its amalgamating pans were functioning.57
With only four stamps in regular use, the Burlington’s capacity in its early months of
operations was only about three tons of ore per day, hardly qualifying it as one of Butte’s
major producers. New equipment installed in late summer of 1878 allowed it to run all eight
of its stamps and increased its tonnage to 15 per day. Witnesses indicated that the Burlington
never impounded its tailings; thus, they went directly "into Silver Bow Creek." The
Mapleton lode claim was not patented until 1883, two years at least after the Burlington had
ceased operation.58
e.

The Alice Mills

The two mills of the Alice Gold & Silver Mining Company were among Butte’s
largest and most important silver milling operations. Located on the Alice Lode claim in
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Walkerville, north of Butte, the first or Old Alice Mill began operations in October, 1877.
The Old Alice was originally a 15-stamp dry crushing mill with the capability of processing
20 tons per day. Each of the 15 stamps weighed 700 pounds. It came with some other heavy
industrial artillery: a Blake crusher, drying kiln, three settlers, six amalgamating pans, a
clean-up pan, two 15-inch retorts, a melting furnace and a 75 horse-power engine. The
stamps dropped at a rate of 85 times per minute. In early 1878, the mills added two Howell
roasting ovens (the first in the Montana Territory), a five-stamp battery, two 80-horsepower
engines, and two 16-foot boilers. In 1879, the facility was further outfitted with a pair of
i

54-inch, 160-horsepower boilers, another Blake crusher, and a Tulloch feeder. By
November 1881, the old Alice was converted to a wet-crushing process. In March, 1892
after a busy fifteen years, a pump breakdown at the Alice Mine resulted in the closure of the
Old Mill. The best available information suggests that it did not reopen after that time.
In December, 1880, the Old Alice was joined by its larger partner, the New Alice
Mill, also located on the Alice Lode claim, and with its construction Butte entered the big
leagues in the reduction of silver ores. Running sixty stamps, the New Alice was the largest
dry-crushing and chloridizing quartz mill in the world. Its hardware included four Howell
and White furnaces, one Bruchner roasting furnace, a 450-horsepower Buckeye Corliss
engine, and six 16-foot boilers. Its sixty stamps weighed a half ton each and dropped at the
rate of 500 strokes per minute.59
During their peak years in the mid-1880s the two Alice Mills rang up some
impressive production figures: they crushed between 90 and 100 tons of ore per day in 1883
and pushed total production to 33,200 tons in 1885. In 1887, three new roasting furnaces and
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two 43-inch White and Howell chloridizing furnaces were added. After fire damaged the
mill in October 1888, its equipment was completely overhauled.60
This impressive industrial facility at the top of Missoula Gulch was originally the
property of the Walker Brothers of Salt Lake City. Though important Western mining men
in their own right (Walkerville was their namesake), the Walkers might still be best known
as the men who sent Marcus Daly to Butte. The Walker brothers developed the Alice Mine
and for a time owned both mills as the property of the Alice Gold and Silver Mining
Company, incorporated in Utah in 1880. The relationship of this corporation to the Alice
Gold Mining Company, incorporated in Montana in 1878 to develop the Alice Mine is
unclear. What is clear is that the principals in the Montana venture at least were the Walkers
(Joseph, Samuel, and Mathew), Marcus Daly, and Lathrop Dunn. It was Daly and his
partners who were responsible for the construction—and early success—of the New Alice
Mill. Daly, of course, by 1881, if he had not exactly lost interest in silver mines and the
Alice properties, had at least transferred his considerable energies and talents to the
development of the Anaconda Mine and its mix of copper and silver ores. The Engineering
and Mining Journal reported in August, 1880 that Daly and Dunn had sold their Alice stock
back to the Walkers.61
The Alice was obviously a major player in Butte’s prosperous days as a silver camp.
But in addition to their production figures, the two Alices also were major contributors to the
wastes dumped along the banks of Missoula Gulch. Occasionally, as in 1891, crews
attempted to work the tailings of the two mills as well as those of the near-by Moulton,
"much to the disgust of the boys down the creek." The two Alice Mills, fed by some of

85

Butte’s richest silver mines and with all that impressive industrial hardware, dumped
hundreds of thousands of tons of tailings and roasted residue into Missoula Gulch at its
highest point above Butte.62
The New Alice reportedly closed its silver operations in 1899, seven years after the
Old Alice had ceased operation. Few silver reduction facilities survived the 1893
demonetization of silver for long. From late 1904 until 1906, the Montana Zinc Company
leased the facility to work zinc. In 1910, more than a decade after it had ceased operation as
a silver mill, ACMC tried to purchase the properties and assets of the Alice Company.
Some disgruntled longtime Alice shareholders thought that the sale price was inadequate and
that ACMC was trying to plunder the Alice. In 1921 their suit was heard by the United
States Supreme Court, which invalidated the sale and remanded the case back to the District
Court. In 1930 the District Court finally voided the sale, and ACMC reconveyed the assets
to the Alice Company. Soon after, the Alice Company transferred them back to ACMC, this
time for cash rather than stocks and pursuant to a different agreement.63
f.

The Silver Bow Mill

The Silver Bow Mill was on the Silver Bow Lode Mining Claim, located in 1877.
The claim was on a fairly steep hillside adjacent to Silver Bow Creek at the place where the
creek starts its long right-swinging arc and begins to flow westerly. The same year the claim
was filed, the 24-stamp Highland Mill was brought to the site. Water was diverted from
Silver Bow Creek by means of dam, flume, and ditch and the mill began operation in
December, 1878, shipping its first load of silver bullion in January, 1879. There is no
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evidence that the Silver Bow operated after 1893. The Anaconda Standard reported in 1892
that the mill had "hung up the stamps."64
There were by that time at least forty of them. In January of 1879 the Engineering
and Mining Journal reported that the mill was "pounding away with its full number of twenty
stamps." Late in 1881, ten more stamps were added; by April, 1885 it was fitted out with
ten more. Since they were crushing dry ore, dust was a significant problem. In an effort to
contain it, the mill was dressed out with suction pipes attached to the crusher. In August of
1880, the Silver Bow underwent extensive improvements, including the addition of roasters
for the processing of base silver ores. Two years later a 40-inch Howell and White cylinder
roaster was installed for chloridizing ore, and by 1883 the operation was reducing 30 tons of
ore per day.65 As for the tailings, the Silver Bow did what most did: no tailings were
impounded; all were "allowed to go down the stream into Silver Bow Creek."

These were

particularly unlovely wastes; the silver mills, most likely including the Silver Bow, were
using "sulphuric acid, bluestone or copper sulphate, and [working] with what they called the
copper solution." 66
The original owners of the Silver Bow Mill were James Talbott, John Downs, Dennis
Leary, and Richard Jones. In January 1881, three years after the mill had commenced
operation, the U.S. Government issued a patent for the Silver Bow Mining claim to the last
named of these partners. In May of 1881, the four original owners incorporated as the
Silver Bow Mining and Milling Company. In November, 1882, A.J. Davis (previously
introduced in connection with the Old Lexington or Davis Mill) bought a portion of the
Silver Bow Company’s property; by May 1883, he was apparently the sole owner.67 In
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August, 1888, the Butte and Boston Mining Company was incorporated with Davis as its
president; the next day the B&B Company bought its president’s Silver Bow M ill.68
g.

The Thornton Mill

The Thornton Mill was situated on a hillside east of Missoula Gulch on the
unpatented Gagnon Lode mining claim. Designed to work the free-milling ores of the Gagon
Mine, it began operation in May, 1879 and ran until 1881. Originally constructed with five
stamps, two amalgamating pans, and one settler, by late 1879 it had expanded to ten stamps,
five pans, and two settlers and was able to handle 18 tons of ore per day. Waste was
disposed of in the usual way: a culvert carried its tailings from the mill site to Missoula
Gulch. By 1888, a map shows only a "refuse pile" at the site.69
The Thornton was originally owned by John Thornton and, possibly, Joseph
Rosenthal, J.W. Ransom, and Timothy Kelley, doing business as the Gagnon Mining
Company. In 1879 William Andrews Clark’s Colorado and Montana Smelting Company
added the Gagnon claim "with the impediments, machinery, and ten-stamp quartz mill
thereon" to its list of corporate assets. The particulars of this transaction are unknown.70
h.

The Grove Gulch Mill

Investors made a great deal of money from some of these silver mills; their histories
provide examples of Western enterprise rewarded. Let Grove Gulch stand as a symbol of
enterprise thwarted. The mill was a five-stamp mill that worked free-milling silver ore. Its
original owners were Daniel Jaeger, Solomon Solberger, Sam W. Aikens, Scott McDonald,
and Benjamin McElroy, who apparently did business as the Butte Mining and Milling
Company. It is impossible now even to determine precisely where the mill was located;
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somewhere along Silver Bow Creek certainly, but exactly where is unknown. It could have
been on one or more of ten unpatented mining claims. Its operational history is as obscure.
It is also brief. The Grove Gulch’s five stamps pounded away from January, 1879 until
November, 1880. Its tailings, it is safe to say, made their way to Silver Bow Creek. In late
1880 the banking firm of Donnell, Clark (William Andrews) and Larabie foreclosed on the
mortgage. Perhaps the mill and site became a part of Clark’s vast holdings.71
i.

The Moulton Mill

The top of Missoula Gulch, at the far north end of "greater" Butte in Walkerville,
was a favored location for silver reduction works. It was near to many of the most
productive silver mines, and the gulch itself served as a convenient waste disposal facility.
Walkerville is more than 1,000 feet higher than Butte; the steep grade of the Butte hill, down
which Missoula Gulch coursed to its mouth at Silver Bow Creek, provided a natural gravity
flow for tailings and other residue from the mills. There were undoubtedly other and
possibly better reasons for the location of silver mills, but the ability of a site to shed tailings
was likely among the considerations. The Alice Mills are cases in point. So is the Moulton.
The Moulton Mill sat on the north side of the gulch on the Frank Moulton lode claim.
Completed in 1881, the Moulton began production with twenty stamps, increasing to forty in
early 1882 and to sixty in 1885. The mill’s last documented activity was in early December,
1893. The Moulton Mine was being worked by lessees as late as 1908, but the adjacent mill
stood idle. Clearly, the Moulton was another casualty of the government’s demonetization of
silver.72 An Engineering and Mining Journal correspondent wrote that the Moulton Mill
was "the most perfect, convenient, and economical dry crushing chloridizing mill ever
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erected."73 By 1883, the Moulton was crushing 40 to 50 tons of rock per day; in 1887 it
worked over 60,000 tons of ore. By that time, the peak of the silver era in Butte, the
Moulton’s equipment included a 350-horsepower engine, two rockbreakers, two revolving
dryers, two Cornish revolving roasters, sixteen amalgamation pans, eight settlers, four
retorts, a Sturtevant crusher, and three batteries of 150-horsepower boilers each.74
The Moulton was a Clark operation. William Andrews Clark was the president and
major shareholder of the Moulton Mining Company of Utah, the original owner of the mill.
In 1884, three years after the mill first fired up, Moulton shareholders voted to reorganize as
the Moulton Mining Company of Montana. Clark took the title of director. The Moulton
was still Clark’s as late as March, 1911; it remained part of the Clark-Montana Realty
Company as late as July, 1928.75
The Moulton generated significant tailings during its operational life. There were
occasions when the tailings were worked. The mill cribbed its tailings, and in 1891, for at
least one example, "several crews" were kept busy "mining" them. According to the
testimony of C.S. Warren, however, even cribbed tailings broke loose and those of the
Moulton flowed with others from the top of the hill down Missoula Gulch into Silver Bow
Creek.76 ACMC only acquired the assets of Clark-Montana Realty Company in 1928, 35
years after the Moulton Mill had processed its last shovel-full of ore.77
j.

The Lexington Mill

The Lexington was the third of the great Missoula Gulch silver mills. Located on the
south side of the gulch and down stream from the Alice and the Moulton Mills, the
Lexington began operations in September 1882. It was built on the Alexander, Wappelo,
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and Lone Tree Lode claims, the last of which was not patented until 1885. The Lexington
was owned and financed by a syndicate of French investors, incorporated in 1883 as the
Societe Anonyme des Mines de Lexington, and its operating company, the Lexington Mining
Company. The Lexington ran steadily from 1883 until, predictably, 1893. It tried to reopen
with half its stamps running, but there was no adequate market for its product. In 1903 a
fire destroyed the mill’s ore-crushing department and part of the old mill. Since it had not
operated for ten years, the EMJ reported that "its burning does not entail great loss."78
The Lexington was an industrial marvel. The mill’s designer, Charles Stetefeldt,
described it in some detail in an 1882 edition of the EM J. The mill was powered by a 250horse compound Corliss engine. It had five of Stetefeldt’s own shelf-dry kilns to dry ore and
salt. The battery held 50 huge 850-pound stamps loaded by Tulloch self-feeders. Ten more
stamps were later put on line in a separate battery to treat custom ores. After stamping, the
pulp passed through a Krom’s revolving screen. It was equipped with two Stetefeldt
designed furnaces "of the largest size," 20 amalgamating pans, ten settlers, two clean-up
pans, and two agitators. The retort room was no less impressive, housing two retorts and a
zinc furnace. The plant’s reverberatory furnace was in a separate building, as were its two
rock breakers. With this kind and quantity of hardware, the Lexington was able to ring up
some impressive production figures. Fifty to sixty tons of ore passed through the facility
every day, and several hundred thousand tons of tailings and other roasted residue exited it
during the ten years of its operation, three of those years Government-owned land. ACMC
never operated the Lexington M ill.79
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k.

The Bluebird Mill

The French were not the only foreign investors in Butte-area silver operations. The
Bluebird opened in November of 1886 on the Lackawanna and Sir John Lode claims, west of
Butte and just north of Silver Bow Creek. Both claims were patented in 1889.

On March

1, 1892, the mill closed for good; by December, 1904 it had been dismantled and sold,
another victim of the "crime against silver." Its first owner appears to have been Ferdinand
Van Zandt, the eventual patentee of the Lackawanna and Sir John claims. Van Zandt later
transferred ownership to the Blue Bird Mining Company, Ltd. of London, a close
corporation in which Van Zandt retained a large interest. In 1892, at a sheriffs sale, Hoge,
Brownlee and Co., a Butte banking firm, acquired the Bluebird property.80
From that point forward, there were various attempts to restart and re invigorate the
Bluebird Mining Company. Leaching operations on the mill’s tailings continued until 1894,
and there appears to have been some mining activity under the company name in 1911.
Certainly the dreams never entirely died. In 1944 the Blue Bird Mining Company obtained a
perpetual charter in New York. Four years later, director E. Perkins McGuire wrote that the
Company had been "dormant for some time, that is, from an operating point of view." At
that, McGuire paid the taxes on the property, including the Lackwanna and Sir John claims,
in 1971.81
Running ninety stamps by 1887, this was the largest silver mill in the Butte area;
indeed, the Bluebird was "the largest mill of its kind in the world." By 1888, with its new
furnace on line, the mill was able to handle 130 tons of ore per day. Its totals for that year
were 37,145 tons of ore from which it produced 1,385,508 ounces of silver. By 1892, there
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were days when 150 tons of ore were fed to its ninety stamps.82 ACMC never owned any
part of this operation.
In 1932 T.A. Rickard, a consulting engineer to the U.S. Bureau of Mines and one
time editor of the Engineering and Mining Journal, wrote A History of American Mining.
Rickard was the epitome of the "practical miner"; he knew Butte and its history, knew
intimately the operations of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company, and brought to his
history the unique perspective of a mining engineer. His judgment regarding the "silver era"
is worth noting:
The climax of the silver period was reached in 1887 when the Alice mill had 80
stamps, the Moulton 40, the Lexington 50, the Bluebird 90, and the Silver Bow 30, a
total of 290 stamps, treating altogether about 400 tons per day, for an average yield
of $25 per ton in silver, besides a little gold.83
His next statement is equally important. "The active operation of the silver mines had
revived B utte...."84 They continued to help sustain the town "until 1893, when...in
common with all the silver-producing centres, [it] was prostrated by the collapse of the silver
market. "85
The milling of Butte silver ores was obviously not some sideline to the more
important interests of copper production. Montana was the largest silver producer in
America, and the Butte district was the busiest and most productive in Montana. At $25.00
per ton and 400 tons per day, the silver era yielded up $10,000 per day for more than a
decade.
ACMC was not even in existence in 1887 at the peak of the silver period. It never
dropped a single one of those 290 stamps, nor any of the hundreds of others of the smaller

93

mills. It never reduced a single pound of the millions of tons of ore. And it never generated
any of the tailings and residues.

3.

Butte Copper Concentrators and Smelters

As Rickard and others make clear, the copper and silver eras overlapped somewhat in
Butte. It is the case, as he put it, that "Butte passed through three stages of development,
devoted to the winning of gold, silver, and copper in turn."86 Silver, and a little gold, for
that matter, continued to be produced and to pay a significant share of the bills, even after
copper had become king of the Butte hill. Still, there is no disputing the dominance of the
red m etal-nor the fact that there were many players in the hunt for it.
Ralph Smith in his "History of the Early Reduction Plants of Butte, Montana,"
describes a blast furnace built in Butte in 1866. Some say it was for smelting gold quartz
ore, but "most writers," according to Smith, "favor the view that it was built to smelt the
copper ore of the Parrot Lodes." Whatever its ore of choice, it was of primitive design.
The blast for the furnace was provided by a large, handmade blacksmith’s bellows covered
with cowhide. The total cost of the "reduction works" was about $7,000; it barely lasted out
the year. Subsequent operations would be considerably larger and employ more sophisticated
hardware.87

a.

Olin Concentrator

The Olin Concentrator was located along Silver Bow Creek. It commenced operation
in July, 1876 and closed down less than a year and a half later. It operated during its brief
lifetime on a placer mining claim patented in 1880 to James A. Talbott, et al. The
concentrator was founded, owned, and operated by Giles S. Olin until his death in 1877.
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The last known operators were A.W. Barnard and his partner a Mr. Purvine, who leased the
facility after Olin’s death.88
The Olin was a concentrator without an adjacent or attendant smelter. It could reduce
low-grade ores to concentrates for less expensive shipment to smelters. Since there were no
smelters in Butte until after the Olin had closed, the concentrator’s operations from the outset
were chancey at best. Hardware included a crusher, a pair of rollers, revolving screen, and
a single automatic jig. Slimes and other tailings were re-treated by two hand jigs. Its
tailings were discharged by a waste spout into Silver Bow Creek.89 ACMC was never
involved with any part of its operation.
b.

Colorado Smelter and C oncentrator

The Colorado Smelter was, at least in its early years, another of William Andrews
Clark’s extensive holdings. In 1877 Clark had sent 150 tons of high-grade cuprous ore from
his Original Mine to the Boston and Colorado smelting firm in Black Hawk, Colorado.
Nathaniel Hill, who ran the Black Hawk operation, was intrigued by Clark’s ore and
dispatched Henry Williams, who knew much of such matters, to Butte to investigate the
source of such ores. Williams liked what he saw of Butte and in 1878-79 the Colorado &
Montana Smelting Company was bom. Hill was its president, Clark vice-president, and
Williams superintendent. In 1883 the smelter was sold to the newly organized Colorado
Smelting and Mining Company.90
The Colorado Smelter was located on the south side of Silver Bow Creek, and its
operations spread across a series of lode and placer mining claims. Given the strength,
financial and otherwise, of the men behind it, the Colorado got a favorable start. It quickly
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justified its investors high expectations, becoming Butte’s first successful copper reduction
facility.91 It had a Blake crusher, two Cornish rolls, jigs, tables for ore concentration, a
steam engine, two reverberatory roasting furnaces, and two reverberatory matting furnaces.
By early 1884, the smelter had two more furnaces; by 1885 it had six stacks and a reducing
capacity of 60 tons per day, boosted by 1888 to 75 tons. In 1881-82, the smelter had been
joined on line by a 50-ton concentrator built one mile to the west of it, also on the south side
of Silver Bow Creek. This concentrator was eventually expanded to 200 tons per day, and
then closed in 1893 when a new concentrator near the smelter was completed.92
A facility of this size figured to generate some serious tailings, and the Colorado
concentrator and smelter did. Most were dumped between the concentrators and Silver Bow
Creek. The Colorado Smelter was shut down in late 1904 and was demolished between 1905
and 1907. In late 1903, the Colorado Smelting and Mining Company’s corporate charter
expired and, as part of the liquidation of that corporation, ownership of the smelter and
concentrator were transferred to the Trenton Mining and Development Company. ACMC
acquired all of Trenton’s assets in 1910, 6 years after the closure of the smelter, and three
years after the smelter was broken up, broken down, and carted away.93

*c.

Boston and Montana Upper Works

What became the B&M’s Upper Works went on line in 1880, the reduction arm of
the New York Copper Company—later and better known as the Montana Copper Company.
Located east of Silver Bow Creek on three unpatented mining claims, the smelter had a
concentrator as well as matting, blast, and calcining furnaces. By 1884 it could treat up to
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75 tons of ore per day in its concentrator, and tons more, without preliminary concentrating,
in its matting furnaces. The end product was 25 tons of copper matte per day.94
The Montana Copper Company was lead by Charles T. Meader, S.E. Raunheim, and
the Lewisohn Brothers of New York. It ran the smelter until 1887 when the company sold it
to the Boston and Montana Consolidated Copper and Silver Mining Company, one of the
giants of Butte copper. The Boston and Montana, with the Lewisohns as major players,
operated the Upper Works only until 1893, when the company’s Great Falls, Montana
reduction plant went on line. It was the last of the Butte smelters to abandon heap roasting,
its manager, the inimical Thomas Couch, arguing that the works were in Meaderville and
thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Butte City Council and its anti-smoke ordinances.95 As
late as 1891 suit was brought against it for heap roasting ores.96 The plant’s tailings appear
to have been conveyed by a trestle leading from its concentrator to a dump between the plant
and Silver Bow Creek.97 ACMC never operated or owned the Upper Works; but for six
years the Federal Government owned the land on which it operated,
d.

P arro t Smelter

The Parrot was one of the city’s major reduction works. It was located about a half
mile east of what became the Northern Pacific Railroad depot and began operation in July of
1881. It was the smelting facility of the Parrot Silver and Copper Company formed in 1880
out of a partnership of the same name of Achille Migron, Franklin Farrel, A.M. Holter, and
S.M. Hauser. The mining claims underlying the smelter and its tailings were patented in
1882 and 1893.98
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The Parrot was an impressive facility. It began operations with eleven long-hearth
hand reverberatory roasters and six matting furnaces capable of producing blister copper, the
first such in the district. During its first year of operation a 50-ton concentrator was built on
the smelter site, and over the next two years the concentrator was expanded to 350 tons per
day. EMJ reported in 1883 that the Parrot was reducing 100 tons of ore a day from the
Parrot Mine; a number that jumped to 400 tons in 1885 with the addition of a new blast
furnace and stack. The Parrot was owned and operated for the whole of its life by the Parrot
Silver and Copper Company. In 1899, the smelter was closed. In its nearly 20 years of
operation the Parrot generated substantial tailings which were deposited along Silver Bow
Creek."
e.

Boston and M ontana Lower W orks

This reduction works was built in 1884 by the ubiquitous William Andrews Clark.
Located on Mineral Application No. 685, the placer claim on which the Olin Concentrator
once sat, the Lower Works began operations in 1884 and closed in 1893. Originally known
as Clark’s Colusa, it was outfitted with roasting, matting, and blast furnaces. It became
B&M’s Lower Works in 1888 when Clark sold it to the Boston and Montana Consolidated
Copper and Silver Mining Company. As with its Upper Works, the Boston and Montana
closed the Lower Works in 1893 when its Great Falls facility was finished. By whatever
name, the smelter was responsible for generating thousands of tons of tailings which it
dumped into an area denoted as "slag grounds" on an 1888 insurancemap.These grounds
were located between the smelter and Silver Bow Creek.100
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f.

Butte Reduction Works

The Butte Reduction Works (also called the Colusa Parrot) was built by the Butte
Smelting Company in 1883. Designed as a custom smelter, the principal players in the Butte
Smelting Company were James McArthur, Larry Muldoon, Rudolph Siever, John and
William Schaunburger, and David Murphy. The smelter was sited on the old and unpatented
Silas F. King placer claim, on the south side of, and approximately fifty feet from, Silver
Bow Creek. The BRW got off to a slow start and, under its original owners, never entirely
recovered-further evidence that copper mining and smelting were risky enterprises. In
1885, employees of the Parrot smelter took over the smelter, and in 1886 or 1887 it was sold
to William Andrews Clark—for whom mining and smelting seemed a somewhat less risky
enterprise. Clark eventually came to run the smelter under his Colusa Parrot Mining and
Smelting Company.101
Clark ran the BRW from 1886-87 until 1910; the smelter was the largest and best of
his reduction facilities, partly because he never ceased improving and increasing its
equipment. Some of these improvements came because the BRW was among the smelters
that originally built heaps of ore and firewood and burned the piles over many weeks. It
may, in fact, have been BRW smoke that occasioned Clark’s famous remark that the women
of Butte had such lovely complexions because of the arsenical smoke from the heaps. Butte
disagreed, however, and Clark and the others grudgingly agreed to use furnaces and stacks.
The BRW had them in abundance. Blast, matte, reverberatory furnaces, Bruckner cylinders,
hand roasters, along with an on-site concentrator, and vanning rooms made up the equipment
list and gave the BRW a capacity by 1905 of 1,000 tons of sulfide ore per day.102
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This was a major operation, and like all such it produced major tailings. Since the
southwest comer of the concentrator’s vanning room was only 30 feet from Silver Bow
Creek, the waters from that much abused stream were vital to operations. A.H. Wethey, the
manager of the BRW, testified that guaranteeing an adequate supply of "reasonably pure
water" required the constmction of a small dam and impoundment. Using the water from
the creek created problems; indeed, the water was "unfit for use for concentrating purposes,"
being "thoroughly impregnated with debris, grit, acids and other refuse of smelters and
reduction works situated along the...creek above the...Butte Reduction Works." As for the
water after it left the BRW, Wethey was sure that "we are putting less material into the creek
[now, i.e., 1901] than we were in 1888.1,103 He was in a position to know; by 1900
Silver Bow Creek appears to have been routed directly through the northwest comer of the
concentrator complex.104
ACMC acquired the BRW in 1910 in a transaction that netted Clark $5 million for his
Butte copper properties. For the 27 years previous to that acquisition the works had been the
property of other parties, for 24 of those years the property of W.A. Clark, who closed the
facility before the property became an asset of ACMC. After the sale, ACMC leased the
concentrator back to Clark who used it to process zinc ores until it burned to the ground on
October 24, 1911.105

g.

Butte and Boston Smelter

The Butte and Boston Smelter was another of Butte’s Big Five. Located on the Silver
Bow lode claim just upstream from the old Silver Bow Mill, it began operations in 1885 and
closed 20 years later in 1905. It is uncertain who exactly owned and operated the smelter
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prior to 1888, but by September of that year the Butte and Boston Mining Company,
incorporated in Montana, was clearly the owner and operator. A.J. Davis was the
Company’s president, and D.L. Demmon of Boston was its treasurer. The company bought
the Silver Bow Mill on adjacent property and began a significant expansion.106
By 1896 the B&B was experiencing financial difficulties; the EMJ attributed them to
mismanagement. The historian Michael Malone, however, citing the contemporary financier
and corporate shark, Thomas Lawson, suggests that the B&B’s problems arose from the fact
that its larger corporate "companion," the Boston and Montana, was plundering it. In 1896,
creditors brought legal actions against the B&B, a receiver was appointed, and all the
company’s assets were auctioned off at a sheriffs sale. As a result, a new or "reorganized"
company, the Butte and Boston Consolidated Mining Company was incorporated in New
York and eventually assumed ownership and management of the smelter.107
The Butte and Boston Smelter was a typical Butte operation, complete with both blast
and reverberatory furnaces, a concentrator on site, and, in later years, a converter plant.
Over the course of its 20 years of operation the B&B smelter generated significant tailings,
many of which were reprocessed at the Anaconda Smelter during World War II. In 1901
both the Boston and Montana and the Butte and Boston companies became owned in large
part by the Amalgamated Copper Company, and in 1910, five years after the shut down of
the Butte and Boston Smelter, the properties were sold to ACM C.108

h.

Montana Ore Purchasing Company Smelter

The MOPCO works, smelter and concentrator, were the reduction arm of F.
Augustus Heinze and his Montana Ore Purchasing Company. To put the matter briefly and
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charitably, the MOP was involved in a number of activities. Whether those included
extortion, bribery, and armed robbery would depend entirely on which contemporary
accounts one chooses to read. It was impossible to be neutral about Heinze or his Montana
Ore Purchasing Company or his United Copper Company, formed in 1902 to hold his
operating companies, including MOP, its mines and reduction works, or even his Johnstown
Mining Company formed to evade an injunction against his Rarus M ine.109
The MOPCO smelter was located just north of the Butte and Boston facility on Silver
Bow Creek in Meaderville. It opened in 1893; its concentrator burned in 1902 and was not
rebuilt, and the entire operation was closed in July 1906.110 Heinze taught Butte a lot
about mining and even more about the myriad and mischievous uses to which the apex law
could be put, but there was nothing that distinguished the MOPCO from the other Butte
smelters of that era. When it started, the company owned no mines or concentrator, so it
leased the old Liquidator concentrator from Patrick Largey and Patrick Lavelle111 and
began to treat ores at relatively low rates from other mines.112 Over its operating lifetime,
the smelter concentrated ores and treated them in both blast and reverberatory furnaces. The
smoke problem was "solved" by two stacks 125 and 175 feet high.113 The MOPCO was an
uncommonly profitable facility. Well managed and well fed by highly productive mines, it
made millions for Heinze and his partners.
Its tailings production seems to have been disposed of in the time honored way:
tailings and slag dumps along Silver Bow Creek and eventual washing and scouring by the
creek. Even these tailings, however, occasioned conflict. In 1899 Heinze filed suit against
the neighboring B&B Smelter, seeking condemnation proceedings on Butte and Boston
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ground for a tailings disposal area for the MOPCO. By that time Heinze’s concentrator was
working 600 tons of ore per day and of that quantity, 425 tons ended up as waste. The
Company had been dumping concentrator tailings for almost eight years and had covered five
acres, not counting those carried off by water. As for the smelter, it was reducing 600 to
700 tons of concentrates and ore per day. The Company needed all the dumping ground it
could get.114
It is well known that Heinze used the apex law and a compliant court system in an
effort to capture mining properties of other companies. He was involved in law suits with
the Butte and Boston, the Boston and Montana, and the Amalgamated Copper Companies—
among other legal tangles. On one occasion, miners working in a MOPCO mine tunneled
into an ore bed on an adjacent mine, provoking an armed battle thousands of feet below the
surface. On another occasion, Heinze staked a mining claim of 0.009 acres, called it the
Copper Trust, argued that the most valuable veins of the huge Neversweat and Anaconda
Mines apexed on the Trust’s claim and therefore belonged to him. He was a fascinating and
complex character.115
He was also one whose only dealings with ACMC were of a distinctly adversarial
sort. In early 1906, having lost his major battles with Amalgamated, Heinze sold the
MOPCO to Thomas F. Cole. Cole subsequently transferred these properties, including the
MOPCO Smelter, to the Red Metal Mining Company. The smelter was soon closed after
this transfer. Amalgamated was minimally involved in the ownership of Red Metal—it owned
50,000 of 1,000,000 shares in the Butte Coalition Mining Company, Red M etal’s parent
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corporation. ACMC acquired the property of Red Metal in 1910. At no time did ACMC
operate the MOPCO smelter or own the land on which MOPCO operations took place.116

i.

Pittsmont Smelter

The Pittsmont Smelter was located east of Butte and Meaderville. This was the first
major smelter to be sited away from the Butte Hill on the flats and far to the east of Silver
Bow Creek. In 1902 Ralph Baggaley, backed by Pittsburgh money, bought the site and
another large tract of land in East Butte. The property had been partially developed
previously by Franklin Farrel and a few associates. Farrel, from Ansonia, Connecticut, had
been involved in the Parrot Smelter and Centennial Mill, but his East Butte properties were
untested. Baggaley’s new company, formed in 1905, was called the Pittsburgh and Montana
Copper Company or, after its reorganization in 1908, the Pittsmont Copper Company.
Baggaley announced that a huge new vein of copper ore had been discovered (where is
unstated) and that a major reduction facility would be built to serve the mine. The smelter
began operation in July of 1905.117
The construction and operational details of the new facility were kept a secret;
Baggaley, it seemed, was going to try a new, experimental process for the smelting of
copper ores, a process that would reduce low-grade copper ore to copper matte to blister
copper in one smooth and continuous operation. There would be no milling or concentrating
of the ores. The key was the new Garretson furnace, a kind of oblong blast furnace,
recently invented—if not perfected—by Oliver Garretson of Buffalo, New York. Butte’s lowgrade ore may not have been the perfect fodder for Garretson’s new furnace or the furnace
did not work. Baggaley retrofitted the smelter with inventions of his ow n-which worked
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only scarcely better than Garretson’s. Add to this a shortage of available ore, and by 1907
Baggaley, wiser and millions of dollars poorer, returned to the East. In 1909 the East Butte
Copper Mining Company acquired a majority stock ownership in the Pittsmont Company and
took over the operation of the smelter.118
East Butte put Oscar Rohn in charge of operations, replaced Baggeley’s failed system
with a standard 250-ton concentrator joined to a 250-ton blast furnace, and ran the smelter
from 1909 to 1924. By 1931, the East Butte Copper Mining Company and the Pittsmont
Copper Company were in liquidation, and the smelter equipment was sold for salvage.
ACMC never owned or operated the smelter. It acquired the real property in 1936, 12 years
after the smelter was closed.119
j.

Bullwhacker Leaching Plant

Like the Pittsmont, the Bullwhacker was a new facility that treated copper ores. The
property of the Bullwhacker Copper Company, headed by Patrick Clark, the plant was
completed in 1912 and began operation in January of 1913.120 In 1914 the Company was
reorgainized and the new company that emerged was labeled the Butte-Bullwhacker Mining
Company.121 The leaching plant was built to treat ores from the Bullwhacker mine. It was
not one of Butte’s giants. The plant operated at full capacity only until January, 1914 and
was shut down, along with its namesake mine, in August, 1914.122 The mine operated
again, but the leaching plant never reopened. In January, 1917 a new agreement resulted in
the joint operation of the Bullwhacker mine and properties of the Butte-Duluth Company by
the utilitarian named Mines Operating Company.123 During the short life of the
Bullwhacker Plant, it handled between 50 and 250 tons of copper ores per day, treating them
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with sulphuric acid to dissolve out the copper.124 There is no record of how it handled its
wastes.
k.

Butte-Duluth Mill and Electrolytic Plant

The Butte-Duluth Mining Company was incorporated in June, 1912. The
incorporators and directors were Alfred C. Kremer, J.B. Kremer, L.P. Sanders, W.M.
Tuohy, and C.M . Everett. The Company’s principal owner, and the man apparently in
charge, was Captain A.B. W olvin.125 The Butte-Duluth, like the Bullwhacker with which
it shared an operational history for a time, was a copper processing facility. The leaching
plant for the Butte-Duluth began operations in July 1913, utilizing a process of crushing ores
then leaching them with sulphuric acid and precipitating the copper from solution by
electrolysis.126 In September 1913, the mill’s capacity was reported to be 100 tons/day.
Two months later it was listed at 240 tons/day. In July 1914, a new 1,000 ton crushing
plant was put into operation, although daily throughput seldom if ever exceeded 250
tons.127
The plant suffered from recurring financial problems. In April 1915, with the
Company in receivership, it was reported to be closed; it was still closed eight months
later.128 In July 1916 some of the plant’s equipment was sold to pay the Company’s debts,
and, although an effort was made to restart the operation in late 1916, it ran sporadically and
at a rate of only 200 tons daily into 1917.129
This wobbly operational history was matched by corporate problems. In 1914 the
Butte-Duluth Mining Company was reportedly sold to Hayden, Stone and Company, but it
does not appear that the sale was ever consummated. In December of 1915, after the
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Company had gone into receivership, the East Butte Mining Company agreed to reopen and
operate the Butte-Duluth properties, but like the Hayden, Stone deal, this agreement does not
appear to have been completed. In January 1917, an agreement was reached which turned
Butte-Duluth, as well as Bullwhacker, operations over to the Mines Operating Company.
Ten years later, Butte-Duluth’s assets were sold to Paul Hudtloff at a sheriffs sale.130
The disposal practices of the Butte-Duluth are difficult to uncover. It is possible to
find information on production and financial difficulties in the EMJ and the Mining and
Scientific Press, but neither of those two leading journals had anything to say about waste
disposal—by the Butte-Duluth or anyone else. It was simply not an issue. What can be
learned is sketchy. Water from Horse Canyon Creek was diverted by means of a dam and
pipes, but this was incoming water, a part of the production process. The Sanborn Fire
Insurance map for 1916 shows that tailings were moved by a conveyer and tram to a dump
west of the plant, but what happened to them next cannot be known with any certainty.131
4.

Butte Zinc Concentration and Reduction Operations

Butte, after 1893, was preeminently a copper town. It had some of the largest copper
mines in the world, and, in nearby Anaconda, it had the world’s largest copper reduction
facility. Two other metals, however, played a role: zinc and manganese. As noted
previously, William Andrews Clark leased back the concentrator at the Butte Reduction
Works from ACMC in order to work his zinc ores. During the little more than a year Clark
used the BRW to process the zinc from his Elm Orlu Mine, zinc tailings were generated and
disposed of at the BRW. But there were other zinc operations with histories entirely separate
from the above silver and copper operations, and it is to their history that I now turn.
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a.

Butte and Superior Mill

This large zinc processor came late to the Butte Hill. Located near the Black Rock
Mine, the mill began operations in 1912 and continued to process zinc ores from company
mines until September 1923. It was owned and managed by the Butte and Superior Copper
Company, Ltd., an Arizona corporation, which changed its name in 1916 to the Butte and
Superior Mining Company. In September, 1923 the company closed the facility
permanently, agreeing to sell its ores to ACMC. The mill was dismantled and salvaged
sometime prior to December 1939. The Company’s corporate charter had expired in 1931,
and ACMC purchased its remaining real property in 1940.132
From the beginning of operations the Butte and Superior had problems with tailings
disposal. One example, from 1916, involved a dam giving way at the mill complex and
sending
a torrent of slime, mud and water down a Meaderville street, completely demolishing
one and damaging several other homes. A number of people had a narrow escape
from death by drowning. As a result of the flood, Main St....w as impassable for 150
feet all day long.... due to the great amount of tailings deposited in the creek and
around buildings, it will be several days before it has completely drained....133
Nothing changed—or improved—in the remaining years of the Butte and Superior’s
operations. Its total tailings load for the eleven years it was in business was approximately
3.3 million tons, at least 460,000 tons of which were used to put out an underground mine
fire. At that, more than 2.5 million tons of waste were stored on site, much of it to be
washed down Silver Bow Creek.134 In a 1921 report, the Butte City Attorney pointed out
that until 1916 the bed of Silver Bow Creek had been on "practically the same level for a
great many years," but that since that year new mills had been constructed and the "tailings
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from said mills [ran] into said Creek and that some of the Companies made little or no effort
to impound tailings. . .and allowed vast quantities. . . to flow into and down the. . .
Creek."135
b.

Tim ber Butte Mill

When the concentrator of the Butte Reduction Works burned down in 1911, W.A.
Clark was left without a facility for the reduction of zinc ores from his Elm Orlu and Poser
Mines. Ever resourceful, Clark built a new mill south of the city at Timber Butte. The mill
was the property of the Timber Butte Milling Company incorporated by W.A. Clark, W.A.
Clark, Jr., W.D. Mangam, Alexander Johnson, and J.K. Heslet.136 The mill began
operations in June of 1914 and, according to Ralph Smith, "flourished for many years
processing Clark’s ore and doing a large custom business."137
"Many years" meant until 1930, when the mill was closed for the compelling reasons
that its processing equipment by then was duplicated by ACMC facilities at Anaconda and
the Depression reduced demand for zinc and other metals.138 It was closed, in fact, by
ACMC, its owner since 1928.139 In 1939 ACMC sold the plant to Dulien Steel Products,
Inc.; some cleanup and tailings processing operations took place subsequently, but in 1948
the mill was totally dismantled and moved from the site.140
During its operating lifetime the Timber Butte Mill treated all of Clark’s zinc ores
from the Elm Orlu and Poser mines and generated considerable quantities of tailings. It had
both wet-concentration and floatation departments, their capacities steadily increasing from
400 tons/day in 1914 to more than double that in 1917. In addition to these fairly impressive
figures, by 1916 an annex to the mill was treating approximately 1,500 tons/day of copper
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tailings from the old Butte Reduction Works, a process continued until 1920.141 The mill
stayed busy as late as 1927, the year before its transfer to ACMC. The U.S.G.S. reported
that the "Elm Orlu Mining Co. operated its mine. . .the entire year [in 1927] and shipped a
large quantity of lead-zinc ore to the Timber Butte Milling C o.’s plant. . . . "

The mill

separated the ore into a lead concentrate "which is shipped to a lead smelter and a zinc
concentrate which is treated in the electroytic zinc plant at Great Falls." As for the mine, it
"ranked second in the production of zinc in Montana in 1927, third in silver, fourth in lead,
and seventh in copper....the mine has been one of the largest producers of zinc in Montana
since 1914. . . ." The mill was as productive as the mine. It was
active throughout the year, treating ore chiefly from the Elm Orlu, Poser, Moulton,
and Otisco properties [but]...it also treated much custom material from mines
in...Jefferson, Cascade, and Granite Counties. The plant treated nearly 350,000 tons
of ore in 1927...142
Less is known about its tailings or the mill’s methods of dealing with them. It was
built high on a hill and a photograph of it was used on the cover of the EMJ as an example
of "an inclined mill site." The EMJ did not say that the incline was useful for the disposal
of wastes, though it did mention that "only such water escapes as is sufficient to carry away
sand and slime tailings."143 At Timber Butte, tailings deposition involved impoundment in
a draw at the foot of the butte and a concrete lined dam complete with a sluiceway. At that,
some of the mill’s tailings reached Silver Bow Creek.144
c.

Q phir Mill

In addition to the Butte and Superior and Timber Butte, one other zinc processing
facility also began operating in the early years of this century. This was the Ophir, a 200ton concentrating mill that was completed in November of 1912 and receiving ores by
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December.145 The mill appears to have been constructed by the Butte Central Copper
Company, organized under Delaware’s laws in 1908.146 The Butte Central seems to have
failed, but not until the Ophir mill was up and operating. In 1916, the Butte-Detroit Copper
and Zinc Mining Company, also incorporated in Delaware, took over the Ophir mine and
mill from the Butte Central. These properties, however, were either cursed or the victim of
undercapitalized speculation in zinc and manganese properties. Whatever the explanation, by
1919 both mine and mill belonged to the U.S. Manganese Corporation.147
Despite its confusing corporate parentage, the Ophir mill was a fairly big-time
producer. It used a cyanide process for the treatment of its mostly zinc feed ores, and began
operations able to handle 475 tons of ore per day. In 1916 the concentrator was remodeled
and an oil floatation system was installed for the treatment of 100 to 150 more tons of zinc
ores per day—all of them from the Colorado mine of the Davis-Daly company. The next
year, stimulated by the new markets for manganese arising out of World War I, and despite
the fact that the mill’s zinc operations were not running at full capacity, Butte-Detroit made
additional changes which allowed the Ophir to treat 200 to 400 tons of manganese ores daily.
The facility was shut down in Feburary 1917, but reopened later in hopes of tapping the war
time market for manganese. During some of the time it was producing manganese for the
war, the mill was operated by the New York-Montana Testing and Engineering Company of
Helena.148
The Ophir dealt with its tailings in a rather unique way. The mill was located almost
directly over the Buffalo Gulch storm sewer. In 1912 the Butte Central Copper Company
paid half of the cost of the part of a sewer extension which crossed the Ophir claim. It was
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a wise investment; this section of the sewer was used for carrying away the mill’s tailings.
Occasionally problems arose. In 1918, the EMJ reported that the mill was "threatened with
shutdown." It seemed the "Buffalo Gulch storm sewer used for carrying...tailings was
clogged by debris coming with the spring thaw."149 Buffalo Gulch was a tributary (often
dry) of Silver Bow Creek.
5.

Anaconda Copper Mining Company

Although not the only one, ACMC ultimately became the biggest player in the Butte
and Anaconda field, and some account of the corporate genealogy of the Anaconda Company
is clearly in order. The Anaconda Mine, like most in Butte at that time, was originally a
silver producer and a good one; good enough to attract the attention of Marcus Daly, in town
on Walker Brothers’ business. In 1880 Daly bought the Anaconda from Michael Hickey and
his co-owner Charles X. Larabie for $30,000. But Daly needed more cash to develop the
property. As noted earlier in this report, he approached James Ben Ali Haggin and Lloyd
Tevis, San Francisco lawyers representing the interests of George Hearst, and persuaded the
three Californians to join him in organizing a partnership. There was no need to
incorporate; the three had plenty of money.150
The Anaconda Silver Mining Company partnership leased the Dexter Mill to reduce
the silver ores from the mine. The Anaconda performed well enough, but its silver ores kept
turning up unacceptably high levels of copper. Daly and the others had either to abandon the
project or rethink it. Not easily discouraged, Daly invited Hearst out to look over the
property, hoping to convince him to finance a copper hunt. Hearst agreed, and in 1881 at
the 300-foot level, Daly’s crews struck a five-foot vein of copper glance. It was, according
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to the historian Michael Malone, "the largest deposit of copper sulfide the world had ever
seen."151 Anaconda would continue to produce silver, but from this point forward both the
mine and the company named for it were inextricably tied to the world of copper.
The timing could not have been more fortuitous. In 1882 the Pearl Street Electrical
Station opened in New York City; the United States was entering the electrical age, and
copper would provide the means of carrying the electric currents. Daly could not have
known that, but he knew enough. He understood mining and the laws which governed i t both statutory and scientific; he had trusting and well-heeled allies; and he had a mine, soon
to be joined by others, filled with the red metal. Copper, however, had to be mined by the
megaton if it were to yield a profitable return. And those tons had to be concentrated,
smelted, and refined. Daly, in other words, needed a reduction works.152
By 1882, Daly had bought up other mining properties near the Anaconda and had
persuaded his partners to abandon their dreams of silver and replace them with more prosaic,
though no less well-paying, visions of copper. Specifically, he persuaded them to finance a
mammoth copper reduction facility to work the ores of the Anaconda group of mines. The
smelting complex would be built on Warm Springs Creek, about 26 miles west of Butte.
There was ample water, good prospects for rail service from mine to smelter, and a ready
made town site. In 1883 ground was broken for what would be known as the Washoe
Smelter at the same time that the new town was being laid out. Daly had wanted to call the
town Copperopolis but another Montana town had taken that name, and Daly settled for the
name of the company that would dominate it.153
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The plant opened operations in 1884, with 60 stamps for silver ore, steam stamps for
crushing copper ore, a concentration department, 34 reverberatory roasters, 26 reverberatory
matting furnaces of 15 ton-per-day capacity each, and two 70-ton-per-day capacity blast
furnaces. Called the Upper Works and located on the north side of Warm Springs Creek, it
was the largest smelter in the world, capable of reducing to a copper matte of 64 percent
copper the 450 to 500 tons of ore it received each day. The matte was then sent to East
Coast and British refineries for finishing.154
From this point forward, the Anaconda syndicate grew at an astonishing rate. Old
mines were bought and new ones developed. The Upper Works was expanded to a capacity
of 1,000 tons per day, and even that was insufficient to handle all that the Anaconda mines
could produce. In 1889-90, after fires at both the Anaconda Mine and the Upper Works, a
new sm elter-the Lower W orks-w as finished on the north side of Warm Springs Creek. The
Syndicate could now process 4,000 tons per day.155 By 1891, Daly had added a refinery to
his Anaconda facilities; by 1895 he had greatly enlarged and expanded it to the point that the
entire Anaconda or Washoe works could produce 100 to 120 tons of marketable copper every
day.
But still the Anaconda mines produced faster than the Anaconda smelters could
consume. In 1900, the year of his death, Daly proposed the construction of a new smelter,
this one south of Warm Springs Creek, run by electricity and capable of reducing 5,000 tons
of copper sulfide ore per day. Separately owned by the Washoe Copper Company, in
Malone’s apt language, it was a "mighty complex. . .the wonder of its day in the world of
copper. . .the world’s largest sm elter."156 These properties would be the heart and soul of
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Anaconda’s Butte and Anaconda properties for the next 80 years.

And let there be no

mistake. Anaconda was a huge operation. At one time, it produced 40% of the world’s
copper. It provided steady, good-paying jobs to thousands of people, many of them drawn
from the most marginalized and defenseless of dozens of nations. Half the wage workers in
the state worked for it; one-third of the population of the state lived in the three cities where
its operations were located. It was also responsible for millions of tons of tailings. The
Anaconda Company was a large industrial corporation with big production numbers.157
To say that the corporate history of the Anaconda was not as smooth as the industrial
is vastly to understate. Daly and the syndicate had constructed a wonderfully integrated
industrial complex of mines, railroad, and reduction works. An operation of this size—and
with balance sheets to match—was hard to keep hidden. The Anaconda had a number of
"admirers." By the time the most persistent of them made its intentions known, ownership
of Anaconda properties had gone through a couple of transformations. In January of 1891,
the Daly, Tevis, Hearst, and Haggin partnership was terminated and its properties transferred
to the newly incorporated Anaconda Mining Company, with a capital stock of $12,500,000.
Incorporation, of course, meant that outsiders—including many far outside—could have a
piece of Daly’s dream.158
The first were the London-based Rothschilds who, through their Exploration
Company, bought up more than a fourth of the Anaconda Mining Company’s stock. In June
1895, the Anaconda properties were sold to the Anaconda Copper Mining Company where
they would remain.159 Still under Daly’s expert guidance, ACMC continued to grow—and
attract attention.
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The next chapter of the Anaconda story has been told often. The full story need not
be told here, but its outlines at least need to be recounted and held in mind. In 1899,
Thomas Lawson, a Wall Street plunger, and two of the Standard Oil trust’s most important
players, H.H. Rogers and William Rockefeller, determined to buy into Butte. Ironically, it
was the Boston "twins," the entirely separate Boston & Montana and Butte & Boston
properties, that first interested them. It was ACMC, however, that finally fell to them.
Rogers and Rockefeller bought up huge amounts of ACMC stock. In April, they and other
Standard Oil executive officers incorporated as the Amalgamated Copper Company. Lawson
had been excluded.160
The Amalgamated Copper Company was a holding company. It neither dug nor
delved, smelted nor refined. It operated no mines or reduction works; it did not do anything
except own stock in companies that did own and operate mines and smelting works. At the
moment of its incorporation, the Amalgamated made a first section issue of its stock which
included some very nice properties: ACMC, the Washoe Copper Company, the Parrot Silver
and Copper Company, and the Colorado Smelting and Mining Company. These companies
led quite separate corporate lives; they each had their own stock, held board meetings, keep
their own books, paid their own share of taxes.161 The same must be said of the companies
in Amalgamated’s second section issuance of stock in 1901: the Boston & Montana (with its
reduction works in Great Falls) and the Butte & Boston Consolidated Companies. These
acquisitions, involving mines and smelting facilities, permitted Amalgamated to consolidate
the reduction of copper ores in Anaconda and Great Falls.162
6.

Consolidation

116

The story might have ended there, except for the actions of F. Augustus Heinze.163
Heinze had begun to make creative use of the apex law years before Amalgamated had even
been a corporate gleam in Rogers’ eye. Heinze’s first targets, in fact, were the Boston &
Montana and the Butte & Boston Companies. He did not relax his efforts when the Boston
companies fell into the Amalgamated basket, and what had once been the B&B and B&M’s
problem became Rogers’ and the Amalgamated’s .164
By 1900, three years after filing his first apex suit, Heinze had an ally in the always
sure-footed William Andrews Clark. Heinze would not keep him, and by 1901 Heinze was
battling the Amalgamated alone. He would lose-but not without a marathon fight that had
all the elements of a Victorian tragedy, including the Rogers-ordered 1903 shutdown of all of
Amalgamated’s Montana properties. By 1906 Heinze was defeated and forced to sell his
Montana Ore Purchasing Company and other properties, not to Amalgamated but to Thomas
Cole and eventually to the Butte Coalition Mining Company and its fully-held Red Metal
Mining Company. Heinze collected $10,000,000 for his properties; Amalgamated and its
operating companies got dismissal of 110 adverse law suits earlier brought by Heinze. Four
years later, in May of 1910, William Andrews Clark, tiring of the chase, his Senatorial
ambitions finally realized, sold his major copper properties, including the Butte Reduction
Works to Amalgamated. That same year Amalgamated consolidated ownership of all its
Butte and Anaconda copper operations under ACMC. In 1915, after as tumultuous a 16-year
run as any American corporation had ever had, and with no more real reason to be, the
Amalgamated dissolved itself, leaving ACMC alone of its operating companies intact.165

117

Thus, in 1899, 1901, and 1910 Amalgamated consolidated the mining and smelting
operations in Butte and Anaconda under one corporate holding company. The reasons behind
these various acquisitions and consolidations, however, were different. In 1899, 1901 and
1906, Amalgamated was "investing," and consolidation of the reduction of ores led to
efficiency and made business sense. So also with the 1910 purchase from Clark. The
acquisitions in 1906 from Heinze and 1910 from Clark also removed rivals and the threat of
continuing and additional apex litigation.
Heinze had taken the apex law and taught it to dance. He filed suit after suit claiming
that his ownership of the ground where ore veins came to the surface or apexed gave him
ownership of the entire vein regardless of its twists and turns underground and regardless of
the financial muscle of the mining companies that "owned" and were working those veins.
Add to the mix a couple of sympathetic—some said bought-and-paid-for—judges, and it is
easy to see how Heinze became the scourge of the Amalgamated and how, upon its eventual
and very expensive victory over Heinze, Amalgamated opted to buy up every claim, mine,
mill, and tool shed in Butte. Amalgamated had dealt with Heinze’s judges by forcing the
passage of a state Fair Trials Act in 1903. But the apex law remained to vex and haunt
them. Written with California ores in mind, it never fit the geological circumstances in
Butte; it was always an open invitation to the clever and/or crooked.166
The 1910 consolidation of assets in ACMC must also be viewed in this context:
Amalgamated wanted to eliminate the possibility that some bandit might use the apex law to
raid its properties— and making ACMC owner eliminated this possibility. Clark, after all,
had for a short time been Heinze’s ally and, in Butte, even one as powerful as Amalgamated

118

could not be too careful. Consolidation was thus, at least in part, a defensive act made
necessary by a bad Federal law.

7.

Philipsburg and the Flint Creek Drainage

In addition to non-ACMC operations in Butte, there were many other non-ACMC
lode mining and processing facilities in the Upper Clark Fork Basin. By far the largest and
most long-lived of these were in the Philipsburg mining district. One of the most productive
silver mining and milling operations anywhere in the West was based in this Flint Creek
valley community and in neighboring Granite. ACMC did not own or operate any of the
Philipsburg operations. But those operations added millions of tons of waste deposits to the
Flint Creek drainage, and thus to the Clark Fork River into which Flint Creek deposited its
loads of silt, sediment, metals and tailings.
The placer mines of the Philipsburg district have already been discussed. But the
district also had a long history of lode mine and ore-processing operations; at one time or
another from the late 1860s until the 1980s, more than 20 silver, zinc, and/or manganese
reduction facilities were located in the Philipsburg area. These were fed by dozens of lode
mines producing mostly silver, along with gold, zinc and manganese as well. Thousands of
tons of ore were lifted by many thousands of men and processed by many thousands more.
This history, too, must be briefly recounted.
The town of Philipsburg was settled in 1866. The next year the St. Louis and
Montana Mining Company built the Hope Mill, a ten-stamp silver mill, the first of its kind in
the Territory.167 Built of stone, it had in addition to its 650-pound stamps, six
amalgamating pans, and three settlers, all driven by an 80-horsepower engine.168 The mill
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ran almost without interruption from its founding until the collapse of silver in 1893, and
intermittently thereafter until its final closure in 1910.169
The Hope was followed by other silver mills, including the 20-stamp mill owned and
operated by the Northwest Company and the Algonquin Mill, a 20-stamp roasting and
chloridizing operation.170 But clearly the giant of the silver producers was the famous
Granite-Bimetallic Consolidated Mining Company, a corporation bom in 1898 of the
marriage of the Granite Mountain Mining Company and the Bimetallic Mining Company.
The Granite Mountain Mining Company was organized in 1881 by a syndicate of St.
Louis investors, most of whom were already involved in the Hope Mining Co.171 The
Company was the fortunate owner of the bonanza Granite Mountain silver mine. Between
December 1884 and March 1889, Granite Mountain built three mills to treat the silver ores
of its mammoth mine: Mill A, Mill B and Mill C (Rumsey M ill).172 Mills A and B were
located at Granite, Montana, near the mine, while the Rumsey Mill was built on Fred Burr
Creek at Rumsey, Montana, about a mile and a half south of the mine.173 Combined, the
mills were dropping 180 stamps and treating silver ores by chloridizing, roasting and pan
amalgamation.174
Adjoining the Granite Mountain Mine on the west and north was the mine of the
Bimetallic Mining Company.175 This mine was also a colossal silver producer, and in 1888
the company built the Bimetallic Mill to treat its ores.176 Originally a 50-stamp mill, by
1890 its size had been doubled.177 Like the Granite Mountain mills, the Bimetallic mill
employed the "Reese River process" of chloridizing, roasting, and pan amalgamation.178
The total gross output of the Bimetallic Company for the first decade of its operational life
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was valued at $5 million; dividends to investors were in excess of $1,000,000. Over 450
men worked in the Bimetallic’s mines and mill. There was not a silver mine/mill complex in
Butte with numbers that approached these.
The four mills of these two silver giants operated nearly without interruption until the
repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and resulting plummeting silver prices in 1893,
when the mines and mills of both companies were shut down.179 Both companies operated
intermittently until 1897, primarily by reworking tailings and ore dumps.180 The Bimetallic
installed a sulphite leaching lixivating plant in 1893 to treat mill tailings, and three years
later constructed a new concentrator.181 By late 1897 or early 1898 the mills of the two
companies were in full operation, and just a few months later they consolidated to form the
Granite-Bimetallic Consolidated Mining Company.182 Significant improvements were made
in the company’s mines, and a new 300-ton-per-day concentrator was installed at the
Bimetallic Mill. By 1901 the tailings pile at the Bimetallic Mill — an accumulation of about
one million tons — comprised the largest tailings dump in the state.183 By 1902, nearly
6,000,000 ounces of silver and over 75,000 ounces of gold were raised from Philipsburg
district mines and processed by Granite-Bimetallic. From 1901 forward, the company mined
about 600,000 tons of ore.184 On August 1, 1905, the mines and mills of the GraniteBimetallic were closed down. After that time the company’s efforts were spent primarily on
reworking tailings, including construction of a cyanide plant.185
The next rush of activity from Philipsburg came during World War I. The war
created markets for American manufacturers, including steel producers, but it also
interrupted the delivery of certain necessary raw materials, including the German and British
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manganese necessary for the production of that steel. Here was a double-barrelled
opportunity. There was money to be had from the development of America’s abundant
manganese supplies; and money to be had from the steel made with that manganesepresuming, of course, that that manganese could be developed.186 When the United States
entered the war in 1917, what had been an economic opportunity became a military
necessity, and the Federal Government began quite actively to stimulate the mining and
processing of manganese ores.
Great quantities of those ores were located within a mile of downtown
Philipsburg.187 There had been some mining of manganese in the Philipsburg district as
early as 1900, but the take-off occurred in 1916 and peaked in 1918. The Federal
j

Government, operating under the Mineral Control Act of 1918, was involved from the
beginning. The Control Act was passed "to provide...for the national security and defense
by encouraging the production, conserving the supply, and controlling the distribution of
certain vital materials of war—manganese among them .188 The U.S.G.S. would serve as
the Government’s agent in this cooperative venture.
Meetings were held between J.T. Pardee, the Survey’s field agent for Philipsburg,
and an association of local miners and mine owners. Pardee obviously impressed upon the
Philipsburg miners that they had a patriotic obligation to get the manganese ore out of the
ground and that their patriotism in this instance would be handsomely rewarded: the market
was huge and stable and the price was steady. And Philipsburg responded by producing
more than 127,000 long tons of manganese ore in 1918, more than twice the production of
the previous year—before appeals were made to their patriotic duty. To put the figure in
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perspective, the entire domestic production of manganese from 1838 to 1918 had been
414,738 long tons. Philipsburg alone, in one year, had produced more than one-fourth that
amount.189
In 1917, the Philipsburg Mining Company—a consolidation of Granite-Bimetallic,
Hope Mining, and others-built a 350-ton concentration mill to process low-grade manganese
ores, as well as silver-lead-zinc ore.190 Marginally successful, the mill operated until 1922
when the company built an electro-magnetic concentrator to process manganese only and shut
down the old concentrator.191 Besieged by bad luck, both mills burned down in 1925 and
were never rebuilt.192
For purposes of manganese production, the war ended too early. As the Montana
State Industrial Accident Board put it in 1919,
It was fortunate that peace reduced the demand for manganese ore. During the
war the little camp of Philipsburg furnished the bulk of the high grade
manganese ore of the world, and when we consider how important was this
product in the steel and munitions making industries, it becomes more
interesting. But the demand is now largely curtailed.193
What the board meant by "more interesting" is uncertain. The Federal Government,
however, acknowledged that it had "stimulated" this production and that stimulation in the
context of war had amounted to a Government "request and demand." In 1919, the Congress
passed the War Relief Mineral Claims Act, allowing affected mining companies to File claims
against the Government for the recovery of losses incurred in meeting the requirements of
the 1918 Act. Philipsburg miners were active claimants.194
Not surprisingly, no one kept track of the tailings resulting from Governmentstimulated manganese production. The camp continued to mine and mill manganese,
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averaging about 15,000 tons of the pink metal from 1919 to 1947.195 It also continued to
produce sizeable yields of silver, gold, copper, zinc, and lead throughout the 20s, 30s, and
40s. 1931 and 1932 were bad years for all metals, but 1934-36 witnessed record breaking
years for silver, gold, lead, and zinc—and manganese numbers that made the district the
largest producer of battery-grade manganese in the United States.196
Certainly, Federal mine officials did not lose track of the camp and its activities, and
when the Second World War began the Government again turned to Philipsburg. In 1942, as
part of a national effort to develop more fully the country’s mineral deposits for the war
effort, the Moorlight Mining Company and the Trout Mining Division of American Machine
and Metals, Inc., began to mine and process manganese-bearing ores in Philipsburg.
Actually, the Moorlight Mining Company had been milling manganese ore on an
intermittent basis since World War I .197 Then during the 1940s it operated a 100-ton
magnetic-separation mill which produced battery-grade manganese concentrate.198
Originally owned and operated by the Moorlight Mining Company, the property was
acquired by Taylor-Knapp Company, a well-known name in Philipsburg mining circles.
Taylor-Knapp continued to operate the property more or less continuously from 1945 through
1971.
The Trout Mining Company originally built its 50-ton-per-day manganese
concentrator in 1925.199 By 1935 the Trout operation consisted of a 100-ton high intensity
magnetic concentrator for the production of battery manganese ore and a flotation mill for
the treatment of silver-lead-zinc ores.200 It also contributed to the production of battery
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grade manganese during World War II.201 The Trout mills operated through about
1961.202
Philipsburg’s World War II production figures did not approach those of World War
I, but they were more than sufficient for the district to hold its rank as the largest producer
of battery-grade manganese in the nation.203 As for Montana, as a whole the U.S. Bureau
of Mines reported that "sixty-eight percent of the total metallurgical manganese ore and 77
percent of the high grade battery ore shipped from mines in 1942 came from M ontana."204
The Metals Reserve Company, through its agent the Sunshine Mining Company, was
stockpiling much of this ore.205 As will be seen, this metallurgical manganese production
was from Butte as well as Philipsburg, and much of it was from Government- operated
facilities.
As was the case during World War I, tailings amounts were not an issue. There
were, however, a couple of brief references to the processing of manganese ores in
Philipsburg. Tailings from the Moorlight concentrator were mixed with the city’s untreated
sewage, filling the system "to the point of saturation," and discharged through the drains into
Flint Creek. It was a significant discharge. The Moorlight put 2,266,000 gallons of water
and 440 cubic feet of solids per day into Philipsburg’s sewer and, eventually, into the
waterways.206
Mining activity continued in Philipsburg until the early 70s. A number of companies,
including Taylor-Knapp and Black Pine Mines, Inc. made the Flint Creek Valley their home
base. As for the Federal Government, it continued to send scores of Bureau of Mines
(BOM), Defense Minerals Exploration Administration (DMEA), and Office of Minerals
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Exploration (OME) agents on exploratory expeditions to drill, take core samples, assay ores,
and write reports.207 Federal mining experts were everywhere-as they had been in the
mining West for more than a century. From the days of the Little Giant hydraulic hoses to
the crisis years of two world wars, the government had performed all of these and other
services. The miners of Philipsburg, like those of Butte, had come to expect and count on
them.
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D.

The Great Flood of 1908

Western mining was based on the availability of two resources: ore and water.
Placering and dredging were done in the water; hydraulics was done with water; and once the
rock in place was raised, the washing, milling, concentrating, amalgamating, smelting and
refining of the ore depended on an abundant water supply.1
A less frequently discussed, but no less vital, use of water was for waste disposal:
mine wastes and the tailings and residues of ore reduction facilities were at first carried away
by flumes, ditches, gulches, streams, and rivers and only later came to be settled and stored in
ponds.2 As noted, although they had plenty to say on everything else connected with mining,
federal mining laws were almost silent on how water could be used. The Congress made
reference in 1866 to water rights by prior appropriation and then left the issue entirely to the
States and Territories.3 But so common was the use of rivers and streams as waste disposal
systems that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1874, in a case arising out of a Montana
Territorial court decision, that such use was the accepted practice and hence the accepted
standard.4
As Butte turned from silver to copper, however, and as copper concentrators, smelters,
and precipitators became more numerous and more technologically advanced, this somewhat
casual attitude toward tailings changed. Tailings were too valuable and too massive in
amounts just to be cut loose. Beginning in the early 1890s, slimes and sands ponds were
constructed at the Anaconda, Colorado, Parrot, Butte & Boston, Butte Reduction Works, and
Montana Ore Purchasing Company smelters. Slag walls were constructed; settling ponds were
built. Except for the Anaconda works, each of these facilities was located on or drained to
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Silver Bow Creek. In 1907-08, the Colorado Smelter even installed a slag pipe on the creek
to collect water and move it around the tailings to prevent their erosion by any ordinary act of
nature into the waterway.5
But what of an extraordinary act of nature? Barringer and Adams, two 19th-century
experts in mining law, offer a legal analysis and definition.
If the mine owner deposits his refuse upon his land so that every ordinary flood carries
it into the stream, he is liable for the injury caused thereby. He must guard against
such floods, and place the refuse...where it cannot be carried off by them. If he does
this, an extraordinary flood will be treated as a vis major, and he will escape liability
for damages caused by its carrying into the stream or upon the land of others the
refuse which he has placed out of reach of ordinary floods and the natural current of
the stream.6
According to a Law Dictionary, vis major means
a greater force, superior force; it is used in the civil law to mean act of God...and has
reference to an "irresistable natural cause which cannot be guarded against by the
ordinary exertions of human skill and prudence." "A loss ‘vis major’... is a loss that
results immediately from natural cause, without the intervention of man, and could not
have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and care.7
Although no one ever complained of too much ore, water in the wrong place, at the
wrong time, or in too great a quantity could wreak havoc. In 1908 a huge flood turned
water—usually the miners’ friend—into the miners’ foe. There was no-long range weather
forecasting in 1908, no careful calculations of snow pack. Indeed, the flood on the Clark
Fork River in 1908 could not have been predicted on the basis of snowpack measurements
alone had they been taken, since the flood was also the result of heavy spring rains. But even
had all of the modem paraphanalia of long-range forecasting been in place, there was no way
to move the tailings to higher ground in anticipation of an unprecedented flood.8
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It rained—or snowed—for 33 consecutive days in the Spring of 1908.9 It was reported
that almost seven inches of rain fell at Anaconda between May 25 and June 5; in other words,
almost half of the average annual precipitation fell in ten days.10 The Clark Fork Basin is a
part of the semi-arid West, an area of less than 20 inches of yearly precipitation on the
average. The fundamental character of the landscape from vegetation to soil types, to the size
and course of stream and river beds arises out of this essential semi-aridity. Those landscape
features can tolerate a certain range of precipitation. They cannot tolerate something like
what happened in the spring of 1908.
In the first place, 33 consecutive days of rain is one short week shy of Biblical. It
started raining one day in late April and it was still raining in early June. Water roared off
the mountains, obliterating the beds and banks of Silver Bow Creek and the Clark Fork and
extending hundreds of yards over adjoining ground. "Riparian" came to have entirely new
applications. The berms, slag walls, dams, sands, slimes, and settling ponds were breached,
blown out, and carried off with the torrents. And the tailings were carried with them.
Let contemporaries tell the story. The first thing that strikes the reader of these 1908
accounts is the utterly bizarre weather. In addition to the 33 consecutive days of rain and the
seven inches of precipitation in ten days, there were these reports: On June 1 "three feet of
new snow is reported to have fallen near Drummond."11 On the same day it was reported
that "near Missoula a snow fall of three feet is reported, while "in the mountains both east and
west of Butte, the snow fall during the last few days has been enormous."12
Three days later, Missoula had 26 consecutive hours of rain and the bridge over
Higgins Avenue was cut in half.13 While it was raining in Missoula, Butte got a
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considerable dump of new, wet snow. The Butte Evening News reported that "Weather
prophets say if the sun should shine a few hours the flood that would come tumbling down
from the hills would put trouble in the mosquito class. . . ."'4 Four days later, the sun did
shine in Butte, "the weather grew warmer and balmier, the wind. . .blew softly
. . .and the heaps of snow sank. . .and was [sic] carried off in water down the sewers."15
By June 9 events proved the "weather prophets" right. The Evening News had the
story. "Another monster rockslide tore away from the face of the continental divide... and
hurled itself down the mountain into the heart of China gulch." Some in Butte were saying
"that the entire sky line of the range is changing and that the slides are only beginning, as
there are still great quantities of unmelted snow on the summit." "Boulders as big as a house
flew 500 feet and struck with such force that they flew into thousands of pieces. Fire flew as
the rocks struck the earth. . . ."16
The second clear impression is the sheer volume of water produced by this eccentric
and unpredictable weather. Silver Bow Creek was a very small stream, but the south end of
the foot bridge across the creek from Rocker to the B.A.P. depot "was floating on the turbid
waters of the swollen stream. During the flood the creek had washed out its banks at this
spot and the water at the floating end of the bridge was several feet deep."17 Boating on that
"usually despised trickle of water" was no longer an "imaginary amusement."18
In some places Silver Bow Creek was "from 25 to 150 feet wide. In other places,
"Silver Bow Creek, usually a little rill, is now raging at a mile wide."19 Everywhere "it has
risen over its banks and clambered into meadows; it has flooded the places where the land is
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lower than the top of the banks." Other reports told of how "it has flowed into back yards
and cellars, made bogs out of sandy flats, seeped up through grassy lawns. .

and left a

600-foot-wide shallow lake between Oregon Avenue and the Butte Reduction Works. "South
Butte," according to another story, "is simply a sea of mud," swamped with "six inches to two
feet of liquid ooze."20
Conditions in Philipsburg were no better. The local newspaper reported that "Every
dry gulch [was] filled with raging water. Flint Creek was described as "a mighty river." The
flood "transformed the [area] creeks into veritable rivers carrying away bridges and
submerging low lands in the valley."21 That was on June 5th. A full week later, the
embankment of Flint Creek "washed out about twenty feet wide and ten or twelve feet
deep."22
The third impression is the effect of a mile-wide (or a 100-foot-wide) Silver Bow
Creek on the mines and reduction works in Butte. There was considerable commentary. "In
the deep cut near the Pittsmont mine the water is three or four feet deep across the track and
sand is washing down over the rails. . . . " All the water from Dublin gulch and the east end
of town, which goes through the Dublin gulch sewer, was discharged into the car yards this
morning. . . ."23 Processing facilities were particularly hard hit. "Precipitation plants all
along the flat [were] filled with wash and mud and many of them ruined."24
Hardest hit of all was W.A. Clark’s Butte Reduction Works. The waters of Silver
Bow Creek were reported to have "flowed into the pits at the Butte Reduction works last
night and the concentrator was shut down because of the stoppage of the engines. . . . " It got
so bad that "the bridge in the yard was taken out. . .to prevent its being carried away."25

145

Later reports said that Silver Bow Creek had overrun "the Butte Reduction Works
[and]...formed a lake in places 20 feet deep and in extent of many acres."26
But the BRW was not alone in the devastation. The creek also flooded the Bell
Smelter’s slum pond and the Colorado Smelter—meaning probably the Colorado’s tailing
fields. It also took out three dredging dams on the British-Butte property, with predictable
consequences.27 Damage, in other words, was general throughout the area drained by Silver
Bow Creek. As one reporter summed it up, "scarcely a precipitation plant in Butte is in any
shape to be used. . . . The dams have been washed out, or the water has leaped over them
and spread the copper in solution all over the flat."28
The flood also spread the "copper" all over the upper Clark Fork River valley. In
September of 1908, an ACMC engineer reported on the damage to haylands occasioned by the
flood of that spring. The lands of Messrs.. Hempstead and Boyle were described as
in bad condition from... the breakage of the Magone, Demourdi and Normandy
irrigation ditch....This wash and breakage being due to the exceptional rain storms of
the spring....There are tailings deposits over the entire 109 acres...and increased
deposits of slum and tailings due to the river overflowing...which covered the land to
various depths from 3 ft. down.29
The meadowlands of Peter Normandi were also flooded and
covered with wash from the hills, mixed with tailings and slums from the overflow of
the river. The depth of this mixture is from a few inches to a foot deep....caused by
the river being out of its banks and overflowing two feet, more or less, over this land,
and for a period of 2 to 3 weeks.30
It is likely that scenes like these were commonly encountered from the head of the Clark Fork
to Missoula and beyond.
I make that last statement not on the basis of expertise in hydrology but from the
fourth indelible impression left from my reading of the historical record: the greatest damage
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by far was to railroad property. There were surprisingly few references to the flood’s effect
on stored tailings. I believe that was because the public cared very little about escaped
tailings. People cared about mud, and inconvenience, and giant boulders avalanching off the
continental divide, but mostly people cared about interrupted rail service.31
It was reported on June 3 that the Clark Fork River had "broken out of its. . .bed [and]
is following the old channel." How old the "old channel" might have been was unstated; but
clearly it was old enough to antedate the construction of the Northern Pacific Railroad. The
N.P. built its line away from and, where possible, above the river bed. It knew the river
would rise and fall with the seasons, but it counted on it following its established course. The
river did not do that, and the "result is the new grade and the cribbings have gone out."32
More than 1,000 Northern Pacific Railroad passengers were stranded for two weeks at
Drummond, about 70 miles west of Butte. Trains were unable to move in either direction
because the rails and bridges were washed out.33 It was also reported that several N.P.
railroad camps were submerged. "In addition to the big Nimrod camp...the camps at Bonita
and Hell Gate are under water."34 "Miles" of Northern Pacific track were washed away.35 It
took some time, but eventually and "little by little the magnitude of the flood is becoming
known. No such washout on the Northern Pacific has ever been known. . . . Missoula is
marooned. . ."36 and "for a considerable distance the entire road bed was destroyed."37 In
Philipsburg it was reported that the "Railroad track [was] washed out in many places."38
The Northern Pacific was dealt the hardest blow, but the St. Paul & Northern and the
Butte, Anaconda & Pacific did not escape unscathed. The St. Paul line lost 400 feet of grade
near Clinton, and the B.A.P. had 200 ore cars stalled at Rocker.39 No trains ran into or out
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of Butte for two weeks, and at least one inescapable conclusion can be drawn from the
widespread flooding of railroad grades, tracks, and bridges: if the waters o f Silver Bow Creek
and the Clark Fork River were high and wide enough to take out the N.P., they were high
enough and wide enough to breach every tailings impoundment in their path and take the
tailings along with them.40 As Carol Zottnick has written, "evidence. . .shows the
contaminated sediments. . . (behind the Milltown Dam) were scoured from the tailing dumps
upstream and were washed down. . .during the flood of 1908."41
Precautions against floods—as floods were known in Butte—had been taken, and not
just by the mining companies. For their part, the Butte companies had done what they could
to hold their tailings back.42 They had a vested interest in not letting their tailings loose.
This was not the 1860s and 70s. These were major corporations, not sour doughs with high
powered hoses, and they attempted to keep their tailings where they could get at them later.
There were tailings left along Silver Bow Creek, but pot in expectation o f the creek washing
them away. They were left along the creek because the reduction works needed an accessible
supply o f water to operate and so were constructed along the creek. The slag walls and
berms, the earthen dams, the timbered cribs were built to withstand high water, protect a
resource, and avoid law suits.43
It may be safely presumed that the Northern Pacific Railroad also had thought about
the potential consequences o f its Clark Fork route; it cannot be imagined that the N.P.
reckoned on being washed away every other year, or every 25 years—or every one hundred.
The same must be said o f every bridge builder, street car operator, and pasture tender from
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Basin to Missoula. Had there been an 1-90, I would add road builders to the list: 1-90 would
have been underwater.
None o f the precautions these parties took were o f any avail against the forces
unleashed by nature in 1908. 1908 was not a normal year; it was not even a normal flood
year. No one could reasonably have foreseen this flood; certainly it can be demonstrated that
no one did. The flood o f 1908 was a vis m ayor, the act o f an unkind Providence.
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E.

The Smoke Commission and the Land Exchange
1.

Smoke Cases and the Smoke Commission

The reduction of copper ores involved two principal forms of "waste": tailings and
smoke. The deposition of tailings has been dealt with. I have already touched on the smoke
problem in Butte. In the late 1800s, as many as seven smelters sent tons of smoke daily into
the Butte airshed. Again, none of these Butte smelters was ever operated by ACMC. Now
it is time to turn the historical analysis to an account of airborne wastes in the Anaconda
region.
ACMC’s reduction works were in Anaconda, at the south end of the Deer Lodge
Valley, 26 miles west of Butte. Though there was little, if any, heap roasting of ores in
Anaconda, it would be disingenuous to pretend that there was no impact from the ACMC
works. There were apparently no formal complaints from the company’s neighbors
regarding smoke from the Old Works, located north of Warm Springs Creek and which
operated from 1884 until 1902. The Washoe Works, however, south of the creek, completed
and on line by 1902, had a serious problem with smoke. In that first year of operation, for
example, ACMC paid out $330,000 to farmers who complained of damage to livestock and
pasturage.1 Sulphur dioxide and arsenic escaped into the atmosphere with deleterious
effects. The company did not contest this; it disputed only the size of the area adversely
impacted by its operations—the so-called "smoke zone." The farmers brought their
grievances to Anaconda’s managers; the company investigated and paid what the parties
settled on as fair.
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Between July and September of 1903 ACMC closed down the Washoe Smelter in
response to farmers’ complaints.2 Company officials needed the downtime to install a new
flue and stack system and to put in an arsenic recovery unit. The new waste disposal system
was based on two theories: first, that a single flue for all operations was better than an
individual flue for each. Second, that a single tall stack would both draw better and disperse
the effluents better than the existing system of four stacks by delivering effluents high enough
to become diluted and harmless by the time they reached the ground.3 With 20-20
hindsight, it didn’t work out quite that way. But it is important to note that this was state-ofthe-art technology in 1903.
The resulting new stack was 300 feet high, the largest stack in the world at that time.
The flue system was a mechanical marvel, and the arsenic plant was able to recover two tons
of marketable arsenic daily. The flue system alone cost ACMC $750,000.4 Unfortunately,
the new system did not eliminate the smoke hazard.5
In 1904 the farmers living north of the smelter organized themselves as the Farmers’
and Dairymen’s Association and by January of 1905, they were meeting with officials of the
Washoe Smelter to complain of the effects of smoke on their livestock and grasslands. This
time the Company was less receptive. ACMC believed that the 300- foot stack and the new
flue system had eliminated the smoke problem. ACMC president William Scallon had earlier
told the farmers that "no more damage will accrue to you after we commence operation with
the high stack." It requires a cynicism of a very high order to assume that Scallon was
lying.6

A year later the EMJ noted that "it is astonishing how high the smoke is

thrown, and how little of it loiters in the region. . . . "
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The Journal was not trying to

disguise anything, stating frankly that "the immediate vicinity [of the smelter] bears
testimony to the destruction of vegetation that has taken place. . . .but little of the severe
damage extends beyond three or four m iles."7 Again, only a cynic would assume that the
Journal was purposefully misleading. Scallon was no scoundrel, and the EMJ was not run
by corporate stooges. It is likely that both ACMC and the EMJ honestly believed that
pollution abatement equipment which cost well over one million dollars would, in fact, have
an ameliorative effect.
It is as likely that the 107 farmers of the Deer Lodge Farm ers’ Association, meeting
in February of 1905, were also sincere. The Association offered to transfer title to 60,525
acres of affected farmland to ACMC for $1,175,000; this included all water rights and
improvements. The proposed agreement worked out to an average of about $20.00/acre and
$ 10,000/farm, significant sums for a farm in 1905. The members of the Association agreed
to be off the land by November 1, 1905, if the money were paid by May 1 of that year. If
ACMC refused, the Association was prepared to seek an injunction to close the sm elter.8
Anaconda did not answer, and on May 4 the Deer Lodge Farmers Association filed suit in
the Federal District Court of M ontana.9 The action was taken in the name of Fred Bliss,
then resident in Idaho, in order to get the case into Federal rather than state court.
Anaconda’s basic defense was that its smelter was not responsible for damages outside
the "smoke zone." At issue was the size of that zone. The farmers argued that it extended
over 100 square miles and 50,000 acres of improved farm land, worth more than
$2,000,000. This is almost double what they had been willing to sell the land for just a few
weeks previous to taking the legal action.10 Con Kelley, representing ACM C, pointed out
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that ACMC had spent many million of dollars in smoke abatement equipment in the last three
years, and that claims that 100 square miles and 50,000 acres of improved farm land worth
more than $2,000,000 had been damaged was a considerable exaggeration. He argued that
the affected lands were worth at most $500,000, suggesting that ACMC was prepared to
settle for that am ount.11
The farmers, however, were not in a settling mood, and the case dragged on until
May, 1909 when Judge W.H. Hunt rendered his opinion. The judge acknowledged that
smoke had done "great damage" prior to 1903, but that since the installation of the big stack,
damage had been reduced considerably—though there was some evidence of damage to timber
resources behind the smelter. An injunction, the judge ruled, was not warranted; there were
other legal remedies available, including damage claims, and the idea of closing a smelter on
which 100,000 jobs depended in order to satisfy the unproven claims of 107 farmers did not
strike him as equitable. Strengthening Judge Hunt’s decision was the fact that fewer than
one-third of the farmers of the valley sided with Bliss and the Association, and none on the
complainant’s side answered Hunt’s request to provide evidence of new smelting methods
that would eliminate harmful emissions.12
Since previous courts had ruled that a "mere nuisance" could not be allowed to affect
materially and adversely a "great public industry," it would seem that Hunt was only
following the path of accepted judicial wisdom. Hunt did order $350.00 to be paid to Bliss,
but all other claims were dismissed. Hunt retained jurisdiction of the case in order to take
continuing expert testimony in respect to ACMC operations. He wanted to be assured that
ACMC was doing what it could to control emissions, and the court reserved the right to
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require ACMC to prove that it was doing all it could to prevent injury.13 The Federal
Circuit Court in San Francisco upheld the verdict on appeal, arguing that to do otherwise
'would violate the sense of "real justice." The case was never brought on appeal beyond the
Circuit Court.14
Before the matter was closed, however, the farmers tried one final tactic. In
December 1908, the Association wrote to President Theodore Roosevelt with an interesting
suggestion. The forested lands behind the Washoe Smelter were a part of the new system of
national forest reserves. There was evidence that the timber on these lands was being
damaged by sulfur dioxide emissions from the smelter. The Deer Lodge farmers first
reminded the Government of its responsibility "to protect its woods and watersheds. .

and

then urged the Government to "take immediate action in court to protect these interests,"
pointing out that in so doing, it would also provide "direct protection to the farming
interests" of the Deer Lodge Valley.15
A disinterested observer might reasonably challenge the ethics of this proposal. The
farmers’ complaint was largely against alleged arsenical damage; the Federal Government’s
suit would be against sulfur dioxide damage.16 The "protection" the farmers sought would
be in the form of an injunction closing the smelter. The judge ruled against them. ACMC
won, and not because it had abused the legal system. There was something slightly
opportunistic about the farmers now turning to a third party and urging it to bring an
unrelated legal action against ACM C.17
Whatever the propriety of the farmers’ suggestion to Roosevelt, the president proved
sympathetic. One of the farmers was a personal friend, and the Association had frequently
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corresponded with him .18 Roosevelt was well aware of the Bliss case. The political issue
was relatively simple: Roosevelt was the steward of the public’s domain, including its forest
reserves. He had reason to believe that the property over which he had executive authority
was being damaged and, like any aggrieved property owner, the Government could take
action against those who were inflicting the alleged damages. This was not a matter of the
Government as regulator, whether in the interests of public health or the environment or the
efficient working of the market. This was a matter of the Government finding a legal
remedy for damage to Government property.
The first remedy sought was a conference at which the contesting sides—the Roosevelt
administration and ACMC—would sit down and reach an accommodation acceptable to both.
Failing an agreement, the Government made it clear that it would take legal action. The
meeting was held on December 5, 1908. The President was there, along with John D. Ryan
of ACMC, Montana’s two Senators, representatives of the Deer Lodge Farmers Association,
Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot, and Ligon Johnson, a Justice Department Special Assistant
and the man who would lead the Government’s charge.
Johnson had developed three alternatives to ACMC’s present operations, and they
became the basis for the Government’s position. The first alternative was for ACMC to
move the Washoe Smelter to Great Falls and combine it with its facility already there; there
were no trees down wind from Great Falls. A second "solution" was to move the smelter’s
incinerating operation—the major source of sulfur fumes— back to Butte; Butte was already a
mess, made so by the operations of previous smelters. Little further damage could be done.
The third alternative was to convert the Washoe’s sulfur fumes into sulfuric acid and mix the
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acid with phosphate to make fertilizer. This last solution, as the Government’s own experts
explained, involved new technologies, but the major problem was one of marketing should
the technology be developed.19
The officers of ACMC and the Washoe Smelter were unimpressed with Johnson’s
"solutions." The works at Anaconda had cost about $10,000,000. Moving them to Great
Falls or moving part of them to Butte seemed extreme. As for manufacturing fertilizer,
ACMC wondered aloud how it might be done and where it might be sold.20 For the next
few months, up to the point when Roosevelt’s administration would give way to that of
William Howard Taft, the two sides wrangled over and discussed the issues.
Anaconda could not move its plant. That left fertilizer. Nathanial Pratt, a chemical
engineer, had investigated the Washoe Smelter at the Government’s request and determined
that there was more than enough sulfur to produce ample supplies of sulfuric acid.21
ACMC was as likely as the Justice Department to have received this news with
pleasure. As Pratt noted in a letter to the Attorney General, "the officials of the Company at
Butte, as well as the Management of the Plant at Anaconda, received me cordially and
extended every possible courtesy. . . .This assistance greatly simplified and expedited the
investigation.n22

All of the pieces were now in place for Ligon Johnson. The

Government had alledgedly been injured, the party alledgedly responsible for the injury had
been discovered, and a means of ending the injury was at hand—Pratt’s investigation
confirmed the availability of sufficient sulfur to make acid. Johnson assumed the availability
of a market to sell it. There is no indication that he ever considered what method of disposal
would be used in the absence of a sufficient market.
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He estimated the cost of a recovery

process for sulfur at $4,000,000—40% of what it cost ACMC to build the entire operation,
but well within what he determined to be the company’s means.23 ACMC, understandably,
asked for some assurances that the phosphorous necessary to making fertilizer was available,
that the technology would work, and that western markets for enormous quantities of
fertilizer could be found, developed, and protected.24 Johnson had no answers to these
queries.
He did not think them relevant. Johnson believed that the damage could be arrested if
ACMC would make fertilizer, that the company could afford the necessary fertilizer plant,
and that a market for the product existed-or at least could be developed. ACMC was
unconvinced and unmoved. The idea of spending four million dollars to enter the fertilizer
business using untested technology, dependent upon undiscovered resources, and forced to
sell in an uncertain and possibly nonexistent market did not strike it as wise and prudent.
Mediation had failed. It likely made as much sense to Anaconda to be sued as to accede to
these demands, and not because ACMC might have thought the Government was bluffing.
Farmers’ suits had closed smelters in Utah; ACMC had every reason to believe that the
Government’s suit could close the Washoe.25 But so could going broke trying to sell
fertilizer.
The suit in equity was filed on March 16, 1910. William Howard Taft had succeeded
Roosevelt as president. Charles Wickersham was the Attorney General. But the driving
force for the Government was still Ligon Johnson, by then Special Assistant to James W.
Freeman, the U.S. Attorney for Montana. In its suit, the Government complained that "in the
mining, roasting, reducing, smelting and treating of. . .ores. . . through. . .furnaces,
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smelters, ovens and appliances" ACMC was discharging harmful materials into the air and
water "for a radius of more than 25 miles" from its smelter.26
The emphasis in the suit was clearly on airborne emissions; the government was
responding to reports of smelter fume damage to its trees and to the pasture lands of private
farmers in the Deer Lodge valley. But there was also the secondary issue of tailings into the
water, and the 1910 suit addressed that issue as well. Damage suits against Butte mills and
smelters for injury to Silver Bow Creek and the Clark Fork River had been filed earlier;
damages were paid, and ACMC had bought up "tailings easements" to prevent further
problems.27 There is no direct evidence that the Government had these cases in mind in
1910, but, moved by whatever considerations, the suit charged that ". . .the waste and
tailings from [the Washoe Smelter] discharged into the streams. . .rendered [them] infertile,
sterile. . .unfit for irrigation . . .and. . .unfit. . .for drinking by man or beast. . . ,"28
The Government, "in its sovereign capacity," claimed that it "is and has at all times
been the owner of certain lands and water shed" in five Montana counties. Among the lands
the Government said it owned were lands subject to at least thirty unpatented mining claims.
These lands had been damaged, the Government claimed, and the only remedy was a "writ
of injunction commanding [ACMC] to absolutely desist and refrain from using
. . .any furnace pit, oven, smelter or other appliance. . . . " 29
The suit never went to trial. Attorney General Wickersham toured the affected timber
regions and seems to have recommended the renewal of talks.30 Whether at Wickersham’s
suggestion or not, Ligon Johnson and Con Kelley were soon involved in steady rounds of
negotiation during which Kelley made clear that ACMC would "not be slow to adopt any
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measure which is practical and which promises satisfactory results."31 John D. Ryan,
president of ACMC, was even more specific, promising that the Company would "agree to
diligently carry on investigations with the object in view of preventing sulphurous fumes
from escaping from our stack."32 In addition to these promises, Anaconda also offered a
$25,000 settlement for past injury to Government lands and $5,000 yearly for continuing
damages.33 It is unclear for how long those annual payments would continue.
The Government rejected this offer. It is possible that Johnson and Attorney General
Wickersham thought the damage settlement inadequate; it is also possible that they believed a
solution to the smoke problem had to be found before any damages could be assessed. At
the time a solution was found, they intended to move on the question of damages.34 A
model for the assessment of those damages was available to them and may have influenced
their decision. W.G. Weigle, Assistant Chief of Forest Management, had proposed that
lands with dead trees be replaced by lands bearing live ones. In other words, rather than
dealing in dollars, deal in land.35
But damages, however computed, could wait.36 The Government determined to
pursue first things first and that meant finding a way to reduce or eliminate the sulfur from
Anaconda’s stack. ACMC, according to Johnson and the Department of Justice, could not
be allowed to do this. There were no market incentives, no immediate or even long-term
corporate rewards. This was a task for disinterested, public spirited experts with neither
axes to grind nor pockets to fill. Anaconda president John D. Ryan had called for
"investigations with the object in view of preventing sulphurous fumes from escaping from
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[the] stack." Johnson agreed, except he would not agree to ACMC performing the
investigations.
Ligon Johnson was a strange and interesting man. Donald Macmillan, the only
historian on this issue, describes a man who was suspicious, cynical, caustic, and committed
to both the style and substance of Rooseveltian Progressivism. The substance of the problem
in this instance was stack emissions; the style—the method of dealing with it—was direct and
active Government involvement in finding and implementing a solution. Part of this ideology
arose from the Progressives’ belief that the private sector would pursue only private ends and
that the Government would have to make it perform its public duties. Another and larger
part arose from the Progressive belief that the Government was ideally suited to this role,
that it had disinterested "experts" at its disposal, and that the general welfare could be
advanced only by mobilizing these experts and turning them loose on problems.
The stipulation of April 13, 1911, which for all purposes ended the Government’s suit
against ACMC, was quintessentially Progressive. It put the Government squarely into the
smelting business, where Ligon Johnson, among others, felt it belonged. It was the
Government’s lands that had been damaged; only the Government’s agents could be trusted
to protect them. As Attorney General Wickersham put it, the agreement would "work out to
the great advantage of the Government. . . .We have secured all that we have a right to
ask." Johnson fully agreed.37
The terms of the stipulation speak for themselves. ACMC agreed that it would "at all
times use its best efforts to prevent, minimize and ultimately to completely eliminate the
♦

emission. . .of all deleterious fumes. . .particularly those containing sulphur dioxide." This
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was not a concession by Anaconda that its fumes had hurt anything; this most progressive of
stipulations did not require immediate damages or an admission of wrong-doing. It required
only compliance. ACMC had to get rid of its "deleterious fumes." But this was not
something that could be left to corporate initiative. The agreement stipulated that "for the
purpose of determining whether or not [ACMC was] at all times complying with the
. . .stipulation. . . .a board of experts" was to be formed. The board later came to be
known as the Smoke Commission, a three-member commission, comprised of a
representative each of the government and ACMC, and a third chosen by the two parties.
The Government’s representative came to be the Director of the U.S. Bureau of Mines.38
The Commission was to report directly to the Department of Justice regarding
ACMC’s record of compliance. These were scientific experts, but they were doing the law’s
work. But the Commission was more than a watch dog. Anaconda had to change the way it
smelted ores; it had to "introduce such methods, improvements, devices or processes" that
would permit it to eliminate its "deleterious fumes." These methods were those "certified"
by the Smoke Commission "to be best calculated to carry out the provisions of this
stipulation, and. . . to conform to the most scientific processes then practicably applicable to
[copper reduction works.]" As for ACMC, it agreed "promptly to comply with all
requirements pursuant to such certificate. . .and if and when requested by the attorney
general of the United States."39
There was no ambiguity in any of this. The Smoke Commission—and, theoretically,
the Attorney General-could require ACMC to install whatever methods, devices, and
processes the Commission determined were needed to meet the terms of the agreement.
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Those terms were clearly stated. So were the powers of the Commission. Its three members
had full access to ACMC operations. They and their resident agents-on-site Federal
employees "on loan" from the Bureau of Mines—fully availed themselves of that access. But
at least as clearly stated was the threat ACMC still faced:
So long as the said defendant shall well and truly comply with the terms of this
stipulation, no further proceedings shall be taken in this suit. In case of a breach of
the terms of this agreement, the government may apply to the court for such relief as
it would be entitled to if this agreement had not been made.40
Anaconda was bound "well and truly to comply" with the specific written and certified
recommendations of the Commission. If it did not comply with those certifications, the
Government could "reactivate" the suit seeking an injunction closing the smelter.
ACMC had no reason to assume that the Government would not do precisely that.
After the fact, Ligon Johnson said that, although "it was probably unknown to the smelters
. .at that time, it was never the intention of the Government to close any plant." In other
words, the Government was bluffing. That was an odd comment for Johnson to make in
light of the 1904 Highland Bov decision in which, according to an historian of the issue, a
Utah court had "effectively shut down the Salt Lake smelter industry." Perhaps Johnson
meant that the Government was bluffing when it sued ACMC. Whatever the explanation for
his own confusion on this issue, ACMC was certainly fooled; it assumed the Government
was serious. At the same time he admitted the bluff, Johnson also revealed that the
Government had in mind that "the smelter operate under the best type of methods and
appliances known to science and commercially feasible. "41 ACMC did not know that
commercial feasibility was a part of the calculus. Neither, if the record is to be believed,
did the Smoke Commissioners. ACMC operated on the assumption that technologically
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possible was the standard-not commercially feasible. Ligon Johnson, it would seem, was a
very tricky fellow.
The Smoke Commission was chaired initially by John Hays Hammond, one of the
world’s best known and most respected mining engineers. He was joined by Dr. J.A.
Holmes, Director of the U.S. Bureau of Mines, and Louis D. Ricketts, general manager of
Anaconda’s Greene-Cananea company, two mining men whose reputations nearly matched
Hammond’s. This was a formidable array of experts. It was also an expensive one, and--it
must be noted—all of the costs arising from its investigations, including salaries, were to be
paid by ACMC.42
The Commission members began their work in July 1911, spending ten days in and
around the Washoe Smelter and the B&M Smelter in Great Falls. The Commission
concluded that the most intractable, but certainly not the only, problem was finding a
solution to the sulphur dioxide emissions. Hammond held out hope but he also counseled
patience.43 In all of this, as in all subsequent Commission activities, the "Anaconda
Company. . . placed at the disposal of the Board not only all of its records, but it has
authorized its employees . . .to carry out whatever tests . . . the Board should request to be
made. . . .',44
The next report was dated February 24, 1913. Two metallurgical chemists, including
F.G. Cottrell of the University of California, spent the year conducting "continuous
investigations concerning the nature and the extent and the variations of the fumes. . .that are
given off. . .in connection with the operations of the. . .Smelter." The chemists, in other
words, were looking at everything in the smoke, not just sulfur. This is an important and
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too often ignored point. As Arthur Wells (still the best and fairest chronicler of the activities
of the Commission) makes clear, the Commission distinguished between the sulfur-caused
damage to forest lands and the alleged injury to animals, but it did not limit its research only
to the sulfur problem. Rather it
interpreted the intent of. . .its creation as being to assure a thorough and fundamental
investigation of all possible improvements within the smelter for reducing the amount
of smoke and fumes of any sort which might be considered harmful. . .45
In other words, arsenical damage to the farmer’s pastures and livestock was also to be
considered. It is time to rethink the old and hoary historical notion that the Deer Lodge
farmers were hopeless victims of a corrupt legal system, that they were misused by ACMC
and abandoned by the courts. The Commission determined to see that "the interests of all
the plaintiffs [would] be subserved. . . ,"46
The Commission meant what it said. It certified to ACMC—meaning it required of
ACMC— a complete reconstructipn of the special arsenic furnace and recovery plant in order
to treat more of the dust and to make a better recovery of the arsenic. . . . This was carried
out. .

and ACMC found itself much more deeply involved in arsenic recovery for making

insecticides and, during the war years, munitions.47 Other problems with arsenic, however,
remained, and the Commission finally decided that they could be dealt with only by the
construction of a new stack system, complete with electric precipitators. As Wells put it, "a
new and larger stack. . .seemed to be absolutely essential. . .in providing for any substantial
increase in the collection of arsenic,. . . . "

After investigation. . .the Cottrell

precipitation method was considered the most likely to meet the requirements at
Anaconda. "48 The investigations proved correct.49

167

In his final report and summary of the Commission’s activities, Arthur Wells gives as
much attention to the arsenic problem as he does the sulfur dioxide—suggesting that the
Commission may have done the same. What is of greatest interest is that the new stack, the
most obvious and visible legacy of the Commission’s involvement in the smelter’s
operations, was designed to reduce arsenic emissions, as well as those of sulfur dioxide.
Arsenic was the bane of the private farmers of the Deer Lodge valley north of the smelter,
not of the Federal Government with its forested lands south of the ACMC Smelter. The
basis of the 1905 law suit was also on the minds of the smoke experts.
Still, the Commission was appointed pursuant to the settlement of a suit brought by
the Government in response to alleged damage by sulfur dioxide to Federal lands. And it
was to those sulfurous emissions that the Commission devoted an equal share of its attention.
The Board examined ". . .every proposed method looking to the utilization of the sulphur
dioxide. . . and encouraged "at different places. . .investigations such as promise to throw
light on this subject. "50
Four months after the Commission made this statement, Ligon Johnson reentered the
discussion with a letter to W.J. Hughes in the Justice Department. Johnson seems to have
learned some valuable lessons since the heady days of 1908. As he put it,
The truth is,. . .there is not now any known method of smelting by which sulphur
dioxide may be completely eliminated. Even the manufacture of sulphuric acid is not
a panacea, and this is only possible under a situation such as that at Ducktown
[Tennessee] where the smelter is surrounded by a fertilizer using territory. . . .51
It is possible-maybe even likely-that Johnson had learned this harsh truth from his
conversations with members of the Commission. Hammond’s counsel of patience was indeed
timely.
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By 1914, the Commission had begun to concentrate on two strategies for dealing with
the sulfur smoke. Neither was new or innovative. The first was the manufacture of sulfuric
acid for various uses, particularly making superphosphate fertilizers. There had always been
two problems with this idea: markets and the availability of phosphate rock. Western
farmers did not use fertilizer, as even Johnson admitted. All the Commission could do was
hope that this would change--that a market could somehow be willed into place.
The other problem -the availability of resources—seemed to have been resolved, or at
least mitigated, by the discovery of large phosphate beds on Government lands near
Garrison, Montana, not far from the smelter. Phosphate had previously been uncovered in
southeastern Idaho, 380 miles from Anaconda and much nearer the smelters of Utah. The
Montana beds held out great promise, and the Commission seized on them with noticeable
enthusiasm. Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane cooperated to the extent of allowing
ACMC to experiment with up to 100 tons of the Montana rock, even though it was on lands
withdrawn from entry. By 1915 there were few remaining reasons why ACMC could not
make fertilizers.52
The other solution to the smoke problem was the construction of a new stack, larger
by far than the existing 300-foot monster built in 1903. The new stack would be joined by
electric precipitators for the removal and recovery of flue dusts, including arsenic. The point
was not simply to put the smoke higher in the air; a stack of nearly 600 feet would also have
much better drafting and cooling effects than the existing system, resulting in significantly
reduced sulphur loads at the point of exit. World War I diverted some of ACMC’s attention
to zinc leaching operations and manganese and copper production, but the Commission was
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confident that when circumstances permitted, ACMC could recover a high percentage of
sulphur and arsenic before they entered the stack and render nearly harmless the sulphur and
arsenic that escaped.
The Commission certified these two requirements—sulphur recovery and a new stack
and precipitator system—and Anaconda, as was true of every other recommendation by the
experts, "well and truly complied." Foundation construction and road building for the new
stack began in July 1917; the first brick was laid in May, the last in November 1918. There
were delays owing to the war, but by May 1919, ACMC official reported that "smoke [was]
turned into new stack. . . five treaters (Cottrells) operating; everything working
satisfactorily."53 It was quite a stack, at 585 feet high, 76 feet in diameter at its base,
weighing 40,000 tons and capable of handling 4,000,000 cubic feet of gas per minute at a
velocity of 24 feet per second, by far the largest and—at almost $2,500,000—the most
expensive anywhere in the world. Eventually twenty huge Cottrell electric precipitators
would treat the gases before they entered the stack.54
While all of this was going on, ACMC had also begun construction of new settling
pond systems. These new ponds were not technically "within the province of the
Commission" whose attention was focused primarily on the Smelter, but they were clearly
relevant to the 1910 suit. It remains something of a mystery why the Commission was not
charged with determining, monitoring and/or operating the tailings disposal systems of the
Washoe. The probable answer is that these tailings were alledgedly damaging the "more
remote" Federal lands, as the suit put it.55 The stakes, in other words, were not as high,
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and the injury to Federal lands not as obvious as with the alleged direct damage to Forest
Service lands.
Whether the suit prompted ACMC to take this action cannot, then, be known. The
idea of settling ponds was at least a decade old in Montana; Governor Joseph Toole raised it
in his 1907 address to the Montana Legislature. There is also the fact that in 1917 Samuel
Fortier, a U.S. Department of Agriculture agent, devised plans for these pond systems along
Silver Bow Creek and that ACMC followed Fortier’s plans. The important point is that in
1917 no one was worrying about who should get credit for impounding concentrator and
smelter tailings, and no one asked whether the tailings being impounded came from
processing at Anaconda or from non-ACMC operations in Butte. What mattered in 1917 was
that ACMC stepped forward and trapped tailings before they could be released into the river.
It also mattered that the Commissioners reported upon ACMC’s new ponds with
pleasure and satisfaction. The ponds were "a means of preventing the discharge of waste
tailings into the waters of the Deer Lodge River [aka Clark Fork]. . . . "

Those tailings had

been a "nuisance to the farmers using the waters of that river for irrigation," a charge made
explicitly in the 1910 suit. The Commissioners pointed out that the new pond system would
"impound the tailings from the concentrators at Anaconda and. . .[help in] clarifying the
waters of the. . .River which were contaminated by mill wastes from Butte."
With accompanying maps and photographs, the experts noted that the ponds for
impounding the Anaconda tailings would cover over 2,000 acres; the dams for those ponds
would require 1,400,000 cubic yards of material and an expenditure of "about $460,000."
The cost of the dams "to clarify the Deer Lodge River will be about $350,000. Thus the
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total expenditure to keep the waters of Deer Lodge River from tailings will be over
$800,000." The clear assumption of the Government’s experts was that the Warm Springs
and Opportunity ponds—as they came to be known—would end the contamination of the
waterways alleged in the 1910 suit.56
For all of their later importance, the Warm Springs ponds were not central to the
work of the Smoke Commissioners. They kept a far more watchful eye on the big stack and
its battery of precipitators. The new system did not "eliminate" all the sulfur and arsenic
from the flue gases, but even Ligon Johnson had argued that complete elimination of sulfur
was impossible and unnecessary. Arsenic recovery, however, was most encouraging and on
balance, the new stack system, including new flues and those 20 Cottrells, was considered a
success.57
The sulphur recovery and fertilizer program went less smoothly. Upon the certified
recommendation of the Commission, ACMC built a 25-ton-per-day superphosphate plant and
was prepared to extend it to 30 tons. As always, the problem was marketing, compounded
by the labor and materials shortages occasioned by the war. The Commission was
sympathetic and reported in 1918 that it was
not inclined to force the company to proceed with the experimental plant until more
favorable conditions are realized. It is understood that as soon as conditions for the
experiments are somewhat more favorable the . . .Company will carry out the
recommendations of the Commission."
That is an interesting and revealing reference. Specific attention is called to the use of the
words "force" and "will carry out the recommendations."58
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It should also be noted that Anaconda never wanted to go into the fertilizer business.
Frederick Laist, manager of the Smelter operations, had written to Con Kelley as early as
November, 1917 that
Whenever discussing this matter. . .[with the Commission], I invariably made clear
. . .that I did not consider the establishment of the phosphate business specially
desirable from a business standpoint. I told them that according to our estimates the
returns would be small considering the size of the investment. . . .1 stated that so far
as the process was concerned I felt quite certain of success and that I would assure
you of this in case they recommended our embarking in this business.
Laist’s concluding remarks are unequivocal. The company’s "embarkation in this business,"
he told Kelley, "would be undesirable from a purely business standpoint, and it should only
be gone into in case the Smoke Commission [could] justify it." Laist did not believe the
Commission could justify it since "it is generally conceded that the S 0 2 damage done by us is
quite negligible. . . . "

ACMC, he concluded, should not be "going into the phosphate

business at all, either now or at any future time." Copies of this letter were sent to the
Commission members.59
The Commission was unmoved. It appears that Ricketts agreed with the ACMC
position but was outvoted by the other two members. Two-to-one ruled, and by December,
1919, Frederick Laist reported for ACMC that all "the material for the plant has been
ordered and construction work is now going on. . . .The Company has purchased a
phosphate property in Idaho, having possibly 4,000,000 tons of rock in sight." This was in
addition to ACMC investments in phosphate lands in California and M ontana.60
The production of phosphate and sulfuric acid was a significant commitment by
ACMC and one which it would not have made on its own. By 1918-1919 the problem was
not technical. ACMC knew how to make sulfuric acid from sulfur dioxide, and it knew how

173

to mix it with phosphate to make superphosphate fertilizers. In fact, ACMC could make
double and treble phosphate fertilizers—super superphosphates. The dilemma was finding
someone who wanted it.
There were two problems associated with the new smelting process. First, ACMC’s
sulphur rich copper ores, when reduced, left enormous quantities of sulphur "waste." The
new system recovered the bulk of it, rather than releasing it to the environment. That was
the good news. The bad news-and the second problem—was that the recovered sulfur had to
be sold or dumped. It was understood that paper pulp mills used liquid sulfur dioxide, but
the Pacific coast mills were adequately supplied by smelters in Tacoma, and the Wisconsin
mills were out of shipping range.61
The Commission also investigated the market for sulfuric acid; the Washoe was
capable of producing about 3,000 tons of it per day. A plant for the manufacture of 120 tons
was in place by 1915; by 1917 an additional chamber boosted production to 180 tons per
day. Total cost of the plant was over $1,000,000. But sulfuric acid did not travel well; a
rail trip of over 200 miles was rare, and the entire area west of the Mississippi River was
responsible for less than 10% of the national consumption. The Anaconda Smelter alone
could produce 233 % of the sulfuric acid used by all of the states west of the Mississippi
River.62
That left superphosphate fertilizers. Southern and mid western farmers were coming
to need it, and they were buying it in quantities and paying a decent price. It was
conservatively estimated that by 1920-21 up to 5,000,000 tons of superphosphate would be
needed. Unfortunately, almost the whole of this consumption would be east of the
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Mississippi. In 1914, less than 3% of the total fertilizer tonnage was used in the West, and
about 85% of this 3% was used in Missouri, Texas, and California, meaning that all of the
rest of the states west of the Mississippi River used about 0.5% of the total. And these
figures were for all mixed fertilizers, not just superphosphates. Skeptics would say the
western market could be expanded. Possibly. But one must ask, could the accessible market
be expanded to absorb the 2,500,000 tons the Washoe could produce? ACMC alone could
have supplied fully one half of the total superphosphate fertilizer required for the whole
United States.63
No wonder ACMC did not want to go into the fertilizer business; no wonder Ligon
Johnson, after the fact, spoke in terms of "commercial feasibility." Unless this operation
could be made commercially feasible, someone faced an enormous disposal problem.
Perhaps this is why Johnson abandoned his career as a crusader and went to work as "smoke
counsel" for ASARCO.64 His legacy, however, lingered. By 1920 ACMC had a whole
department with an agronomist and soil scientist whose sole purpose was to find markets for
superphosphate fertilizers. By then ACMC was treating 400 tons of phosphate rock per day
and producing 250 tons of its treble superphosphate. That was less than its sulfuric acid
supply and its new and expensive phosphate holdings were capable of producing, but it was
far more than the market could possibly use. There were well and truly costs to
complying.65
There are important implications to the resolution of the smoke case. The Smoke
Commission had the power to require ACMC to do whatever was necessary to end the injury
to the public’s lands. After careful study, the experts decided that ACMC must install 20
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Cottrell precipitators, build a smoke stack almost twice the size of its existing stack-already
the tallest in the world—and enter fully into the business of making superphosphate fertilizers.
The Anaconda managers "well and truly complied," at a cost of close to $3,000,000. But
how could they have refused? There is nothing in the historical record to suggest that if left
to their own devices and driven by their own judgment of the markets, the men who ran
ACMC would probably not have built the 585-foot stack and would certainly never have
gone into the fertilizer business. The Government orchestrated all of this; ACMC had even
to offer written explanations of why it was "delaying carrying into execution the
experiment[s] recommended by the. . .Commission."66 For five years the Commission had
representatives on-site, running the day-to-day operations of a major component of the
Washoe Smelter. For five more years, the Commission had—and exercised—full authority
over funding, installation, and management of an incredibly complex system of flues,
treaters, and recovery systems, all linked to the world’s tallest stack and tallest masonry
structure of any kind. This was as hands-on as management gets. The Commissioners
decided policy, controlled finances, managed employees and daily business operations, and
let contracts-or at least determined how and to whom contracts would be let. The final
symbolic expression of the Government’s control occurred in 1920 when Frederick Cottrell,
inventor of the precipitators which treated ACMC fumes and one-time resident agent of the
Commission of Experts, became the Director of the U.S. Bureau of Mines and, by right of
succession, Chairman of the Smoke Commission.67 From 1911 until at least 1921, the
Smoke Commission arranged for and, to an extent, operated the smoke abatement facilities at
the Washoe Smelter.
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2.

The Land Exchange

But the story does not end with Cottrell. ACMC met the general requirements of the
1911 agreement, as well as the more specific requirements of the Smoke Commission. As
L.D. Ricketts, a member of the Commission put it in 1920,
the Anaconda Copper Company has spent very large sums of money and virtually
followed and complied with all the recommendations that the Commission has made.
They are doing everything within reason to save as much as possible of the solids that
are going out the stack. . .and have spent several million dollars to this end.68

A second member of the Commission, Chairman Van Manning, concurred. The "officials of
the Anaconda Copper Mining Company," Manning wrote,

. .have without a single

exception met heartily the Commission’s recommendations and have cheerfully fulfilled their
part of the contract. . . ."69
Unfortunately, all the new industrial hardware did not meet the requirements of
smoke abatement. There were no further legal complaints from neighboring farmers and
ranchers, either because the arsenic problem had been solved or because ACMC had
purchased smoke and tailings easements.70 But alleged damage to the adjacent lands of the
U.S. Forest Service from sulfur dioxide emissions continued. In part this was because
production increased significantly during the war years, and the new equipment could not
handle the increase.71 In part, too, it was because no one could make the sulfur in copper
sulfide ores disappear—these were experts, not magicians—and no one knew what to do with
' I

the recovered sulfur. The issue was literally how to dispose of millions of tons of sulphuric
acid or liquid sulphur dioxide.
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This was not a question of commercial feasibility. Surely there is no argument that
ACMC should have been willing to produce sulphuric acid in the absence of a market as a
gesture of good will. If it had, what would it then have done with the unsold, unwanted,
quite useless, and highly toxic acid. Where should ACMC have put it?
But the Government believed that the smelter was still emitting sulphur dioxide, and
the public’s trees were still dying. By 1921-22, the scientific experts had reached the limits
of their expertise; there was nothing left for them to do. It was time for the Government to
turn its attention to the other part of the 1910 suit: the assessment and collection of damages.
The reality was that sulfur dioxide figured to remain an issue because it would continue to be
emitted from the Washoe’s stacks and to injure the timber resources within its reach. In
1910 ACMC had agreed to pay a lump sum to settle the damage done, and a yearly sum to
cover any future damages. The Government had rejected the offer but not the concept. Add
to this W.G. Wiegle’s "land for land" method of determining damages, and the way was
paved for a settlement of the smoke case.
The assumption behind W eigle’s "formula" was that those who had damaged a
resource would pay for the resource by replacing it. The problem in the forests affected by
the Washoe’s smoke was that reforestation would simply put healthy trees in the way of
sulfur dioxide gases. Those gases might be less toxic and of lesser amount than previously
emitted, but they might still be harmful. A cash settlement made a bit more sense, except
that live trees grow and reseed themselves and forests become more valuable more quickly
and surely than money. The solution to this quandary was suggested by the simple statement
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of it: let dead and dying trees behind the smelter be replaced by live, healthy, and growing
trees outside the "smoke zone." In other words, swap lands.
ACMC was the owner of large tracts of forested lands in western Montana. In 1922
Congress passed a law allowing for the transfer of privately owned lands in exchange for
Forest Service lands.72 The new law caught the eye of alert U .S.F.S. officials in western
Montana, and one of them, Fred Morrell, approached ACMC with a proposal. Morrell was
District Forester of the Deer Lodge National Forest with headquarters in Butte. In May
1922, less than six weeks after the passage of the law, Morrell wrote to L.O. Evans, an
ACMC attorney, asking for a meeting "to discuss certain phases of the problem involved in
the area of . . .land surrounding Anaconda which shows damage from smelter fumes."
Morrell had "a proposal for adjusting the matter in a way which. . . promises to be mutually
advantageous."73 Two months later, Morrell wrote again to Evans, this time saying that a
land exchange was "a way of solving the matter to the mutual satisfaction of both the
company and the Government."74
The exchange Morrell had in mind would transfer alledgedly injured forest service
lands to ACMC. The Company would in turn transfer some of its timber lands to the
Government. ACMC’s smoke might still be injurious to trees, but the trees would now
belong to ACMC. As for past injuries, including damage to the streams and rivers, the lands
ACMC would surrender to the Government would more than compensate for those. There
was a kind of relentless common sense about the proposed exchange. As Morrell noted in a
Memorandum, it "would, once and for all dispose as far as the Forest Service was
concerned, of questions of any possible damage. "75
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And the foresters had all the leverage they needed. "We must remember," one of
them wrote, "that the Company . . . has been doing considerable work on the extent and
amount of damage on this smelter area. . . . "76 In other words, ACMC could hardly
dispute damages which it had itself investigated. Just in case, however, the Forest Service
held in reserve the right "to force action through threat of suit for damages. . .the Company
must be forced to consider an exchange as a compromise offering, a more satisfactory and
safer solution than. . .a suit."77
Whether the reference was to "reactivating" the suit of 1910 or initiating new
proceedings is unclear and not important.78 The Forest Service had some damaged goods
on its hands. A major cause of the damage was alledgedly known. The damage could not
be halted short of closing the smelter, but a solution of extraordinary tidiness was at hand.
The Forest Service knew that establishing the extent of the damages and proving conclusively
that smelter fumes had caused all of them might prove tedious--if not impossible. As the
Smoke Commissioners had reported, the "matter. . .was an exceedingly intricate one, for the
reason that during the past 20 years there have been. . .extensive forest cuttings and
. . .extensive forest fires, and there is . . . a resulting uncertainty as to the extent to which
. . .the smelter smoke may have played a part. . . ."79 But ACM C’s position was only that
the smoke zone was more likely to diminish than to expand, not that there was no smoke
zone for which it was responsible.
It was also the case that ACMC would have to "be willing to acquire the injured lands
at a valuation equal to what the lands would have without the smelter fume damage. .

but

this also seemed fair and agreeable to L.O. Evans who represented ACMC in the preliminary
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negotiations.80 It could be that by then ACMC was in a particularly accomodating mood; it
may be that it simply wanted to do whatever was necessary to be out from under the threat
of legal action.
Evans was more matter-of-fact than machinating in his response to the Government’s
offer. He began by reminding the Forest Service of the 1910 suit.
The government, as you know, in the past showed interest in the future protection of
the forests and went to the extent during the Roosevelt [sic] administration of filing an
injunction suit. . . .and from that. . .[came] the appointment of a Commission to
insure the plant operated in such a way as to minimize, as far as possible, any further
forest injury.81
This is an important statement for a couple of reasons. It establishes what ACMC’s
perception of the role and the power of the Commission had been, and it indicates that
ACMC obviously connected the land exchange with the 1910 suit. ACMC assumed that the
events of 1903, 1905, 1910, 1911-20, and 1922 were clearly related, that each gave rise to
the next: there was a seamless progression from the tailings cases, to the Bliss case, to the
Federal suit, to the years of the Smoke Commission and smoke easements, to the Forest
Service proposal for a land swap. There is absolutely no reason to assume that the Forest
Service and the Departments of Agriculture and Justice were not fully aware of ACMC’s
feelings on this matter. The Smoke Commission and the land exchange were both products
of the 1910 suit which itself grew out of the 1905 suit.
All that was left was determining the details of the exchange. That would not be
easy. There were questions regarding mineral lands within the areas to be exchanged.82
The issue of Northern Pacific Railroad lands would have to be addressed and finessed.83
The Government made another case for its ownership of public lands subject to unpatented
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mining claims within the smoke zone and insisted that ACMC compensate it for damage to
those lands; both sides made a case for retaining mineral rights.84 The Forest Service had
to decide whether it wanted only ACMC "inholdings" or if it could accept non-contiguous
lands.85
These were contentious issues. The Congress would have to pass two laws, in 1925
and 1929, to supplement the transfer act of 1922 and accommodate these needs. There was
the question of determining damages from smelter fumes versus damages from fire, insects,
and weather; of affixing a value to meadow lands and barren lands. And always there was
the issue of whether the smoke zone would shrink or expand.
These details would have to be worked out, but there was one area of perfect
agreement, and the Government’s representatives were not reluctant to give voice to it. The
Government knew and acted as if a land exchange would settle the lawsuit brought by the
Department of Justice in 1910 and that ACMC would be released from any future liability
for damages to the air or water from its smelter. It could not have been otherwise. The
1910 suit alleged in part that smoke from ACM C’s Washoe Smelter was injuring the
Government’s trees.

The Smoke Commission was charged with operating the smelter in

such a fashion that the injuries would stop; the land exchange represented ACMC’s payment
in full for all damages done.
The Forest Service’s representatives understood this fully, and they were not shy in
expressing that understanding. The land exchange, one of them said in 1922, would "point a
way of solving the matter to the. . .satisfaction of. . .the Government." The fact that
ACMC would also be "satisfied" hardly diminished the plan’s appeal, particularly since the
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point was being made to an ACMC attorney.86 Later language regarding the effect of the
exchange included reference to "dispose. . .of questions of any possible damage"; "equitably
adjusting the. . .problem"; "liquidating the damages"; "compensating the Forest Service for
the injury;" the exchange would "effect settlement" of the smoke case;87 "the Government
would. . .get properly reimbursed for the damages"; the Government would be receiving
"indemnity. . .lands"; the Government was "withdraw ring! its claims for damage" and
"dropping out as a contender against the A .C .M ."; the Government would be "dropping" its
"pending suit against the Company"; the exchange would "in effect be a complete settlement
of the Government’s claims"; it would mean "disposing of questions of damage"; the
Department of Justice "concurred in the proposed exchange scheme for disposing of
questions of damage"; it represented an "amicable settlement" of the 1910 suit; the "results
of the exchange will be to settle the long-standing problem. . .resulting from the smelter
injury"; ACMC had gone "to considerable expense" to meet the requirements of the Smoke
Commission and the exchange was a logical conclusion to the entire proceedings; ACMC "is
actually reimbursing the Government for the damage caused": and finally, "the right to claim
damages is relinquished. . . ,"88
These references, drawn from documents written over a fifteen-year period, indicate
clearly that the Government thought of the land exchange as releasing ACMC from any
further and future liability for the damages ennumerated in the 1910 suit. Even Ligon
Johnson recommended that "the exchange be effected and the litigation disposed of on this '
basis."89 The Government consistently and purposefully spoke and acted as if ACMC was
released. One thing is certain: the Anaconda officials took the Forest Service at its word,
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assuming, on the basis of the Government’s actions, that the land exchange represented a last
and best offer for the settlement of the 1910 suit, in all of its aspects.
Evidence that ACMC believed the Government meant what it said is found in the
letter of October 9, 1923, which officially signalled ACM C’s acceptance in principle of the
land exchange. In the letter, ACMC "formally institute[d]. . .the matter of the proposed
exchange." ACMC called attention, first of all, to the conference that had been held over
the previous year and a half at which "the matter of settling all [the] claims, and the
prevention of future controversies. . .was discussed."
The rest of the letter reads like a legal brief. "It is understood," ACMC wrote, "that
the basis of the exchange shall be that each party shall convey equal value, such value to be
determined by agreement and agreed appraisals by the parties of the land and timber
thereon." The letter concluded with the very matter-of-fact comment that "as stated. . .with
the completion of this transfer we would expect a release and discharge on the part of the
Government, releasing the Anaconda Copper Mining Company from all claims arising prior
to the date of the settlement. "91 At no time did the Forest Service challenge this or any
other aspect of what it came to refer to as the "agreement of 1923."92
Two years after ACMC entered into this contract, the Forest Service decided that the
exchange could not be handled in one transaction. There were problems of surveying, of
determining equal values, of politics and public perceptions, and of insuring that the smoke
zone would not one day take in lands as yet undamaged and so not part of the exchange
negotiations.93 For these reasons the Government proposed the idea of multiple exchanges,
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of what one Forest Service official called "an indefinite number of exchanges, each one
complete and meritorious in itself but all fitting into a general plan agreed to in advance."94
ACMC was not pleased with this new plan. It wanted "to get the whole business
cleaned up,"95 but the Forest Service assured ACMC’s representatives that "the basis for
bringing suit for damage would be removed to a very great degree so far as the lands
acquired by the Company in the exchange were concerned." In other words, the deal was
still on, the agreement of 1923 was still binding on the Government. The only difference
was that there would be more than one exchange.96
A process had been set in motion. There was to be an ongoing series of exchanges.
The process would continue until the Government was fully "reimbursed." The best and
most complete statement of the process came from E.A. Sherman, the Acting United States
Forester, in 1927. He had been involved in one way or another in the smoke case since at
least 1919, and the idea for a series of exchanges seems to have been his. In a letter to the
attorney for the Department of Agriculture, Sherman put the matter this way:
The areas are being tackled piecemeal and each exchange is being put through upon
its own merits without reference to what may follow. As each exchange is
consummated the damage problem is correspondingly diminished. Until the entire
area damaged has been acquired by the Company, I do not feel that the suit should be
dismissed. Upon the other hand, as long as we are going forward with exchanges I
do not feel that the suit should be pressed. . . .so long as we are making good
progress, as I now feel we are, in bringing about a practical and businesslike
settlement. . .legal action should simply remain suspended. . . ,97
Obviously, good progress continued to be made; legal action remained "suspended,"
and on March 24, 1933, after five block exchanges had been completed and a sixth in the
process of being consummated, the 1910 suit was "abandoned" according to the Court docket
sheet.98 That did not, of course, mean that the exchanges would cease. The Government
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retained the right to seek further indemnification from ACMC and, in fact, a seventh
exchange was proposed." The important consideration is that the first six exchanges were
sufficient to satisfy all the damage claims arising out of the 1910 suit, as well as the
provisions of the Agreement of 1923.
By 1942 the Forest Service declared that the "entire exchange [was] nearing its
close."100 ACMC, as the Assistant Chief Forester put it that same year, had not been
"wildly enthusiastic regarding this solution but accepted it and. . .has fully kept faith with the
Forest Service."101 A year later the Forest Service went on record with a statement
remarkably similar to that offered by the Smoke Commission that "all that seems humanly
possible has been done by the A.C.M . to hold damage to the unavoidable minimum."102
The six exchanges took place between 1926 and 1933, i.e., from first approval by the
forest supervisor to final approval by the Secretary of the Interior, though the last was not
consummated until 1937. By their terms, the United States Government received
approximately 131,157 acres of ACMC timberlands with 142,000,000 board feet of timber in
exchange for 108,763 acres of land in the Deerlodge National Forest. The total value of the
Government’s new lands was $241,172; the estimated total value of the Deerlodge lands
turned over to ACMC would have been $227,311; it must be kept in mind that this estimate
was based on the value had there been no smoke damage. The actual value of the lands was
considerably less.103 There is a final point. ACMC had so little interest in its new
holdings that it turned their management over to the Forest Service.104 Here was a deal
even Ligon Johnson would have liked.
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Certainly the Forest Service did. The foresters had known all along that, as one of
them put it, "the acreage which the Co. will acquire will be much smaller than the acreage
the govt will acquire."105 Once the exchanges began, the Government’s timber managers
grew even more excited. In a policy statement to all Forest officers issued in 1928 and
marked "Confidential," the Deerlodge Forest Supervisor said that "in exchange for an area
which without smelter injury could never have been highly productive, we are securing a
larger area of more highly productive lands. . . ." 106 In a later statement, also marked
"Confidential," the District Forester told his supervisors that ACMC was to get lands
"largely denuded of timber by smelter fume injury, trespass, and fire. The timber has
largely been salvaged and used. . . ." 107 In exchange,
the Government will obtain title to. . .A.C.M . Company lands of generally high
timber-producing power. . . .An appreciably greater volume of marketable-sized
timber is being acquired by the Government than is being passed to the ownership of
the company. As a result of the exchange, the timber-producing capacity of lands in
Federal ownership will be very materially increased."108
The point of all of this is not that ACMC was duped by the mendacious minions of
the Government. It is rather that the men who ran ACMC, as surely as those who ran the
Government, wanted to settle an issue first raised in 1903-05. The mining and smelting of
copper ores was vital to the nation’s prosperity and security; that fact was acknowledged by
the Government during the land exchange negotiations.109 But the arsenic and sulfur
incidental to that mining and smelting was alleged to have done damage to private and public
property. ACMC paid for those alleged damages. It bought smoke and tailings easements
from private citizens, complied with the demands of the Smoke Commission by installing
expensive apparatus and producing fertilizer for a non-existent market, and reimbursed the

187

Government by turning over good lands in exchange for damaged lands-lands which the
Government itself admitted were of marginal value even before they were damaged and
would have been of only marginal value had they never been damaged. And in return for
these rather substantial payments, ACMC was released by the Government from ever having
to pay again for the same offenses. In 1925 E.A. Sherman wrote to the U.S. Forester that
"in order to make the [exchange plan] a success there must be a certain amount of mutual
trust and good will. . . ." n0 His words were true then; they are true now.
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F.

The Partnership in Peace and War

In the first section of this report I wrote at length about the United States Geological
Survey. My purpose was to show how seriously the Government took its responsibilities to
encourage those useful enterprises which served the general welfare. The U.S.G.S. was an
example—perhaps the best example—of that governmental commitment. The fact that the
Survey was involved with the nation’s mining interests made its story even more relevant.
The government encouraged the full development of the nation’s mineral resources; it did so
without regard to environmental costs; it benefitted directly from that development; and it
was not averse to claiming a full partner’s share of the credit for the positive contributions
made by America’s mining industry.
But there is another and less direct lesson to be learned from the story of the
U.S.G.S. The lesson belies a commonly held notion about American history and forces
students of that history to rethink conventional ideas about the role of an activist government
and the historical origins of that role. What is the government’s role in the management of
the nation’s affairs? More specifically, how involved should the government be in the
private economic affairs of its citizens, and what form should that involvement take? To
what extent should the government plan the economy? How cozy a partnership should it
have with private industries? Should it support and encourage certain forms of enterprise
and discourage others? To what extent should the government serve as an arbiter between
the competing interests of, say, business and labor or industry and the environment? These
and more are the functions of the "modem" state. Each entails tradeoffs and compromises;
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each is intensely political or at least intensely politicized. And each becomes more urgent as
the process of industrialization raises the stakes of those "competing claims and interests."
Obviously, different nations answered those questions differently, and the answers for
any given nation changed over time as economic and social conditions changed. Some
generalizations, however, are possible. In industrializing Japan the partnership between the
government and private industry was very close and cooperative indeed—far closer than the
American Constitution and America’s political institutions would have permitted. In
Germany the so-called Prussian Road was tak en -a path of clear, of sometimes covert,
partnership between the state and private industry. In Britain, the Royal Navy and the
various managers of empire represented the government’s "planning office."1
In the United States these questions were made more complex simply because there
were two governments whose roles had to be determined—state and federal. That
determination involved, in addition to the state and federal governments’ relationship with the
private sector, the two governments’ relationship with one another. I will limit my remarks
to the role of the Federal Government. Again, however, certain generalizations are possible.
Until fairly recently, historians would have argued that the "modem" American state
was bom in the 1930s. By modem I mean the state as an active agent of economic planning,
involved in some way with almost every detail of economic decision-making. Within that
context, the conventional wisdom held that, until the 1930s and the New Deal, the public and
private spheres were also separate spheres, and that FDR was—for better or worse—the first
"modem" American president.
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A few would have disputed this historical wisdom. Some might try to make a case
for Lincoln; others for Theodore Roosevelt. Both were activist leaders, and both vastly
increased the power and authority of the Federal Government. But these claims are
diminished by what seems the ephemeral and transient nature of their activist administrations.
The Civil War and Reconstruction Era, it was argued, were followed by the politically
passive Gilded Age; Rooseveltian (and Wilsonian) Progressivism was succeeded by the
politically inert and laissez-faire Roaring Twenties. Only New Deal activism had any staying
power.
This interpretation fits nicely into the more general theory of history as a succession
of pendulum swings, each swing set in motion by the excesses of the other. Thus, reform
followed reaction which gave rise to further reform; an activist administration or two would
overreach and be succeeded by an era of passive administrations which allowed "things"
(variously described) to get out of hand, forcing the government once again to become an
active player. It was all very predictable. The New Deal halted the pendulum—or rather
Eisenhower did—and ended a dizzying historical process. So the argument had it.
Few historians now embrace this simplistic notion. There were periods of greater and
lesser governmental involvement in economic planning, but there was never a time after
about 1875 when the government was not an active partner in the design and management of
the American economy.

The American Federal Government responded to the challenges,

crises, and opportunities of industrialization in a variety of ways, but detachment and
disinterest were not among them. Whether history is linear or circular may be debated. But
it is not a swinging pendulum.
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If one man may be said to have been the philosopher, or at least the ideologue, of this
activist governmental role, it would be Lester Frank Ward. In 1883 Ward published his
seminal Dynamic Sociology, which argues for the use of government as an instrument of
social and economic progress. It broke with both the advocates of laissez-faire and of
conservative Social Darwinism by offering the rather unremarkable idea that the human
capacity for reason came as "naturally" to it as did, say, the opposable thumb. Humans used
their thumbs to grasp things and from that came tools. They used reason to invent things
and from that came government. Not to use either of these naturally occurring gifts made no
sense.. Sociology-by which Ward meant social policy-m ust be dynamic. It must plan,
manage, organize, and make efficient the structural components of society.2
Ward provided the ideological underpinnings for what came to be called
\

Progressivism., His philosophy was unabashedly pragmatic and experimental—the philosophy
of the bureaucrat as the agent of the activist state. As such, it was a philosophy ideally
suited to "solving" problems. If some aspect of American society was not working, fix it
and make it work. Use the tools available; form a committee, call in the experts, pass the
necessary legislation. Government was a tool for Ward—no more, but certainly no less. The
key words in the progressive’s lexicon were "order," "efficiency," and, "progress." Its
weapon was "corporatism" or, and more revealingly, "state capitalism." But in all instances,
its emphasis was on the development of a dynamic social policy.3
By the time Ward was writing, it had become obvious that industrialization was a
messy process. In the words of historian Robert Wiebe, it forced the American people to
"search for order." Wiebe dates the beginnings of the search in 1877. Another eminent

199

historian, Olivier Zunz, says that industrialization involved "making America corporate" and
that the incorporation of the government was central to that process, which he says began in
1870. Martin Sklar’s "corporate reconstruction of American capitalism" began in 1890.4
But what of those Roaring Twenties? Did they, or the Great War which came before
them, not halt the process? Did they not represent the repudiation of Lester Frank Ward?
Increasingly, the historical evidence say no. The partnership begun in the 1870s continued
into and through the 1920s. The economic historian, Robert F. Himmelberg, has edited a
volume of articles entitled Business-Govemment Cooperation. 1917-1932. The title itself
should occasion a reconsideration of government in the 1920s. The collection contains
essays on such topics as "The Discovery and Study of ‘Corporate Liberalism’"; "Herbert
Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an ‘Associative State,’1921-1928"; and
"Herbert Hoover and Economic Stabilization, 1921-22. "5
Obviously, Hoover was an important player in bridging Progressivism and the 1920s,
as Theodore Roosevelt had been in spanning the 1880s and the 1900s. But the entire era of
the 20s is being reevaluated-not just Hoover’s role. Far from representing a return to
"normalcy," defined as pre-Progressivism laissez-faire, the decade is now seen as part of a
continuation-even a fulfillment-of Progressivism, as well as the natural precursor of the
New Deal. The historical emphasis for the years from 1870 to 1929 is no longer on change
and watersheds but on seamlessness and continuity.6
In this context, the USGS is a symbol, a kind of bureaucratic ideogram marking the
beginning of a new public policy. But the USGS history also presents us with a wonderful
juxtaposition, an example of lines intersecting in a way that reveals far more than the lines
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themselves ever could. Lester Frank Ward wrote Dynamic Sociology while working for the
USGS. As the historian of science A. Hunter Dupree put it, "That a social philosophy which
stressed planning for human progress grew up in the Geological Survey has at least a
symbolic significance."7
I now return to the Survey briefly only to show to what extent it may stand for a
larger and long-running political movement. Other examples could have been chosen; there
were new bureaus and surveys and commissions dealing with labor and immigration issues,
foreign policy, and the conservation of natural resources. (Under no circumstances should
this last be confused with an environmental movement; it represented what is now called
"wise use.") Indeed, it is hard to imagine an area of American national life for which a
bureau of some sort was not formed between 1870 and 1930. There was a Fish
Commission, a Country Life Commission, an Office of Irrigation Investigation, an Inland
Waterways Commission, a National Board of Health, the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, and literally hundreds more. Post Civil War American government was not
shy.
For present purposes, however, the USGS is the paradigm of private/public
partnership. But although the Survey may have been the most important of the agencies for
this report, it was not the only one. The two other agencies that come immediately to mind
are the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Mines. The first was formed in 1905, the
latter in 1910. Both belong then to the general heading of Progressive agencies, but both had
pre-Progressive antecedents and long, continuing post-Progressive lives. And both played
active roles in the affairs of ACMC and in the history of the upper Clark Fork River basin.
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One responsibility of the Bureau of Mines has already been detailed: the head of the
Bureau was made the chair of the Smoke Commission. It was a perfectly appropriate,
historically predictable role. The head was an expert in matters pertaining to mining and
smelting. Who better to insure that the Washoe Smelter would not continue to damage the
property of the U.S. Government? Although the Commission was dissolved in 1920, the
Bureau of Mines stayed very active in the Clark Fork Basin area for the next 70 years.

1.

The Rocker Timber Treatment Plant

The Forest Service was also a player in the smoke case. It was the foresters who
initiated and negotiated the land exchanges which concluded the 1910 suit and released
ACMC from any future liability for the Anaconda Smelter. But swapping lands was not the
Service’s only involvement in ACMC affairs during these years. There was also the case of
the Rocker Timber Treatment Plant, and it deserves discussion.
On May 17, 1909, the Forest Service entered into a "Wood Preservation Agreement"
with ACMC. There is a message in its language and method of presentation.
The District Forester, in pursuance of investigations of forest products, and in order
to disseminate a knowledge of their best use and render practical assistance to the
Anaconda Copper Mining Company, shall make a careful study. . .of the most
efficient methods for the preservative treatment of structural and other timbers. . . .8
There is a notable matter-of-factness about this contract; the Forest Service drafted the
document, and it is clear that it did not consider "rendering practical assistance" to ACMC to
require any elaborate justification. That is what modem, progressive, "dynamic"
governments did. In fact, the Forest Service entered into similar agreements with various
other national industrial, mining and railroad giants.9
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It is also worth pointing out that less than a year after this agreement was signed, the
government filed a suit in equity against the same ACMC with which its Forest Service was
cooperating. The two actions were unrelated, except as both indicate important parts of the
Progressive impulse. Both the Agreement of 1909 and the su it-o r at least the 1911
stipulation which tabled it—involved public/private partnerships; both were concerned with
the "efficient" use of resources; both called on scientific experts; and both were designed to
"preserve," protect and wisely use a vital national resource. In these instances it was even
the same resource: the trees of the Federal forests. To understand the mentality of
Progressivism, one would be well advised to look closely at the relationship between the
Federal Government and ACMC between 1909 and 1927.
By the terms of the Wood Preservation Agreement, the Forest Service prepared the
designs and specifications for a wood- treatment plant, supervised its construction, and ran it
for the first months of its operation. The plant was built on both sides of Silver Bow Creek,
at Rocker, Montana, a small community about five miles west of Butte.10 The plant was
known to Forest Service officials as Project 44; it was an important laboratory for them, a
place to test the newest ideas for extending the useful life of mine and railroad timbers.
The stakes were high. ACMC consumed an enormous amount of timber in its mines.
Anything that could extend the life of that timber or allow the use of more abundant and less
commercially valuable trees would be a clear gain for forest preservation. The EMJ, in
reporting on the partnership between the U .S.F.S and ACMC, stated that "next to checking
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the waste by forest fires, wood preservation. . .is perhaps the most important phase of forest
conservation."11
ACMC mines had been using red cedar from Idaho and coast fir from western
Washington. Both were expensive, quality woods of great valueTo a variety of economic
interests. As a consequence, both were far dearer to the hearts of the Forest Service than the
lodgepole pine available in great abundance in western Montana and of little use to
anyone.12 Simple prudence and common sense suggested that mines use the cheaper
timbers.13 And so the Forest Service "recommended" that ACMC pay for a plant that
would treat "thoroughly air-seasoned" lodgepole and western yellow pine "with about 5
pounds of cresote per cubic foot and some with one-half pound dry zinc chloride per cubic
foot."14 The finished treating plant began operations under direct Forest Service
supervision in September 1910; on December 1 it "was turned over to the company for
future operations. . . ,"15
It was a major operation of more than 3,000 square feet with state-of-the-art industrial
hardware and an impressive capacity of 450 to 570 cubic feet of timber per run. It required
"probably 45,000 cubic yards of dirt and cinders" as fill dirt. It had hoisting engines, a huge
loading platform, twelve cylinder cars, a 43-foot-long treating cylinder, and measuring tanks
for the creosote mixture. The final plans also called for "cribbing. . .to be put in along the
south bank of the creek for a distance of about 1000 feet in order to prevent washouts."16
There were no further references to this cribbing; one can only hope that it worked as
intended, because Rocker used a sizeable amount of creosote. Between September 1910
when it opened and January 1911, 62 runs of ties, 26 runs of plank, and 12 runs of shaft
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timbers were treated with a total of 23,723 gallons of creosote.17 The majority of that
production was during the months when the Forest Service was in full charge of the
operation and setting the pattern for both treatment and waste disposal. Between 1911 and
1914, over 160,000 gallons of creosote were used on millions of board feet of tim ber.18
Penetration in these air-dried timbers varied, but at best a significant amount of cresote
would almost surely have been "released."
The Forest Service probably figured it was worth it. "The use of treated red fir shaft
timber," it noted with obvious pleasure, "will cut down the drain on the forests 60% ," saving
trees for the Government and dollars for ACMC. And, "if the. . .Company. . .would use
treated lodgepole pine poles it would cut down the drain on the cedar and create a market for
the 6" and 7" ‘stulls’ which are hard to dispose of at present."19 "Summing it up, the
policy of treating ties, poles, posts, shaft timber and timber in the main drifts, not only
means a big saving to the . . .Company, but also cuts down the consumption of red fir and
increases the use of inferior species such as lodgepole pine."20
In 1926 the pressure plant at Rocker was destroyed in a fire, causing no little concern
among Forest officials who continued to treat the Rocker plant as if it were one of their
laboratories and continued to monitor its operation.

George Hunt, in charge of the wood

preservation section of the Service, wanted to know if ACMC was "planning to rebuild it
soon. . . .The advantages of pressure equipment are so great that I hope you will soon be
prepared to treat with pressure again." Hunt was also interested in learning more "about the
service tests [ACMC was] making on timber treated with arsenical solutions. . . . [and
about] the substitution of cresoil for creosote. . . . "
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He hoped that ACMC would "pardon

[his] asking so many questions, but the things you are doing are of such interest that I would
like to follow them further. "21
That same year and for at least the next ten years, the U.S.F.S. interested itself in
another ACMC venture in wood preservation. This one involved the use of arsenic as a
wood preservative. The research was conducted at the Forest Products Laboratory at
Madison, Wisconsin. The arsenic was provided, under the terms of a formal "cooperative
agreement," by several companies, including ACMC. The object was to treat fence posts,
railroad ties, and telephone poles with various arsenical pastes, solutions, and dusts to see if
arsenic--the toxicity of which was readily admitted by the Forest Service-might not extend
their useable life. ACMC’s arsenic treating plant was at Rocker.22
This was the way partnerships were supposed to work. Both sides had something to
gain from the arrangement; neither thought of the other as an adversary. Whether the
preservative be creosote, cresoil, or arsenic, ACMC and the Forest Service could and did
share information, facilities, and personnel. Rocker, however, was not an environmentally
benign operation—a fact of which the Government was fully aware.
2.

World War I

The First World War was literally that: the first time the nations of the world—or
enough of them to qualify—had gone about the business of destroying one another. As with
all firsts, there was no precedent and no chance to practice. This conflict would require the
mobilization, under the aegis of government, of entire populations—not just armed forces.
More to the point here, it would require that the essential resources of war-making be
mobilized under that same aegis.
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Accordingly, the modem states in place by 1914 were presented with their greatest
challenge. "Coordination," "efficiency," "order," "planning"—the code words of the activist
state-would take on new and more urgent meanings. This was true in America, as well as in
Europe, whether the U.S. was a non-combatant or, after April 6, 1917, a co-belligerent.
The partnerships formed between 1875 and the outbreak of hostilities would be tightened and
the range and extent of governmental activism broadened and vastly strengthened.
A. Hunter Dupree, a leading historian of American science, described that closer
partnership in these terms:
Although spawned in a period of peace and directed toward nonmilitary problems, the
civilian scientific bureaus of the government had. . .much to offer in research
resources for a total war. . . .Especially the new bureaus oriented to industrial
problems—Standards and Mines—possessed skill of high importance."23
Those skills, combined with those employed in private American industries, were fully
enlisted in the war effort. The result, says Dupree, was that "cooperative research on a large
scale" became the accepted model for American scientists. They had become "accustomed to
working together for the quick solution of an immediate problem ." This was not, however,
something new with Progressivism or even the war years. "The government," Dupree makes
clear, "had pioneered in the problem approach from 1880 onward. Now it became the
common experience of a whole generation of scientists-the ones who shaped institutions not
only in the 1920s and 1930s but during the second World War as w ell."24
Dupree, of course, was speaking generally; he was, in fact, primarily interested in the
government’s involvement in research in medicine and new methods of warfare. But copper
operations could also be used as examples of wartime partnerships. As will be seen, these
were partnerships in which the copper companies were distinctly junior to the Federal
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Government. It is almost enough to offer the reminder that the Smoke Commission with
responsibility over ACMC’s sulfur and arsenic recovery processes was a wartime agency and
aware of its wartime responsibilities. Technically, it was the War Industries Board with
whom ACMC was required to do business. There would be times, however, when
distinguishing between the Smoke Commission and the W.I.B. would be problematic at best.
The strategic significance of copper, zinc, and manganese was acknowledged early in.
the war, in advance of direct U.S. involvement in the hostilities.25 With America’s
entrance in 1917, these metals were declared essential materials, and the Government went
about insuring that it had adequate supplies.26 It had three basic needs: an efficient delivery
system, an adequate labor force, and prices stable and high enough to finance the increased
production from privately owned and controlled mines and smelters.
The government dealt with the delivery system by nationalizing the railroads, an act
of obvious historical importance but of only peripheral significance to this report. Clearly,
when the government took over the operation of the entire rail system, it pushed its activist
role as far as it might reasonably be pushed. It took this step because the private—if heavily
subsidized—system was too slow and there was a war to be fought. After the war, the
Government gave the system back.27
The question of labor was a more difficult one. War requires increased industrial
production, but it also requires that many of the producers trade their work clothes for battle
fatigues. The inevitable results are an inadequate supply of workers of every skill level,
higher wages, absenteeism, and job actions. An appeal to patriotism reduced some of the
threat from the last two of these problems, but this was a world war fought at a time when
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many millions of America’s most recent immigrants had not shed all of their old world
allegiances. President Wilson railed against those inassimilable ethnics who took sides in the
war on the basis of their nation of origin and its perceived interests. In fact, it could not
have been otherwise, and Wilson should have known that. There were hundreds of
thousands of German, Austrian, Serbian, Croatian, Finnish, Polish, and Irish-Americans for
whom this war represented something more than just a failure of the diplomatists or "secret
treaties, secretly arrived at." This was a war involving the Home Land, and no Presidential
proclamation or Congressional declaration of war could change minds and hearts irrevocably
set at birth.28 .
The problem for ACMC was that it must at times have seemed that every one of
those ethnics was working in Butte or Anaconda. In June 1917, about six weeks after the
U.S. declared war, Butte’s miners went on strike. The usual issues were raised: hours,
wages, blacklisting, and worker safety. But the strike wore an ethnic aspect as well. Many
ethnics felt betrayed by their adopted nation’s declaration of war against their nation of birth
or descent or one of its allies.29 As one government official put it after the war, the
copper miners were "streaked with alienism, bolshevism, syndicalism, and prone to
strike."30 Whether those in Butte struck to protest the war or to protest working conditions
is a subject far beyond the scope of this report.
The Government took as its own responsibility insuring the loyalty, as well as the
sufficiency, of the ACMC work force. Together with officials from the State, Federal agents
from Military Intelligence and the Department of Justice occupied Butte as they might have
occupied any other sector in the war zone. To a certain extent, Butte was literally that.
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From 1917 to 1920 there were four major strikes of Butte miners, two of them during war
time. A Federal mediator was dispatched to Butte.31 The National Guard was called. The
regular Army was sent~an organizer for the radical Industrial Workers of the World referred
to the soldiers as "Uncle Sam’s scabs in uniform."32 There were rumors that the
Government would take over the mines; indeed the striking workers asked that, like the
railroads, the mines be nationalized.33 The government did not go quite that far, but the
National Council of Defense, as well as agents of the new Bureau of Investigation within the
Department of Justice, joined by Pinkertons and Bums detectives and a reported agent of
Scotland Yard, made Butte a kind of second home. They raided the headquarters of
suspected radicals, attempted to infiltrate radical organizations, and guaranteed the safety of
replacement workers during the strikes. Governmental activities amply justified the later
references to a "military regime in Butte.1134
Copper, it was said, could win the war. The Government did what it could to see
that the mines and smelters were adequately manned, meaning it kept its eye on the quality—
in terms of loyalty—of the men in the copper fields. It did not, however, ignore the issue of
sufficiency of supply. Soldiers were furloughed to mine work as part of a program jointly
administered by the Bureau of Mines and the War Department.
Draft boards were consulted and influenced, and in the summer of 1918 the United
States Employment Service was organized as part of the effort to insure an adequate supply
of what one authority called "so-called unskilled workers. . .to reduce the waste due to our
unprecedented labor turnover." Unfortunately, "this form of government aid," though
helpful, could not remedy the shortage of "trained miners; [these] must be taken from the
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poorer and smaller. . .mines and allotted to those copper producers who have the greatest
capacity. . . ."35
More important than transportation or worker loyalty were the related matters of price
and production. It was this issue that led the War Industries Board, under the direction of
Bernard Baruch, to turn its considerable gaze toward Butte and Anaconda and others of
America’s copper towns. The W .I.B. was involved with transportation and labor—as well as
with the Smoke Commission—but its principal responsibility was insuring the supplies of
essential materials of war, including copper. As the Board admitted after the war,
"maximum production was absolutely required and the Government could take no risk of
causing a reduction." Maximum production required stabilizing prices plus frank appeals to
patriotism. Those failing, the Board was prepared to take over the mines.
Stabilizing the price would not be easy. Unlike steel and oil, copper had never had a
rigid price structure. In fact, it is hard to imagine a basic industry submitted to such wild
market fluctuations as those which beset copper. Let the statistics tell the story. Adjusting
for the value of the dollar, in 1870 the price of copper was 21.2 cents per pound; in 1872 it
was 35.6 cents; in 1894 9.5. During WWI, it ranged from 23.5 to 29.2; but in 1921 it stood
at 12.7 cents; in 1929 it was at 18.2; in 1932 at 5.7; in 1937 at 13.3. During WWII, copper
fell to 11.9 cents; in 1946 it was at 13.9. Obviously, every effort to com er and control the
market had failed.36 There was, however, one constant in this 80-year record of price
fluctuation: the overall tendency of copper prices was to fall at an "average annual rate of
decrease in the real price of copper [of] 1.31 percent per year."37
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Copper was a volatile industry, subject to huge and steadily downward fluctuations in
price. Profit margins were very low and easily lost. ACMC was prey to every whim,
shake, blip, and hiccup of a notoriously erratic market. ACMC did not set the price; it
certainly did not fix the price. It must have seemed at times as if it had no semblance of
control over the price. Producing copper was not for the faint of heart. "At no time,"
according to George Hildebrand and Garth Mangum, two recent economists of the copper
industry,

. .was the domestic price of copper effectively manipulated upward by a private

combination of producers unaided by a national government. "38
Clearly, the Government’s peacetime involvement in copper production, however
much it might have aided in other aspects of the business, did not bring higher or even stable
prices. That did not come until 1917 when the United States entered the war, and the
government began fully to realize its dependence on copper. John D. Ryan, president of
ACMC, and chairman of the Copper Cooperative Association, spoke for ACMC and other
producers and offered to provide 51,510,000 pounds of copper needed by the military for
16.6739 cents per pound, the average price of copper from 1907 to 1916. This was scarcely
half the current market price, and, with labor costs fixed by that market price, it did not
represent a "fair" return on production costs. In a less cynical age, it might be possible to
say that ACMC was meeting its patriotic obligations. Bernard Baruch, in fact, said exactly
that.39
In an agreement of September 21, 1917, negotiated by Ryan for the Copper
Cooperative Association and Baruch, the War Industries Board set the price at a more
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reasonable 23.5 cents per pound. This, too, represented a war-time concession by the copper
producers, a fact acknowledged by the WIB in a report issued after the war:
. . .the price was definitely fixed in the form of agreement between the government
and the producers. It was approved by the President, subject to revision after four
months
. . . .It is interesting. . .to note that. . . no consumer, public or private, nor official
of our own or any other government. . .objected] to the price as too high. . . .The
price of copper represented a smaller advance over prewar normal than that of
perhaps any other commodity. This was the first negotiated price-fixing arrangement
ever established bv the United States Government. Despite many hardships and
obstacles the American copper producers played their part and contributed to the
successful prosecution of the war in a way second to no other industry. There are
ample grounds for the belief that the prices fixed bv the government worked hardship
on many operators (emphasis added).40
It might be said that the WIB was something less than a disinterested party and that
this high praise for the copper companies, ACMC conspicuous among them, was selfserving. This would be unfair. There was general and totally unsolicited agreement on this
point. Grosvenor B. Clarkson, for example, the director of the U.S. Council of National
Defense during the war, wrote in 1923 that the agreement "set an example that would be
used against their selfish interests and those of all industry throughout the war. . . . "
Clarkson’s point was that the copper producers were "establishing the criterion by which all
prices would be. . . measured; the criterion [of]. . .in accord with public interest."41
\

But the copper industry did more. Clarkson explained:
. . .beset by labor troubles, hobbled by the draft, cramped by transportation
deficiencies, and sometimes starved for lack of fuel, [it] fed the workshops of the
Republic and of the Allies with unfailing streams of the second metal of victory.42
The first metal was steel, but it was the "copper men [who] have the distinction of being the
industry that sounded the industrial keynote. . .of service and repudiation of profiteering

213

. . . .they cordially met the Government’s initial requirements at something less than half the
prevailing prices."43 The reference to sounding an industrial keynote is important. Setting
the price for copper had intrinsic value because copper was vital to the war effort. But
almost as important was what the WIB called "the psychological effect" of the copper
agreement on other industries. Baruch believed that Ryan’s initial offer to sell to the Army
and Navy at about half price, and his later acceptance of prices fixed below the market had a
most salutary effect on other industries, particularly steel.44 Others agreed. A later source
noted that the copper deal "represented much more than a mere saving of money.
Psychologically the copper bargain was of immeasurable importance." It was "an
arrangement whereby property rights retreated before the transcending right of the United
States to use its own resources for its own vital purposes. . . .The historical importance of
the episode was out of all proportion to the mere quantities and values involved."45 All that
praise for patriotism and sacrifice must have pleased ACM C’s officers, but they were also
aware of something contemporary readers must keep in mind: ACMC had no choice in any
of this. They sold their copper for 23.5 and 26 cents per pound because Bernard Baruch told
them they had to.
Twenty three and one-half cents was still far less than the market price; so was 26
cents, the final ceiling reached in June, 1918 and reflecting increased labor and transportation
costs. Even at that last rate, according to a member of the Government’s Price Fixing
Board, "the advance in copper [prices] over prewar normal. . .was less than half the average
granted [to other war essentials."]46 President Woodrow Wilson also understood what the
copper producers, and specifically ACMC and John Ryan, had done. The industry, Wilson
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said, had placed "its full production. . .at the disposal of the Government. . .without
unnecessary urging. .

as to Ryan, he had "served the needs of the Nation. . . admirably.

. .and unselfishly, [his] activities. . . were actuated by the highest patriotism."47 The
American Mining Congress, admittedly another "interested" party, agreed, saying that "the
attitude of the copper producers throughout the war was one of unselfish and patriotic
devotion to the best interests of the Government, for which they were repeatedly and highly
commended. . . ,"48 There is no disputing the last clause.
In other words, the copper companies, ACMC first among them, under some
prodding from an impatient government, supplied, at considerably less than market, the
copper the nation needed.49 This is not to say that the copper companies did not make
money during the war; they did. It is to say that they also vastly expanded their production,
built up huge inventories with no assurance of a peacetime use for them, and did so for
considerably less than the market price. As will be seen, costs attended this policy. They
would not be paid by the Government.
Government officials had three "incentives" they could offer ACMC in order to insure
the company’s cooperation. The first was price fixing; the second was an appeal to
patriotism and corporate responsibility. Both worked. The third was the threat of
government confiscation, and since it was neither abstract nor empty, it deserves some
discussion. In early 1918, the Congress held hearings on what became known as the
Minerals Control Act. The legislation appears to have been suggested by Robert Brookings,
chair of the Price Fixing Committee of the WIB. It identified forty substances, including
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minerals and metals, which were categorized as "necessaries" and "essential to the national
security and defense."50
The Mineral Control Act did not include copper, lead, steel, coal, etc.; governmental
"control" of those minerals was already sufficient. It did, however, include at least four
minerals in which ACMC had a lively interest: antimony, arsenic, manganese, and sulfur.
The crux of the law, in the unellipted language of the law, gave to the President the right to
"form one or more corporations" to produce these necessities and/or to "requisition and take
over any insufficiently developed or partially operated smelter or part thereof producing or
capable of producing said necessaries and to operate such smelter." Con Kelley read this
law, and the ACMC vice president responded to it with some heat.
In a letter to Brookings written on May 27, 1918, Kelley was, as usual, forceful and
direct. He implied that the Minerals Control Act, though it excluded copper, was a part of
the ongoing and contentious debate between ACMC and the Price Fixing Committee on the
price of copper. There had to have been hints from the Committee that ACMC and the other
producers were asking for too high a price. Kelley, first of all, wanted Brookings to
understand that ACMC "realizes, to the fullest extent, the obligation which it owes to the
Government. . . . [and that] it puts the obligation above any difference of opinion which it
may have with your Honorable Committee. . . . "

Furthermore, ACMC had never "declined

to furnish any of the metals produced by it to the Government. . .at any price which might
be fixed by the President." Labor and transportation costs, however, were increasing, and if
the Government wanted to keep the flow of copper coming, it had to increase the fixed price.
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Kelley then came to the essence of his argument with Brookings. The Chairman, it
seemed, had openly threatened the copper producers with nationalization. Since IWW
radicals, on strike in Butte, had demanded the same, Kelley was understandably touchy on
the point and he "protested against the attitude of the Chairman (Brookings). . .in repeatedly.
. .threatening the industry with the club of its being taken over by the Government. . . . "
Kelley could not
conceive of our Government taking such action as an arbitrary step to punish the
Officers of Corporations who, while imbued with patriotic instincts, have the temerity
to stand for what they believe to be the rights of their shareholders. . . .It is felt that,
if we had cheerfully acquiesced in the action of the Committee with reference to
price, we would have become a party to a policy that we believe will end in disaster.
This, without violating our conscience, we cannot and will not do.51
During the hearings on the law and prior to his letter to Brookings, Kelley also spoke
out strongly against the bill, despite the fact that the $50,000,000 the act would give the
President to stimulate production would benefit ACMC. He pointed out, however, that, "as
the bill stands, there is not a single copper smelter. . . in the United States that would not be
guilty of violating this law every time it operated." Kelley offered that remark in May 1918.
The maximum production of, say, sulfuric acid which the law clearly demanded, was
impossible without the maximum production of the copper which yielded the sulfur from
which the acid was made.

But as Kelley explained, the fixed price for copper "can be

maintained . . .as long as there is a deficit in production, [but] the capacity for making
sufphuric acid is unlimited. .

If that unlimited capacity in sulfur were to be reached, the

supply of copper would far exceed the demand and would drive the price below 23.5 cents.
The producers would go broke and no one would have any copper.
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In addition to this market problem, there was a technological problem at which Kelley
only hinted. The giant stack at his company’s Washoe Smelter was not completed; fumes
would not be entered into it for another year. This meant that, by the rules established by
the Smoke Commission, part of A CM C’s smelter was "insufficiently developed or partially
operated," and hence, a fit target for "requisition and take over." Kelley pointed out that the
Washoe Smelter was not recovering all of its waste gases, hence was technically
"insufficiently developed" and only "partially operated." He implied that this would not be
the case once the stack was completed, but until then ACMC was clearly threatened with a
Government takeover.52
Kelley was operating on the assumption that once the stack was on line, the smelter
would be completely developed and fully operated. Sulphur would always be a problem
because of inadequate markets. But arsenic presented real potential. "I want to develop the
arsenic situation," Kelley said,
because. . . .after several years of the closest cooperation with the Bureau of Mines
we entered upon a plan of spending approximately a million dollars and a quarter in
the construction of a new stack and new flues, and putting in Cottrell treaters. That
work is proceeding just as fast as it can be done. Now, we will have a supply of
arsenic sufficient. . .to take care of the United States, and if we do not sell it, we will
have to dig holes in the ground and bury it and cover it up. . . .53
Kelley did not mention that those "several years of the closest cooperation" arose because the
Federal Government sued ACMC, but for an historian the fascinating aspect of Kelley’s
testimony arises from the way it ties together the work of the WIB and the Smoke
Commission.
It is not necessary to take only Kelley’s word for this close association. Bernard
Baruch received weekly reports on the activities of the War Industries Board. Those
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activities were many and varied. The report of July 25, 1918 contained the following
information.
With reference to the Sulphuric Acid work which the Bureau of Mines is doing for
the War Industries Board, it is only fair that this work should be regarded as Bureau
of Mines work and so recognized by the War Industries Board. . . .Mr. Wells has
been putting in most of his time for the War Industries Board, working out acid
production, sulphur requirements and designs for liquid S 0 2 plant. . . .54
The reference to the assignment of credit was almost certainly to the point of a jurisdictional
dispute between the Bureau of Mines and the WIB over which should be the Federal agency
in charge of the nationalization of the smelters, should that become necessary. The reference
to Mr. Wells is less problematic; E.A. Wells was the Bureau of Mines agent in charge of
Smoke Commission operations at Anaconda. Mr. Wells, it would seem, served more than
one bureaucratic master.
The Bureau of Mines was fully aware of W ells’s dual role. In its 1918 Annual
Report, under the heading of "Sulphuric Acid," Van Manning, Director of the Bureau and
chair of the Anaconda Smoke Commission, said simply that "A.E. Wells, who is in charge
of the sulphuric-acid investigations. . .has been acting in cooperation with the War Industries
Board. . .and reported on the possibility of using acid from western smelter fumes. . . ."55
This meant all western smelters, though Wells was clearly preoccupied with ACMC and his
work on the Smoke Commission.
Fortunately, the Washoe Smelter was as useful a Government laboratory in war time
as it had been in peace, and Wells was able to use his findings from Anaconda as a guide to
what other western smelter operators might do. In one important exchange, F.Y. Robertson
of the United States Smelting, Refining, and Mining Company, posed some questions about
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ACMC’s operations and then asked Wells "if [he had] any further information as to whether
the Government will require us to produce metallic arsenic and whether it will be in the
pulverized form or crystals?"56 It is inconceivable that Wells would not have understood
fully what Robertson meant by "require."
The Mineral Controls Act, referred to by Grosvenor Clarkson as the War Minerals
Stimulation Law, was passed on October 5, 1918. Full implementation was held up until it
could be decided which Federal agency would take over and run the delinquent facilities—or
provide assistance and stimulation to those facilities that needed and deserved it. On
November 11, the Secretary of the Interior was directed to exercise the authority given under
the Act to the President. November 11 was also the day the armistice ending the war was
signed.57
Woodrow Wilson once wrote that "the highest and best form of efficiency is the
spontaneous cooperation of a free people."58 It could be that in war time efficiency was too
important to leave to the spontaneous cooperation of the people, for the Federal Government
exercised quite remarkable powers during World War I. The language is telling. The War
«

Industries Board, one person said, "commanded. . .the forces of industry."59 "Before the
end [of the war]," said another, "it was found necessary to establish a very comprehensive
scheme of control over the entire industrial life of the Nation. . .

There were others

who used less flattering terms. The WIB was "an institution with tremendous powers and no
responsibilities. . .a tyrant with power to shatter the ordinary rules. . . ."61 The writer of
those lines did not think the charges true, but it is instructive that some did think them true.
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The same year the war ended, the economist Lewis Morse wrote that "the federal
government was under the necessity of creating new machinery to marshall the nation’s
resources. The enormous powers given for this end have. . .become almost unlimited."
Morse spoke also of one of those powers: ". . .the threat or act of commandeering. . .has
made workable its plan for direction of industry through voluntary cooperative price fixing."
It is uncertain if Morse was aware of the ironic—if not self-contradictory—aspect of that last
sentence.62
But let the final word on the extent of the Federal Government’s operational role
come from one who knew something about governmental controls. The reference was to
America’s
. . .brilliant, if pitiless, war industry. . . . [It] had entered the service of patriotism
and had not failed it. Under the compulsion of military necessity a ruthless autocracy
was at work and rightly, even in this land at the portals of which the Statue of Liberty
flashes its blinding light across the seas. They understood w ar.63
Von Hindenburg wrote that, probably in 1921. He intended it as a compliment.
The "ruthless autocracy" of the Government was felt in almost every area of
American economic life. But it was felt with more force and more devastating consequences
in copper than in any other major enterprise. The Minerals Control Act threatened the entire
industry with nationalization, and the price controls set by the War Industries Board were far
below the market. But ACMC was unique within a unique industry. For the duration of the
war, significant aspects of ACM C’s operations were in the hands of a Smoke Commission
which possessed all the "ruthlessly autocratic" powers of the War Industries Board plus those
derived from the 1911 set-aside of a Federal lawsuit. I feel confident in saying that no
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American industry, possibly excluding the railroads, was kept on as short a leach as that used
to tug at the Anaconda Copper Mining Company.
I quoted earlier Lewis Morse’s comment about the threat of "commandeering" and the
usefulness-and substance-of that threat in mobilizing the copper industry. By 1919 with the
war over and its markets gone, there had to have been some among the copper men who
would have welcomed it. There had been a huge increase in copper production during the
war. Hostilities ended before all or even most of that increase could be turned to military
ends. ACMC had copper stocks that could not be sold even at the fire sale prices of the
early 1920s. In 1918, in an effort to reduce some of the copper inventories and relieve some
of the pressure on prices, the Congress had passed the Webb-Pomerene Act legalizing the
formation of export associations (cartels). Copper producers could and did form such
associations and allocated overseas sales as a means of getting rid of their surpluses without
driving the price once again to ruinous lows.64
As the figures cited above would indicate, however, Webb-Pomerene organizations
didn’t work. In December, 1919 the American Mining Congress complained that "with the
signing of the Armistice. . .complete stagnation developed in the copper market, and
producers were left with an enormous stock of copper. . .produced to meet the requirements
of this Government and its Allies."65 ACMC was not spared. 1919 was a year of
"profound depression" as it tried to unload war-swollen inventories at depressed prices on
uncertain markets. Copper production was down by nearly half; employment figures were
down by more than half.66 By 1921 the price had fallen to 12.7 cents, and ACMC was
laying off workers by the thousands. One report indicated that ACMC had employed 18,000
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people at a daily wage of $5.75 during the war years; by 1921 those numbers were 2,600
and $4.50.67 If this were not bad enough, ACMC was also stuck with an unused and
unusable ferromanganese facility in Great Falls. Built at the request of the War Industries
Board at a cost of $750,000, the plant’s five furnaces could produce 1,000 tons of ferro per
day. On December 6, 1918, ACMC shut down the plant and dismantled the furnaces.68
ACMC’s ill-fated Great Falls plant was only part of its war-time involvement in the
production of manganese. As noted earlier, Philipsburg was a major Montana supplier of
manganese, but half of the state’s production came from ACMC operations, and like the
Philipsburg operations, ACMC was responding to Government "stimulation." Indeed, J.T.
Pardee, the USGS agent in Philipsburg, was the Survey’s advance man in Butte as well.69
The Government understood that its stimulation of production, however justified by
the exigencies of war, might have worked genuine hardships on mine operators. The
stimulus in this case came from two sources. The first was Secretary of the Interior Franklin
Lane’s circular issued March 9, 1918, pointing out that continued reliance on foreign sources
for certain minerals exacerbated the shipping crisis and imperiled the war effort. Lane
included manganese among those minerals that could be produced domestically. Bureau of
Mines agents had been working on the manganese issue since 1916 as part of the
Government’s preparedness policy; Lane’s circular was nothing new. But the Secretary also
asked for specific legislation "extending Government aid in the exploitation of such
deposits. . ."70
That legislation, the Minerals Control Act, served as the second stimulus. Con
Kelley, of course, vigorously and unsuccessfully opposed its passage because of its
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requirement that sulfur and arsenic recovery be complete. Whatever its purpose and effect,
the law gave the President and his agent the right to control and stimulate the production of
certain key metals. Manganese operations, including those in Butte and Philpsburg,
responded and increased U.S. manganese production by a factor of six in one year. But
wars end, and with the armistice comes the end of wartime markets. Producers are left
holding the bag. In 1918 manganese operators found themselves holding some rather large
ones.
This was not, of course, the first time the Government had sought to inspire and
quicken the pace of mining activity; from at least the California gold rush forward,
"stimulation" could have served as the rallying cry of every Government agent having
anything to do with the extraction and processing of metal ores. Most miners profited from
this benign attention; some were "overstimulated" and failed. Fortunately for the public
purse, those in the latter group did not have access to the national treasury. In 1918,
however, the Government determined that it had a "moral obligation" to those who had
responded to Lane’s circular or to the Minerals Control Act; they had been lured into
producing far beyond what the peacetime economy could consume. They had, in the
parlance; been sandbagged, and just as there was to be no war-spawned profiteering, neither
could the Government allow war-spawned economic loss.71
On March 2, 1919 Congress passed the War Minerals Relief Act, giving the Secretary
of the Interior the authority to "adjust certain losses sustained in the production, or attempted
production, of manganese, chrome, pyrites, or tungsten during the period of the war."72 It
permitted operators who "were stimulated by certain named Government Agents to produce"
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to file claims against the Government for any and all losses incurred in preparing to produce
or in the actual production of those metals. The act was amended November 23, 1921 to
liberalize the interpretation of what constituted stimulation.73
Montana manganese producers were among the first to apply for relief. Their claims
conformed to the language of the law. For example, claim 339 filed by J.J. Appel of
Philipsburg in the amount of $7,067.10 to cover losses on the Pearl and Little Gem mines,
includes letters from an attorney noting that "claimant bases stimulation, in part, as coming
through a previously stimulated mining venture. . . . "

The claim ant’s partner "received

various communications from various authorized sources in stimulation of the mining of
domestic manganese. . . .He also asserts the President’s message as a stimulating factor. .
.[and] it is a matter of common knowledge, of course, that Philipsburg was one of the most
intensively stimulated areas."74
The claimants themselves were even more specific. "We were . . .always being
urged to get out all the manganese we could get," said one. "State and United States agents
. . .and representatives of the Bureau of Mines. . .were always asking everybody in
Philipsburg to get out the manganese. . . .The papers carried articles about the Government
wanting manganese. . ,"75 George Otis Smith of the USGS made frank appeals to
nationalism. "A very real and patriotic help is given to the Government" when production is
increased, he told one Philipsburg producer.76 Another claimant referred to this type
material as "propaganda."77
Appeals to patriotism probably worked for most, but Smith was taking no chances.
He reminded another Philipsburg miner that the "War Industries Board has the power to
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commandeer mines or equipment." He went on to add that "there is no prospect that the
power will be used in the near future," but his correspondent was persuaded that unless
production increased dramatically, "the government or the War Industry Board might be
compelled to take over the mine and operate the same. . . . "78
There is no indication in any of these claims or in any of the accompanying affidavits
and statements that the Government ever said anything about being careful with mining and
mineral-processing wastes. There is, in fact, no indication that the Government ever
concerned itself in any way with those wastes, other than to "stimulate" them as it stimulated
the mining and smelting that produced them.
Not all of the claimants were small operators. In 1920 W.A. Clark’s Clark-Montana
Realty Company filed for relief in the amount of $68,519.00 covering the losses incurred in
the "extensive" development of the company’s Ancient and Travona lode claims. It seemed
"Mr. J.T. Pardee of the U.S. Bureau of Mines (sic. Pardee was actually with the USGS)
. . .visited the office of the. . . Company about August 10, 1917. That date is taken as the
date of Government stimulation." Clark’s company was certainly stimulated. Its
representative stated that all of its operations "were due to direct or indirect Government
influence. . . .There is no evidence that general mining operations would have been
undertaken without direct Government influence."79
ACMC also sought relief under the laws of 1919 and 1921. Specifically, it asked for
$561,346.62, the loss incurred in its ferromanganese facility in Great Falls. Bernard Baruch
thought the claim entirely justified. Baruch was in Paris, a member of President Wilson’s
Treaty Commission, when he wrote in defense of ACMC’s case. The former head of the
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W ar Industries Board pointed out that the Board was "faced with. . .the necessity of
providing the increasing war program with sufficient manganese. These facts were presented
to the officials o f the Anaconda Copper M ining Company and their aid and cooperation
asked." ACM C provided both, though they "were somewhat reluctant. . .and proposed
certain conditions which would largely insure them against loss in the necessary investm ent."
The Board accepted the conditions but could not "legally commit the Governm ent." ACM C
went ahead with the ferromanganese plant on this basis. Baruch was clear regarding the
particulars.

"This plant was constructed after solicitation by the Government and it appears

to me that it is a case which the Governm ent might justly consider for reim bursement.

" m

Theodore Simons, a Professor of M ining Engineering at the M ontana State School of
Mines in Butte and a Bureau o f M ines agent during the war, fully agreed with Baruch’s
assessment. He wrote that it was "quite natural" that
the solicitude manifested by the governm ent in having a local agent look after the
manganese industry and the fact that all producers were able to dispose o f all their ore
at a fair price, could not fail to give the impression that the governm ent encouraged
the output o f manganese ores, if not actually asking for it. This assumption gained
ground greatly through the neglect o f the governm ent to issue any warning whatsoever
that the m arket might come to a sudden en d .81
Simons went on that "in M ontana the fact [was] never denied by the governm ent, that the
Anaconda company at a cost of a m illion dollars built a set of electric furnaces in Great Falls
at the direct request of the governm ent stimulated production of manganese ores. . . .',82
It would seem that the WIB could not morally commit the Government anymore than
it could legally commit it, and that what was obvious to Simons was less so to the
Government: the ACM C claim was denied. The Attorney General ruled that
ferromanganese, unlike manganese itself, is "an alloy o f iron and manganese" and hence an
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"article of commerce." Manganese is mined; ferromanganese is manufactured. The Mining
Relief Act did not cover "intermediate metallurgical products."83 ACMC would have to
absorb its loss. In the context of lawsuits, Smoke Commissions, and the War Industries
Board, that cannot have gone down easily.
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G.

H ard Times and W ar Times
1.

The Depression

Historians have been trying for years to make clear to more affluent-and hence less
comprehending—generations the cruelties of the Great Depression. No literary device really
works. Only one such device—statistical evidence—will be tried here. It does reveal
something of the near total collapse of the national economy.
Appropriately, the first of these statistics was generated in 1936 by Robert R. Nathan,
an expert witness for ARCO in the present litigation, at the time a young economist in the
Commerce Department. Nathan calculated that average monthly unemployment in 1933 was
13,176,000 people. For the first quarter of that worst of times, the figures were as follows:
January—14,492,000; February—14,597,000; March—15,071,000. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics reported that the total civilian labor force in 1933 was 51,590,000, meaning that,
using Nathan’s figures, the joblessness rate for 1933 was over 25% and that it reached
almost 30% in March.1 By way of revealing contrast, unemployment in 1906 was estimated
at less than 1%; in 1926 at 1.9%; in 1929 at 3.2%; and in 1996 at 5.5%2
It is impossible to conceive of this level of unemployment. Coming at a time when
there were no "safety nets," the effects were devastating. But the figures cited above are
themselves misleadingly rosy. Of those working in 1933, a great many, perhaps even a
majority, were on short time—that is, were only partially employed. During the Hoover
administration, work sharing-working two weeks out of six, for example—became the most
common response to reduced industrial capacity. Let the numbers for U.S. Steel reveal
something of the effect. In 1929 the corporation had 224,980 full-time employees. In 1930
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it had 211,055. The next year, that figure was down to 53,619. In 1932 it reached 18,938,
and in 1933 it was at zero.3
An entire class of "migratory-casual" industrial workers was created, men and women
without jobs wandering from one industrial town to another in search of a week’s work—or a
day’s. The median annual earnings of these most desperate of America’s dispossessed was
less than $300 in 1933; less than $250 in 1934. Often settling in rough shanty-towns
(invariably and unfairly dubbed "Hoovervilles") when they stopped wandering, these
"knights" (and ladies) of the road were the most visible symbols of the Depression. At that,
they were luckier than others who lived in holes in the ground, tent cities, and packing
boxes.4
America’s copper towns were not spared any of this grief. Copper, which cost about
a dime a pound to get out of the ground and processed, was selling for less than a nickel a
pound in 1933.5 Production during the Depression was less than a quarter of what it had
been during the Great War, less than a third of what it had been from the mid-20s to 1930,
less even than it had been during the copper-specific "crash" of 1921.6 Employment
numbers plummeted. Men who had spent their working lives in copper mines and copper
smelters found themselves unemployed and unemployable.
No government could have ignored the needs of its most afflicted citizens during these
years. Certainly the governments of both Hoover and Roosevelt did not. As discussed
earlier, the activist state was not bom fully grown in 1933; the American government was
not without practice in the planning and operation of various elements of the economy. The
scale was different in the ’30s; the needs were greater and so was the sense of urgency; but
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these were differences of degree-not kind. It is almost enough to point out that Hoover was
among the ablest bureaucrats of the Wilson administration and that FDR was the Democratic
Vice-Presidential nominee in 1920. History is about continuity as well as change.
It is the case that the Hoover Administration’s response to the crisis was halting and
unimaginative—about what one would expect from a war-time administrator. It is also the
case, however, that the initial response of the Roosevelt Administration was marked by
restraint and, though a bit more innovative than Hoover’s, a well-developed sense of limits—
what one might expect from a Wilsonian Progressive and heir to that tradition. There were,
however, a couple of programs in FD R ’s so-called First New Deal that did involve the
Government in the day-to-day affairs of the economy that deserve mention.7
The first of these was the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), an
agency under the Reconstruction Finance Administration left over from the Hoover years.
FERA was one of the First New Deal’s most important agencies, and its chief, Harry
Hopkins, one of the entire New Deal’s ablest and most controversial administrators. The
New Dealers were concerned with three basic issues, their version of the 3Rs: providing
immediate relief to the millions without work or, in too many instances, the means of
subsistence; stimulating long-term recovery by tending to the affairs and the problems of
banking, industry, and the general economy; and insuring even longer term reform by the
establishment of new government bureaus charged with a myriad of new responsibilities.
Some New Deal measures, the TV A or even Social Security, for example, had elements of
all three. Some, like the FDIC, spoke to the second and third R ’s. Others were intended
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solely for relief; they were emergency measures only, and even their firmest friends did not
envision a life for them beyond the provision of that relief.
One such was FERA. FERA was launched on May 22, 1933, a central component of
the New Deal’s first hundred days. It was guided during its entire short life by five basic
policies. First, it was a federal-state program which was exclusively public and concerned
only with the unemployed. The money and some administrative guidance came from the
Federal agency; projects were handled by state emergency relief agencies. No private
charitable organizations were eligible for the Federal funds—partly because those were not in
the business of providing jobs. Second, the FERA tried—with varying degrees of success—to
keep politics out of its administration, to professionalize the relief process, and to maintain a
semblance of national standards. This was not going to be the Federal equivalent of
Tammany Hall. Third, it meant to provide relief to everyone: there was to be no
discrimination because of race, religion, citizenship, even status as a striking worker.
Fourth, it covered, or tried to cover, everything: the needy would be given food, shelter,
fuel, utilities, clothing, and medical attention. This was an emergency relief agency, not an
employment bureau. Fifth, FERA provided cash for both "direct relief" and "work relief"—
but it much preferred the latter. Hopkins was aware of the American aversion to the dole.8
In sum, FERA represented a direct involvement by the Federal Government in
feeding, clothing, and sheltering the poorest of America’s poor. While administered at the
local level, there was no mistaking the source of funds and energy. Harry Hopkins not only
ran FERA, he was a kind of one-man relief agency. But it was the almost palpable Federal
presence that occasioned the greatest comment. The USGS had agents in the field, but they
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were restricted mostly to mining towns. The U.S. Forest Service was hardly invisible; yet at
that for every ten Americans who encountered rangers, many millions did not. But FERA
was everywhere, doing something for everyone. By October of 1933, less than six months
after its chartering, FERA was providing assistance for 3 million families, 12.5 million
people.9 The historian Irving Bernstein uses heavily laden language to describe this
omnipresence, but few would quarrel with his selection of words. "FERA," he says, "was
an immense peacetime mobilization of people and resources under forced draft."10
In 1935 FERA gave way to the Works Progress (later, in 1937, Works Projects)
Administration (WPA), also headed by Hopkins. There were a couple of reasons for the
change.

No one wanted to go into the political season with a three year old "emergency"

agency still functioning, and there had been problems with the role of Federal money/State
administration. The WPA was forbidden to give grants to any state agency; it was an
exclusively Federal operation. There had also been growing concern within FERA about
direct relief—the hated dole—and Hopkins asked for and got a Civic Works Administration
(CWA) funded in part by FERA and the Public Works Administration (PWA) to provide
work relief only on public projects through the winter of 1933-34. The WPA was also
expected to be a temporary relief agency with some longer term recovery functions; few
could have envisioned it continuing to function until 1942.11
All three of these relief agencies-FERA , CWA, and W P A -w ere active in Butte and
were directly involved in the funding, management, and operation of a meat packing project,
a tannery, and a sewer construction and stream channelization project. All but the first of
these contributed either to the effluent load in Silver Bow Creek or to the distribution of that
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load throughout the upper Clark Fork drainage. In the case of the sewer and channelization
project, that contribution appears to have been sizeable.

2.

The FERA/WPA Tannery

In 1934 Montana’s Depression spawned economic problems that were exacerbated by
a severe drought. ACMC operations were all but suspended—which effectively closed down
the western part of the state—and the drought was having a disastrous impact on, among
other interests, the cattlemen of the eastern plains. A partial solution suggested itself: bring
starving cattle to Butte, kill and process them, and tan the raw hides. State relief agents
brought the idea to the attention of FERA officials, an agreement was reached between the
Montana Relief Commission/Montana Rural Rehabilitation Corporation and the Hansen
Packing House in Butte, and the so-called FERA Tannery was the result.12
The Tannery was built with FERA funds very near Hansen’s Packing House on the
flats south of Butte and on the banks of Little Basin Creek, a tributary of Black Tail Creek
(also known as Blacktail Deer Creek), which flowed into Silver Bow Creek. It began
operations in May of 1934, working hides from the packing plant. The raw hides were the
property of the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation (FSCC), an agency of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA). The plant was "owned" by the Montana
Rural Rehabilitation Corporation, a private entity created by the State legislature, and acting
as trustee for the Montana Relief Commission, representing FER A .13 The state’s Relief
Commission was barred by law from owning property—hence the private Montana Rural
Rehabilitation Corporation.

It was a byzantine arrangement, but when the line of ownership
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and descent is traced, there is no disputing that this was a Federally owned and operated
facility.14 Even the workers were represented by the FERA Workers Protective U nion.15
There seem to have been upwards of 600 of those workers.16 In an all-but-closeddown mining town with 1800 "stranded single men and about 2000 [stranded] families," the
Tannery was one of the only games in town.17 When FERA was succeeded by the WPA in
1935, there was a time when the plant was threatened with closure, but finally ownership of
the Tannery was transferred from the Montana Rural Rehabilitation Corporation to the WPA,
which continued to operate it until about late 1936.18
It was a quintessential New Deal relief agency, although one zealous FERA official
claimed far more for it. T.J. Edwards was the Regional Representative for the Relief
Administration. At a meeting with the Montana Relief Commission in 1935, he told his
audience that history was being made in Montana, that
. . .the new deal is concerned with possibly a re-evaluation of our entire social
structure in this country which may point the way to a reconstruction of the social
structure of society of the world as a whole. Right here in Montana I think we are
part of it."19
There was no recorded response from the gathered Montanans. It is not likely that
they saw the tannery in so grand a light. Most probably shared the views of Congressman
Joseph Monahan, who noted approvingly in 1936 that "This project has provided
employment for a number of people who were desperately in need of w ork." Even the
Silver Bow Trades and Labor Council approved of it.20 Ted Leybold, of the Leather
Workers Union, was another union officer who supported the project. When the plant was
threatened with closure, he wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt asking for a reprieve for "the
government tannery at Butte." Closing it, Leybold pointed out, would throw "over three
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hundred men out of employment," which seemed "a shame after the government spent over
three hundred thousand dollars to build it." There were enough hides to run it at least two
more years. That was two years more than the mines could provide. "The mines can not
handle or use all the surplus labor in this community. . . These men will have to work on
outside projects and many of them have not enough clothes to keep them warm . . . men
with large families can not possibly exist on the security wage. . ."21
But however viewed, whether as the first salvo in a world-wide social revolution or as
a source of much needed emergency relief, the tannery on Little Basin Creek was also a
source of some nasty effluent. In 1936 heavy rains gouged "some quite deep open ditches
. . .at the tannery" that would have to be filled if the area was not to become "a public
menace."22 For members of the State Board of Health, it may already have been that.
According to a Health Board officer, the "waste [from the plant consisted] largely of
drainage from lime ‘pickle’ and chrome vats." The lime wastes were "highly alkaline in
character." The ‘pickle’ wastes are acid (sulphuric)."

These wastes, it was reported, "were

of a grayish, turbid appearance and had a distinct, characteristic odor." About 30,000
gallons of waste a day were generated, an amount that figured to increase. All of the
effluent was "being discharged. . .into the channel of Little Basin Creek and following the
natural course of this stream entering Black Tail Creek. . . . 'l23 There is no indication that
the State ever did anything about the problem; Federal authorities never even commented on
it.
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3.

The CWA/WPA Silver Bow Creek Project

There were a number of reasons for the threatened closure of the tannery. They had
to do with jurisdictional problems or funding or both. However, Arthur Dwyer, Secretary
Treasurer of the local assembly of the United Leather W orkers’ International Union, had
another explanation for the possible closure. He offered it in uncompromising language.
After four years of one relief system or another, and the spending of millions of
dollars to half-feed a starving community, we of this City have nothing to show
. . .except the Butte Tannery. . . .The latest phase of work relief. . .is worthless
. . .boondoggling [at] approximately $250,000 per month.
Dwyer’s reference was to the CWA/WPA projects on Silver Bow Creek. "Here hundreds of
t

men, yes, thousands, are now putting in time to collect their security earnings on a project
that is absolutely worthless." In truth, Dwyer thought it was worse than that; it was "a
curse," a "meeting place for unemployed men—a place where they are brought together in
large groups in an unhealthy sewerage creek. . . . "

All of this was bad enough but what

really aggravated Dwyer was that "orders have been issued that the Butte Tannery. . .be
closed" and for reasons that appeared to him scandalous.

The "only self-liquidating or

worth-while work accomplished under Government supervision in this County must. . .be
closed. . .that there might be more men available for this nonsense along Silver Bow
Creek."24
The "nonsense on Silver Bow Creek" was a CWA/WPA project of stream
channelization and storm sewer construction. Whether it ever approached the price tag of
$250,000 per month is uncertain, but it was a major undertaking designed to provide
immediate relief and long-term benefits. As the project was finally carried out, it provided
some considerable long-term relief as well.
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The Butte Sewer Committee had begun to think about Federally funded and
constructed sewer improvements as early as 1933. In a meeting in August of that year, the
Committee listed 24 sewer projects, four sanitary sewer projects, a storm drain, and a 6,400foot concrete ditch and impounding dam at Silver Bow Creek. The plans were submitted to
the Public Works Administration (PWA) operating under the National Industrial Recovery
Administration.25 The PWA proved to be the wrong Federal agency for this kind of work,
but that did not deter the Sewer Committee; it simply found the right agency. In October of
1933, the City Council submitted 13 storm sewer projects to FERA, together involving 167
catch basins and 32,959 feet of granite piping.26 By this time, too, the Federal authorities
had determined on a project to concrete the bed of Silver Bow Creek.27
By late Fall 1933, the Silver Bow Creek Flood Control Storm and Sanitary Sewer and
Drainage Project was fully underway. It would be paid for by the CWA until 1935, when
the WPA would take over and carry the project to completion. Nearly 1,000 men were set
to work on six separate projects in the winter of 1933-34.28 The storm sewer segment of
their work, when completed, would discharge directly into Silver Bow Creek, by then
drained, dredged, straightened, channelized, rip-rapped (usually with slag blocks), culverted,
and/or cemented over.29 By 1934, the residents of Walkerville, Centerville, Corktown, and
Dublin Gulch were granted permission to hook on to the new and developing sewer
system.30
On September 21, 1937, almost three years after the Butte sewer project had begun,
Harry Hopkins sent a telegram to all state WPA Administrators telling them that
Effective today project applications for the construction, reconstruction, repair, or
extension of sanitary sewers dumping into lakes or streams will not be approved
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unless evidence is transmitted that the sewage is treated in a disposal plant or unless a
general plan is submitted for the establishment of a sewage disposal plant.31
Two weeks later a team of county, state, and Federal officials made an inspection of Butte’s
sewer outlets and the locations of the proposed extensions to the sewer and came to the not
very remarkable conclusion that untreated sewage was being dumped into Silver Bow Creek
and that the new system would dump more of it and faster.32
It was at this point that Federal Government officials were taught some interestingand confusing-lessons about the state and its attitude toward Silver Bow Creek. The
Montana State Board of Health informed local and Federal officials that the "disposal from
the said sewage will in no way create any health hazards or violate any health regulations
. . .

It seemed that the "flow of the stream [into] which this sewage empties is known as

Silver Bow Creek. . . . [and] the acid from this water disposes all of the sludge that empties
into it." In plain language, the state considered Silver Bow Creek to be a sewage treatment
facility. Granted, it was oversized at almost 30 miles long, but it was remarkably effective.
Besides, "Silver Bow Creek does not empty into any navigable stream that is used for
commercial purposes." The WPA officials accepted this reasoning and proceeded with the
sewer project—in fact, extended it to include work on Black Tail and Bell Creeks.33
In 1936 the Montana Power Company’s Gas Division produced a map of Butte and its
"suburbs." The map indicated the usual: streets, gas lines, schools, major buildings, mines,
railroad yards, etc. But it also showed the "present channel" and the "old channel" of Silver
Bow Creek. The old channel was fairly wide and meandering, with a large ox-bow,
complete with an island, just east of the power sub-station on Montana Street. The "present
channel" was shown as a narrow sluice way, straight as an arrow and resembling nothing so
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much as a concrete irrigation ditch. The "present channel" coursed through or very near
major tailings piles, the left-over refuse of long dormant concentrators and smelters. It was
loaded with material from miles of storm sewers, including those built by the WPA in
Missoula Gulch, which meant the "present channel" was also carrying the refuse of long
dormant silver mills. I have no expert opinion on the effects of this channelization of Silver
Bow Creek on the movement and distribution of these tailings, but common sense would
suggest that it carried them faster, farther, and wider.34
There are no records indicating how many of Butte’s unemployed were given work by
these Federal projects. There were some reports that claimed that 600 men worked at the
tannery and over a thousand were involved on the sewer and channelization projects.
Whatever the exact number, there is no question that the Federal Government was a major
employer in Butte during the 1930s and that it offered hope to many thousands whose
circumstance would otherwise have been hopeless.
4.

W ar Times

When the Great War ended in 1919, Bernard Baruch of the War Industries Board
tried to persuade the Congress to continue to monitor those American industries whose
production was essential to the nation’s ability to wage war. This included prominently
America’s non-ferrous mining companies. Baruch was joined in this lobbying effort by
representatives of the USGS and the Bureau of M ines.35 They were joined by private
mining company officials who wanted at least to see the Government buy and stockpile some
of their enormous war-time supplies. As already noted, the 20s did not witness a rejection of
the activist state; neither, however, did it witness a continuation of the wartime mobilization
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of the WIB. "Normalcy" meant the status quo ante in this instance and Baruch and the
others failed to persuade the Congress that statesmanship should be proactive. Perhaps the
legislators were operating on the Wilsonian promise that the Great War would end all wars.
Whatever the explanation, the Government in the ’20s did not take Baruch’s advice to
form a peacetime equivalent of the WIB in close contact with the Army and the Navy;
neither did it protect and stimulate the production of items that might be in short supply in
the event of another war or encourage mining companies to maintain scaled-down versions of
war production divisions. Encouraging the mining industry in every way possible was the
proper peacetime role of Government; controlling that industry was for wartime emergencies
only. One student of this policy was sufficiently convinced of its shortsightedness that he
could write that "It is perhaps fortunate that the Japanese struck as savagely as they did.
Had the American people not been shocked from their lethargy by the demonstrated
efficiency of the enemy we might have been the. . .losers of World War II.36
That exaggerates slightly. As that same student points out, the U.S. had begun to
move toward a war footing a year and a half before Pearl Harbor. It had done so, of course,
because of the outbreak of war in Europe and the importance of America as the "Arsenal of
Democracy." The key Federal agency in this partial mobilization was the Advisory
Commission to the Council of National Defense which, as it came to consider copper
supplies, worked closely with the Copper Institute, headed by Con Kelley of ACMC. In late
1940, still a year before Pearl Harbor, the Advisory Committee’s Price Stabilization Division
stabilized the price of copper at 12 cents per pound, zinc at 7.25 cents per pound. I use
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"stabilized" rather than "fixed" because in the absence of a declaration of war, that is all the
Government could officially do.37
In the Summer of 1941, six months before the Japanese attack, the contours of the
copper and war story as it was eventually acted out began to take shape. Unlike World War
I, the major problem was not going to be price, production, or worker loyalty. Production
would have to be increased, of course, and the fixed price would have to be high enough to
permit that. The Government and the companies had had plenty of practice working through
the details of that issue. The most stubborn obstacle to increased production was different
this time and more clear cut—though no simpler of solution. There were too few laborers.
Men were leaving the copper mines either for better paying jobs in one of the "arsenals" for
democracy or for safer jobs almost anywhere.
Holding these men for the mines and smelters would require increasing their wages at
the least, but with wages tied to the price of copper, the price fixers were once again called
to their duty. By this time, other Government agencies had been formed with greater
authority over the question of prices. The Office of Price Administration, for example, had
the authority to fix prices rather than merely "stabilize" them by jawboning and friendly
persuasion. The OPA joined with the Office of Production Management (OPM, soon to be
the War Productions Board or WPB), the labor unions, and the copper companies to set
prices for copper and zinc.
They were not set in stone. In August 1941, the partners set 13 cents/pound for
copper, 9 cents, later 8.25 cents, for zinc. In January 1942, the U.S., now a co-belligerent
in a world war, established a premium price policy (PPP) that allowed the Metals Reserve
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Company (MRC), a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to buy
copper at the fixed price until production exceeded a set quota, at which time premiums of
up to 5 cents a pound for copper, 2.75 cents for zinc, sweetened the transaction for both
companies and workers alike.38 Of course, it must also be noted that it was "obligatory on
any. . .corporation" to supply war materials "at a reasonable price as determined by" the
Government or the Government could "take immediate possession of [the offending
corporation’s] plant."39
One of the great problems associated with writing histories of any part of the New
Deal or World War II eras is drowning in the alphabet soup of agencies, administrations, and
bureaus, each with countless branches, divisions, and subsidiaries, and all with acronyms. I
am going to try to avoid the problem by avoiding the agencies and their acronyms and
writing about the Government. Historically, the Government exercised inordinate control
over the copper companies and, specifically, the ACMC Company during World War II.
This is the salient point. Through which bureau that Government power was exerted is not
important to this historical account.40
If by "preparation" is meant the active management of industrial production, the
United States Government may be said to have begun to prepare for war prior to the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. An Office of Production Management was formed in
January 1941 to do what its title indicated.

Specifically, it was to "increase, accelerate, and

regulate [the] production and supply" of items "needed for national defense." The OPM was
involved in a myriad of ways with both other Governmental agencies, including the military,
and with the private sector. None of this involvement was, strictly defined, controlling or
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coercive; the OPM was without war power authority for the simple reason that the nation
was not at war. But it did possess significant management prerogatives, and no basic
American industry was unaware of its presence. Certainly no one in the copper business
needed an introduction to the OPM or to the Director of its Copper-Zinc Branch.41
ACMC produced three items of interest to these pre-war war planners: copper, zinc,
and manganese. No sense of urgency attached to any one of the three; there were adequate
supplies of each in the Summer of 1941. Pearl Harbor changed that, as it changed the mood
of the public and the Government. A certain urgency now attached to everything, including
the supplies of copper and zinc. On January 16, 1942, the OPM gave way to the WPB, with
separate branches for copper, zinc, and manganese/chromite, and with vastly increased
powers over those of the OPM.42 The "essentiality of copper" was acknowledged, as was
the potential for shortfalls in its supply. America’s copper producers, ACMC prominent
among them, were expected to meet the challenge of providing an essential material in the
conduct of war. Copper had an "urgency rating band of III,. . .the highest rating given to
plants on the ‘must’ program with the exception of the Manhattan Projects." In a very real
sense, their operations and their production were "conscripted" and put to Government
use.43
In the case of ACMC, the major problem in meeting its production quotas was not
inadequate supplies of ores or insufficient smelting capacity. ACMC’s mines were thought
rich enough; its reductions works were known to be big enough. As it happens, ACMC was
beginning to encounter some lower-grade and refractory ores in its Butte mines, but the only
real limits on ACMC production were the result of a shortage of workers. In World War I,
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ACMC found itself with a work force of questionable loyalty. In World War II, there were
few concerns on that score, partly because of the CIO ’s no-strike pledge, and partly because
ACMC was too preoccupied with finding willing men to spend much time checking political
credentials.
Put simply, significant numbers of men were leaving Butte and Anaconda. Some had
been drafted and some were bound for better paying and safer jobs in West Coast defense
industries. The War Manpower Stabilization Act of September, 1942 was an effort to freeze
men in the copper mines. As an example of Government involvement in the economy, the
Act is of obvious importance. As an effective deterrent to men leaving the mines, it left
much to be desired. It was reported that despite the freeze, 4,571 men left the mines to find
other work; another 2,154 left to enter the army.44 Whatever their reasons for leaving, the
exodus from the mines at the very moment when the nation most needed the metals of those
mines created something approaching a national emergency.
The Government had to intervene, and the intervention had to be aggressive. As a
representative of the United States Employment Service put it in August of 1942, "in view of
the seriousness of the labor shortages in. . .the Butte area. . . .the full facilities of the
Federal Manpower Agencies will be utilized to implement the recruiting of miners."45
Another clear statement of Government commitment and intent came later that same year.
This time the spokesman was from the WPB. In his Progress Report from Butte, Lewis
Bassie lamented that "production [was] not all it could be." The major problem, Bassie went
on, was "the manpower situation. . . .Labor must be made available. . . .Such provision
requires major policy decisions which shall establish the relative importance of providing
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labor for copper mining and shall direct our manpower input in such a way as to maximize
copper output. . . . "

All of this would require "an over-all and integrated plan. . . ,"46

The major policy decisions, the over-all and integrated plan that Bassie mentioned,
came finally to include, among other devices, the aforementioned freeze order, the
furloughing of soldiers to work in the mines, and the closing of gold mines and the
"reassignment" of the miners to copper properties.

Others have commented on the

organizational structure of this plan, the flow charts and numbers of men released for mine
work and the ultimate authority over their labor. I want to concentrate on other, more
important elements of the plan—the language used in the recruitment effort, the style and tone
of the campaign. It is important to remember that the historical context is wartime. That
being so, what is to be made of the style as well as the substance of this "over-all plan"?
The first thing that struck me as I began to study the documents was how close was
the resemblance between the Government’s plan and a policy of obligatory National Service.
In June 1943, in a Memorandum for the Secretary of War, the War Department addressed
the on-going "Critical Condition in Non-ferrous Metal Mining." The memorandum noted
that "copper [was] a critical limiting factor on war production [and that a] shortage of labor
[had] . . .retarded production by 5,000 tons a month . . .with a prospective monthly loss of
10,000 tons, or 12% of domestic production. . . . "

Remedial steps had been taken-closing

gold mines, granting deferments to non-ferrous miners, etc., but "additional measures" were
clearly called for. First among them was the passage of a "National Service Act," in less
euphemistic language, a labor or industrial draft.
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The War Department had "taken the

position that this [was] the sound and only thoroughly effective.method of dealing with the
matter," and the only one that was not "subject to certain objections. . ."47
The idea had what two students of the issue have called "Presidential endorsement,"
an imprimatur of sorts which gave great force to the efficacy of a system of obligatory
national service.48 Roosevelt was indisputably the head of the war management team. As
one of the students put it, critics of executive power charged that

. .there were czars all

over the place and in fact nobody was a czar except Roosevelt. "49 The Congress never
passed a National Service Act—so much for the notion of President qua czar-but that is not
the same as saying that something very like it was not implemented. Indeed, something very
like it clearly was implemented. It is quite reasonable to assume that within the Executive
Branch the idea of obligatory national service did not vanish with the failure to achieve it
legislatively.
There is substantial evidence for this position. Reference has already been made to
the Government’s efforts to "freeze" mine workers in place by requiring anyone wishing to
leave the mines to secure a Certificate of Separation. Mention was also made that this freeze
did not work very well. The point, however, is that mine workers were not "free," as the .
free labor ideology in America defined freedom. I offer one example from what I can only
assume would be thousands. In February 1943, 19- year-old James Dunstan applied to the
local Butte office of the United States Employment Service for a Certificate of Separation.
Dunstan stated that he had "no desire to be a miner and [that his] parents object." He had
only worked in the Butte mines part-time "in connection of (sic) School of Mines." He
needed "school money." Dunstan had another job "on the coast to learn a trade, in defense
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plant." The local board heard his petition, but noted that "his only reason was that he did
not wish to work in the mines." That was not reason enough, and Dunstan’s request was
marked "rejected, insufficient evidence." The rejection was upheld by the Appeals Board.50
By law, workers could not leave their jobs in the mines. By law, soldiers could not
leave their jobs in the armed forces. To do so in both instances was to be AWOL. This is
neither a strained nor forced historical comparison. The Government was very concerned
that men assigned or referred to the mines adhere to the terms of their "contract." Any
"infractions of the contract for employment" were to be reported to the United States
Employment Service of the War Manpower Commission.51
The WMC dealt harshly with "malingerers." Too many unexcused absences from
work were treated as acts of near treason. WMC’s standard warning letter told "AWOL"
miners:
. . .the. . .Commission. . .members. . .consider your job to be just as important in
this war as the job of the soldier manning the tanks on our front lines. . . . you. . .
must hold yourself to the same standards that a solider has. He wouldn’t take time
off from a ‘shift’ without reason. If he did, he would know that he was playing fast
and loose with the lives of his comrades. . .and his family and neighbors at home.
He would take dangerous chances in this war for freedom; he would be risking his
right to hold up his head as a free man. The same goes for you.52

Interestingly, letters of thanks and commendation were sent to those whose attendance and
work records were up to a soldier’s standards. The Nonferrous Metals Commission, in one
of those letters, praised the "spirit" of those miners who "have pledged to do all in their
power to further our fight against the Fascists." Lest the wrong impression be given,
however, the Commission also noted that it would "at all times be interested in your record
as a producer of the vital metals needed by the soldiers at the front. "53

254

The martial spirit in what one USES official called an "intensive recruitment
campaign for the Butte mines," did not end with reprimands and commendations. In a
"Message to American Workers in Mines, Mills, Refineries, and Smelters of Copper. . .Zinc
[and] Manganese," Paul V. McNutt, head of the WMC, noted that
the nation’s war effort is slowing down for lack of ore from your mines. To defeat
the Axis, you must furnish the metal for more ships and planes, more tanks and guns,
more bombs and bullets. The mines are where American war production starts. The
mightiest of armies, the largest of factories cannot win this war unless you supply the
metal for making the weapons of war. Why is not more ore being produced?
Because there are not enough men working in the mines.54
In other words, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU!
It was possible, in fact, that he wanted miners as much as he wanted soldiers. There
was a particularly revealing comment from a WPB official who reported in January 1943 that
"to a certain extent, at least, the army regards copper production as more important to its
purposes than the inclusion of copper miners in the armed forces."55 The War Department
was of similar mind, noting that "metal production is as essential to winning the war as
military service."56
Both references were to the furloughing of soldiers to work in the copper mines.
More than 4,000 men, presumably with mining experience, volunteered to a transfer from
regular army duty to duty in the mines. More than 1,200 of them ended up in Butte. The
furlough program was a most uncommon experiment, conceivable only under the war powers
acts. It was entirely voluntary; no one was forced out of the army and into the mines. At
the same time, a transfer—as it was described—was not a discharge. It was a furlough, a
leave of absence. The soldier/miners were placed in an Enlisted Reserve Corps. They were
still very much in the Army. They were, for example, subject to immediate recall to their
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original unit should Uncle Sam ever decide that soldiering was more important to its
purposes than the production of copper. The men who volunteered were "referred to an
appropriate employer’s hiring representative."57

Life did not necessarily become less

regimented once the men were in the mines. Their "service records and . . .papers . . .
"accompanied] them," and the local office of the USES was "informed daily of any changes
in employment status of soldiers furloughed from the Army for work in the mines."58
The addition of those furloughed soldiers allowed ACMC to increase production, but
it also significantly increased ACMC’s payroll, as did the Government-mandated and
retroactive wage increase of $1.00 per shift. The raise and the additional, men on the payroll
had an obvious effect on ACMC. Certainly the effect was obvious to the WPB, and, in
March 1943, it more than halved ACMC’s copper "quota" from 12,900 tons per month to
4,750 tons.59 Under the Premium Price Plan, that meant that ACMC received a "bonus"
for every ton it produced over 4,750 rather than 12,900. No other copper producer received
a quota reduction even approaching that given ACMC, but, then, no other copper company
absorbed a full one-third of the furloughed soldiers.60 However indirectly, the wages of the
furloughed soldiers at ACMC were still being paid by the Government through higher copper
prices. There was a certain logic to this indirect payment of wages: the soldier-miners were
still G.I.s. Who better to pay them?
In addition to pulling soldiers from active military duty to work in the mines, the
Government also extended draft deferments to those men who agreed to stay in the mines.
But even that did not exhaust the Government’s involvement in putting together a work force
for the Butte mines. The "intensive recruitment campaign" also included the "transfer" of
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suddenly unemployed gold miners to copper mines as well as an active Governmentsponsored search for men, often far distant from Butte, who could do the hard work of
digging and loading copper ores.
This represented far more than the Government as employment agency. The
Government was the hiring officer—and a zealous one at that. In February of 1945, very late
in the war, O.C. Lamport, the Montana Manpower Director for the WMC delivered a final
pep talk to his local officers. He urged them not to relax their efforts by reminding them of
what they had already accomplished. There could be no doubting his enthusiasm.
Your have demonstrated in these war months that recruitment for far distant plants
can be done. Now we have a war necessity right in Montana. The difficulties which
must be overcome are recognized, but the war isn’t won by difficulties at home, it is
won in this case by production of copper. . . .the USES can do this job. . . .Every
possible facility will be provided. . . .Let nothing stand in the way of this accelerated,
intensified, recruitment program for copper mine workers. . . .61
Few Army recruiting sergeants could have improved on Lamport’s dedication; it is unlikely
that any employment agency ever approached it.
Lamport, however, thought of his job as no less important than that of the recruiting
sergeant. In fact, the entire recruiting and retention process was replete with the images and
symbols of war. ACMC, for example, with the support of the Unions and the Government,
published a bi-weekly newspaper filled with news of copper and war. It was called The
Copper Commando. In one particularly bellicose news story, the Commando made an open
appeal not only to the patriotism of the copper workers, but to the close association between
masculinity and soldiering.
When Hirohito pulled his sneak punch at Pearl Harbor. . .he didn’t realize that he had
locked horns with the construction crews at Anaconda. Just three days before, the
boys had rolled up their sleeves to tackle the remodeling of the East Mill of the
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copper concentrator--it looked like a staggering task for anybody except the
construction boys. What should keep Hirohito awake nights is the fact that. . .the
East Mill will have a capacity of 2,000 additional tons of copper every twenty-four
hours. . . ,62
This story was of a kind with the warning letters sent to miners who missed shifts and with
the entire Army morale program with its war stories, posters, and short films on such topics
as "The Army Behind the Army" and "Combat Report." Not only was the recruitment
policy conscriptive, the language and tone of the entire operation was unabashedly
militaristic. Under the circumstances, both miners and mining companies could be excused
?!
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if they thought of themselves as conscripts.
Clearly, the Government’s job was not simply to find men and point them toward
Butte. The War Manpower Commission was not in the service of the mining companies; the
companies were in the service of the Government. This imposed obligations on both parties,
of course—the WMC provided men for ACMC, ACMC provided copper for the military. It
was a cooperative system. In one WPB Field Supervisor’s report, it was noted that "close
contact is maintained with the Butte Mines and Anaconda Smelter. . . [but] no orders [for
miners or smeltermen] have been received from the Anaconda smelter. . . . "

The

Government filled those orders as surely and as routinely as it filled comparable orders from
the Army or the Navy. Once "an order is on hand, applicants [are] selected and referred
either through clearance or spot recruitment. . . .applicants [were placed] in the active or
inactive file."63
The Government asked ACMC to provide it with a "statement of labor requirements,"
number of men needed, "the physical requirements and age limits," etc. Wages, shift hours,
and job descriptions would be provided by ACMC as well as information on the availability
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and cost of housing. From this point forward, the Government took over. It was the
Government that "interviewed, numbered, photographed, [and] assigned. . . " t he recruits.64
In Anaconda, it was the Government that built 200 housing units—on land provided by
ACMC for $1.00.65 The transportation of the new recruits was arranged by the
Government. Finally, the Government could provide bonuses to particularly skilled men, the
hope being that such incentives would "afford the. . .Government a means of directing the
allocation of labor in metal mining. . .without resort to compulsion."66
Inevitably in such a system, a number of less skilled and an even greater number of
rank tyros would also find themselves bound for the mines. An industrial equivalent of boot
camp would have to be found for these "student miners." ACMC had the best and most
"life-like" of these training programs, with mock ups of mines, cages, and drifts. The
program was "developed by the Anaconda Copper Mining Company," but it was "prepared
for the Bureau of Training, War Manpower Commission," published by the Commission,
and led by supervisors who had themselves been trained by the Commission.67
In fact, the entire recruitment effort was a Government program. The idea that the
WMC was only performing a useful employment service to ACMC inverts the historical
record and distorts reality. Of the thousands of pages of documents I read on this issue, one
captured perfectly the nature of the relationship of the Government to ACMC as the
Government provided and delivered a work force to the company’s mines. The document
was a standard "Contract of Employment and Transportation Agreement "-form USES-701.
The one I saw was dated 29 December 1942 and involved a "worker" by the name of Frank
Allen, then living in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Mr. Allen agreed to move to Butte and

259

"perform diligently all services required of him by the Employer [ACMC]," in whose mines
Mr. Allen would be working. ACMC, however, was not simply the Employer. The
agreement was between Frank Allen and "the United States of America, hereinafter called
the United States Government by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, acting
through his authorized representative, the Anaconda Copper Mining Company of Butte,
Montana." ACMC would pay Mr. Allen’s wages but it would do so as the representative of
the WMC.68
The operational power and authority of the Government is conveniently captured in
that contract language. But how and to what purpose that power and authority was used
must also be explored, beginning with two general and related propositions: (1) ACM C’s
management could do certain things before and after the war that it could not do during the
war; and (2) the market determined wages, prices, production targets, markets, etc. before
and after the war but not during it. These matters need to be placed in historical context,
and one way of doing that is to find another model for management prerogative and use it as
a kind of benchmark. The model is one from union-management relations, and it is well
enough known not to require extensive documentation.
Put simply, there are fundamental differences between the rights and responsibilities
of those wearing blue collars and those wearing white. Management manages. Labor
labors. Occasionally workers make decisions that are "managerial" in nature—as in the
Butte mines when on-site and experienced miners determined where and how to extend a
drift rather than waiting for a mining engineer to make the call. On those occasions, the
worker assumed a managerial role (and often demanded'a manager’s pay.) Another instance
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would be union and company hiring halls; this was a disputatious point precisely because
workers hiring other workers upset the "natural order." The 8-hour day is a third example,
in no small part because the length of a shift and the number of shifts had an effect on
production, and decisions on production, as well as those regarding the length of a shift,
were thought to be the province of management, or management and labor, or the market.
A quick look at the Government’s role in the everyday affairs of ACMC, on the basis
of the management-labor model, indicates how distinctly subordinate ACMC officers were in
this wartime partnership. It is true that production methods were left to the copper men, not
out of any shyness on the part of Government officials, but because ACMC’s men knew
more about producing copper than anyone in Government and because, given the other
controls, how copper was produced was less important than how much. At that, it should be
recalled that the copper ores that went from Butte to Anaconda were run through treaters
installed at Government directive;, the waste gases passed through flues and a stack installed
upon that same directive; tailings were disposed of into settling ponds built with Government
help and with a Government suit pending.
It must also be noted that Butte ores in the 1940s were notoriously low-grade, that
more ore had to be mined to produce the same amount of smelted copper, that more miners
had to dig that ore, and that more smoke and tailings resulted from the processing of it.
Despite all this, ACMC copper production increased from about 70 million pounds in 1933
to over 275 million pounds ten years later, an increase in the range of 400% Those
275,000,000 pounds represented "approximately one-third of the total supply of primary
copper available to the United States."69
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It could be argued that despite the rules and directives, contracts and allotment orders,
WPB and WMC officials did not exercise day-to-day operational control over ACMC
because they were not present day to day. In fact, there were Government agents in Butte
and Anaconda, and they did keep daily accounts of ACMC affairs. It is the case that their
presence was not as conspicuous as that of the Smoke Commissioners’ representatives
between 1911 and 1916; it is also the case that no suit was pending. But the fact that Donald
Nelson, of the WPB, and Paul McNutt, of the WMC, lived and worked in Washington D.C.
is of no importance in determining day-to-day hands-on control of ACMC’s Butte and
Anaconda properties. Con Kelley lived on Long Island. No one ever said the Chairman of
the ACMC Board was without day-to-day influence simply because he was physically
removed from the mines and smelter.
Government personnel may not have been omnipresent—but Government rules and
authority certainly were. Ordinarily, companies trained their own managers; in the case of
ACMC, given its well-established tradition of promoting from within, this was particularly
the case. During the war, the Government offered "Job Instruction, Job Methods, [and] Job
Relations Training through the Training Within Industry Service of the War Manpower
Commission."70 These do not appear to have been voluntary programs, and hundreds of
ACMC’s middle management and supervisory personnel passed through these "Government
training schools."71
There may have been times when ACMC’s top management wondered why the
Government bothered even to train Company personnel. It had left them little enough to do.
In 1944, in an internal memorandum, a regional WMC officer wrote that "if the company is
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sincere in its efforts to recruit additional manpower. . . .it is very important (among other
things) that the ACMC delegate hiring authority to local offices of the War Manpower
Commission. . . . "72 It is unclear if ACMC delegated hiring authority or if the WMC
simply took it. And the Government’s control did not stop at the hiring hall. In 1943, the
Nonferrous Metals Commission of the National War Labor Board issued a "Directive
O rder." It was as blunt as one might expect from such a document: "NOW THEREFORE,
the Commission hereby orders and decrees. . .that. . .there be a wage increase of $1.00 per
shift. . . .[and] that this increase be retroactive. . . ."73 There had been negotiations on this
point earlier, and the raise was extended to all copper workers, not just ACMC’s.
And the Government did not stop with "ordering" wage increases. In 1943, for
example, the War Labor Board reported that "the bi-weekly payment of wages proposed by
the company (ACMC) be denied."74 I have no way of knowing how important a bi-weekly
payday was to ACMC’s management. What is significant is that ACMC had to ask the
Government if it could do it and be bound by the Government’s decision that it could not.
ACMC was used to dealing with unions on matters of this sort, but this was something new.
So was the fact that the Government would set the length of the work week, the number of
shifts per week, and the hours the mines and smelter would operate. The Government also
had authority over the costs of meals and lodgings in company "stores"; bonuses and
incentive and severance pay; a guaranteed annual wage; the return of injured workers to the
job; reinstatement policies; sick, injury, and personal leave; and vacation time and vacation
pay.75
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These were matters left either to managerial authority, labor-management negotiation,
or arbitration. In this instance, however, they were assigned by law to the Government; they
gave to that Government significant influence over labor issues and considerable power over
the operation of ACMC’s facilities. This is not a simple matter of degree; this is
Government control of a distinctly different kind. The same must be said of the
Government’s jurisdiction over other elements of ACMC’s operations. It is tru e-if
historically irrelevant-that ACMC would not have been exporting copper during a wartime
emergency. What is relevant is that it could not have exported had it wished to.76
Similarly, ACMC would not likely have sought non-military customers for its copper
at a time when the "essentiality of copper" to the national defense was acknowledged by
everyone. In fact, however, as the Government put it, "all copper production in the United
States has been placed under mandatory priority control by the OPM or the WPB."77 In
other words, although ACMC sold its copper to its own fabricators, they, by law, could sell
their products only to the military or to military suppliers. Couple this with severe
restrictions on the stockpiling of raw copper, and the effect on the mining and smelting end
of ACMC’s vertical organization was as obvious as the effect on the fabricating end.78
The War Powers Board knew this. In 1942, it summarized its position.
It was realized that in order to control the flow and use of copper. . . it would be
necessary to develop a number of channels for such control. Thereafter, control
orders for copper were divided into: . . .allocation of copper. . . .the control of
refined copper and copper alloy scrap . . . . and. . . .the conservation of copper
through restrictions on less essential uses. At the present time a fairly comprehensive
set of controls exists. All refined copper is allocated to primary fabricators. . . .79
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There were much tighter controls on copper fabricators than copper producers, but the effect
of those controls was felt at every stage of the copper business. Again, let the WPB speak
for itself. The Board had "complete control" over "the brass mills and the wire mills. . .in
that they may ship only those orders authorized." But, ". . .the Copper Branch has
gradually moved into a position where refined copper is completely allocated by end use."80
And smelted copper was completely allocated by refined use, as mined copper was
completely allocated by smelter use.
If this were not enough, in November 1942, the Government adopted its Controlled
Materials Plan (CMP) under which "the WPB divides available steel, copper, and aluminum
among the government agencies responsible for filling the essential military. . .needs of the
U .S." Interestingly, this description of the CMP was part of a general discussion of the
Government’s control over the economy. Mention was made of closing down
domestic automobile production and
tooling up for tanks, planes, guns and other weapons. In quick succession came
limitation orders to insure that steel, copper, aluminum. . . .went into war goods. . .
.Within a few months the great consumers durable goods industries were virtually
shut down, as such, for the duration. "81
Whether intentional or not, referring to copper allocations in the same paragraph containing
reference to shutting down the nation’s consumer durable goods industries had to have served
a clear purpose. This was a cautionary tale; ACMC knew that its mines and smelter were as
subject to control as its wholly-owned fabricating plants.
Part of that control arose because the Government had the legal authority to seize
industrial facilities, to take them over and run them "for the duration."82 It might be said
that this was a theoretical authority only; that ACMC was never seriously threatened and was
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not influenced by it. There is a particularly revealing letter from Frederick Laist, Vice
President of ACMC’s Metallurgical Operations, to W.E. Mitchell, Manager of ACMC’s
Reduction Works, which I believe contradicts this notion. Laist was writing in January of
1942, when America’s direct involvement in the war was barely a month old. I have read
many of Laist’s letters, and this one revealed a sense of urgency uncommon in a man not
given to panic attacks. He told Mitchell that ACMC was coming in for considerable
criticism in Washington D.C. because its production levels were not up to those reached in
1929. ACMC, if asked, could have provided "good reasons" but no one asked. Laist used
strong language to make his point: "I cannot be too insistent as to the importance of keeping
up with ore shipments from Butte and making all of the copper possible out of the
tailings."83
Laist had been with ACMC since 1904. His involvement with the Smoke
Commissioners, particularly their certified "recommendation" that ACMC produce fertilizer,
has been recounted. He managed the Washoe Smelter during World War I, and he knew
that the Government had the power to take over or shutdown ACMC’s operation. No one
can know what determined the urgent tone of Laist’s letter to Mitchell, but it could certainly
be argued that if he did not fear seizure, he did fear the consequences from Washington if
ACMC did not boost its production. Laist was still an ACMC official in 1944 when the
Government took over and operated "the mines, collieries, and facilities of the Philadelphia
and Reading Coal and Iron Company."84 He was in that position during those three weeks
between December 1943 and January 1944, when the Government took over and operated
ACMC’s railroad, the Butte, Anaconda and Pacific. It may be argued that the Government
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took over 564 other railroads at the same time and that it did so on the basis of legislation
passed in 1916 and not bearing on mines and smelters.85 It is the power and willingness to
seize that is at issue, not the nature and timing of the statutory authority to seize. All
ACMC knew was that the Government seized property belonging to private corporations.
That was all ACMC had to know.
There is one final piece to the story of the Government’s operational authority over
ACMC’s mines and smelter. The point might be made that the Government had no real
coercive power over ACMC and that, as a consequence, it cannot be said that it controlled
ACMC’s affairs. It could even be argued that although the Government could keep certain
industries in line by withholding certain necessary raw materials through the various
allotment and permit programs, this was not leverage that could have been used against
ACMC. This is a story of mines and a smelter, and the Government had no control over
%

their raw materials and no possible interest in withholding them.
The Government did, however, control an element in the industrial mix more
important to ACMC’s mining and smelting operations than copper ore. And the Government
was on record as being willing to withhold this element. In September of 1942, the War
Manpower Commission reported on the actions it had taken since the war began. It
mentioned the deferment and furlough programs; the recruitment drives, including help in
providing transportation and housing; the training programs; and wage adjustments. It
concluded, however, with an action which was clearly coercive. "Certificates of separation. ”
the report said with underlined emphasis, were "to be granted automatically to workers
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employed by anv employer not complying with the provisions of the stabilization order and
subsequent procedures."86
At first glance, this action might seem to run counter to everything the WMC had
been doing. Under the stabilization order, the only way a man could leave the copper mines
was to get a certificate of separation. Granting those certificates automatically for whatever
reason could empty a copper mine at a time when the WMC was presumably trying to fill
them. It is hard to know what to do with this report; interpreting it is not easy. Since the
Government was not about to close ACMC’s or any other nonferrous mines, the only
explanation is that the Government was prepared to take over the mines of non-complying
companies and operate them with the same men it had released from service. But however
the document is interpreted, it makes clear that the Government was more than an
employment bureau. It was the employer.
In sum, during World War II, the Federal Government, through a variety of agencies,
exercised meaningful control over ACMC’s operations. There is absolutely no comparison
between the management rights and authority enjoyed by ACMC executives before and after
the war and those they were allowed to retain during the war. Nor did this Government
control manifest itself only sporadically and from a distance. There were Federal officers in
Butte and Anaconda; they filed daily reports on some aspects of ACMC’s operations and
took a direct hand in many. The idea that ACMC managed its mines and smelter as it had
before the war and as it would after the war is patently false. The Government did, in fact,
determine the price of copper and to whom it could be sold. It did, in fact, have the power
to seize, take over, and operate industries not in compliance—whatever the nature of that
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noncompliance. This power was not merely theoretical, nor was it necessary that it be
applied periodically to make it real.
There was more. Government officials had hiring power as well as general authority
over such matters as wages, raises, absenteeism, worker discipline, vacations, leave policy,
length of shift, transportation, housing, employee training, even the timing of paydays. If
Government officials exercised little control over the means of production, it was only
because they had the good sense to realize that ACMC officials knew more about that aspect
of the operation than they did. The Government was considerably less bashful when its own
putative expertise exceeded that of ACMC. As for waste disposal, the long shadow of the
Smoke Commission was still determinative. ACMC could not have cut out the Cottrells or
by-passed the flues and stack had it wanted to. The Federal Government had mandated and
arranged for a waste disposal system between 1911 and 1925. That system was still in place
and still operational, as was the Governmental authority that put it there and made it such.
5.

M anganese and Zinc in W orld W ar II

Copper was an essential of war, but it was not the only metal mined and processed in
Butte, Anaconda, and Philipsburg, in which the Government took an active an interest.
Manganese, zinc, and, to a lesser extent, arsenic were also important materials of war.
I have already called attention to the Government’s role in stimulating the
development of the rich manganese ore deposits in the Philipsburg area. Both the Bureau of
Mines and the USGS had agents in the field who vigorously encouraged Philipsburg mine
operators to exploit those deposits. And Philipsburg responded—more aggressively, perhaps
than it should have given the losses many in the district sustained when their war markets
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disappeared. Although some of these losses were partially recovered under the War Minerals
Relief Act of 1918, producing manganese at the Government’s urging to meet inflated war
markets was at best a risky proposition.
Philipsburg’s manganese operations would be "re-stimulated" during World War II,
but an account of that episode will have to wait its turn. As with copper, this is principally
Butte and Anaconda’s story. There were accounts of manganese in the Butte district in the
1880s and ’90s, but Butte was a silver and copper town then and the reports captured no
one’s attention, except as they identified another "waste" rock.87 But manganese was
essential to steel-making, and as that industry grew, so did the demand for a domestic source
of high grade manganese.88 Sometime just before the U.S. entered the war in 1917, the
Emma mine—as well as the Czarina, Travona, and Ancient—in Butte began to show
significant deposits of rhodocrosite, the carbonate of manganese.89 ACMC leased the
Emma from the Butte Copper and Zinc Company and used these ores to make ferro
manganese under contract to the War Industries Board.90
In 1920 ACMC metallurgists had the idea that rhodochrosite ore could be roasted in
such a fashion to produce a nodulized form of manganese from which ferro-manganese could
be made at considerably less cost. Experiments were conducted. The process worked, and
ACMC began to sell ferro-manganese to steel producers in the open market. From then until
1927, ACMC continued to conduct experiments using the nodules made from the manganese
ores of the Emma mine.91
Seven years later, in 1927, a new player entered the Butte manganese business. John
H. Cole, an experienced manganese producer from Philipsburg, proposed to build a

270

nodulizing plant at Butte. ACMC shared with Cole the results of its experimental work, and
Cole proposed to use ACMC ores from the Emma and other mines in Butte and Philipsburg
to make nodulized manganese to be used in the production of ferro-manganese. Cole called
his new corporation the Domestic Manganese and Development Company (DMD); the name
was indicative. Cole was determined to help reduce the nation’s dependence on foreign
sources of manganese.92 He entered into a contract and lease arrangement with ACMC, in
which the copper company leased him the ground of the old Butte Reduction Works "for the
sole purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating a plant for the nodulizing and other
treatment of manganese ores. . . . " Cole’s new plant, costing $400,000, was on line by
March 1928. Cole was committed to treating 875,000 tons of ore over the next five years,
most of it from ACMC but some from both the Butte Copper and Zinc company and the
Clark-Montana Realty Company. The DMD plant ran at full bore from its opening until
July, 1930.93
For reasons that are unclear—although they almost surely had something to do with
the Emma running out of high-grade ores-D M D was unable to meet all of its contractual
obligations, and in 1930 the contract was canceled. With the exception of a few specific
orders, DMD did not treat ores from the Emma mine after that date. From July 1930 until
1937, DMD ran at one-third capacity; from 1937 to March 1943, at one-half capacity.94
During the three years of the DMD’s contract with ACMC, Cole’s operation produced
187,000 tons of nodules from the 417,000 tons of ore from the Emma mine. Some of this
production involved nodulizing ACMC ores treated through floatation at its zinc concentrator
in Anaconda. DMD’s nodulized product was then sold to the Colorado Fuel and Iron
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Company for the manufacture of ferro-manganese. Not one of the many Government
officials involved in compiling these reports ever said a word about waste disposal
methods.95
When the war began in Europe, ACMC had had considerable experience-not all of it
fondly recalled—in the manganese business. In 1940 ACMC proposed to mine 150,000 tons
yearly of low-grade ores from the Emma, construct and outfit concentrating and nodulizing
plants, and sell the entire finished product, approximately 50,000 tons of high-grade
manganese oxide, to the U.S. Government for the manufacture of ferro-manganese. The
capital costs of this new ACMC venture were estimated at $1,000,000. The Government,
through the OPM, liked the idea; liked it so much, in fact, that it persuaded ACMC to
double its offer to 300,000 tons of ore and 100,000 tons of manganese oxide. This
represented the maximum amount of manganese ore that could be taken from the Emma, and
getting it required ACMC to halt the mining of zinc from that mine. The deal was struck.
The plant began operations in June 1941; it was the largest producer of manganese in the
United States.96 Again, although fully aware of the wastes that attended these operations,
there was no mention by the Government officials of what would be done with them.97
In the Summer of 1940, about the same time that OPM was negotiating with ACMC,
John Cole and DMD again became a part of the manganese mix in Butte, apparently as a
rival to ACMC. Cole and his partner, Harold Pumpelly, approached the OPM officials in
Butte, reminding them of DMD’s nodulizing plant. That plant, however, had no mine
attached to it and hence no guaranteed source of "feed ores." In addition, according to
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ACMC officials, it was not "adapted for the most economical production of finished high
grade ore. . .and should not be used."98
R.C. Allen, representing the OPM, seems to have disagreed. In November 1940
DMD entered into two contracts with MRC for 160,000 long tons of nodulized manganese.
A year later, nothing had been done on either contract, but by then matters had begun to
change.99 In the first place, according to a very brief Defense Plant Corporation (DPC)
history, in "1942 and early 1943 substantial tonnages of low grade manganese carbonate ores
were developed in Butte and Philipsburg." This development was "under the sponsorship of
the Metals Reserve Company (MRC) at the request of the WPB." In other words, this was a
Government operation.
At the same time these new ores were being developed, metallurgical tests were being
conducted for the concentration by flotation process of these new low-grade, as well as highgrade, ores. It is unclear if this flotation process was different from that pioneered by
ACMC in 1920. What is clear is that the system worked, and that ores treated by flotation
were "suitable for feed to DMD Nodulizing plant." A 400-ton flotation mill was designed
and built.
On May 18, 1943, the DPC signed an agreement with DMD for construction of the
mill and for DM D’s operation of it "as Agent for MRC." For its part, MRC had leased
DM D’s nodulizing mill and arranged for DMD management of it as well. The new flotation
mill was completed January 7, 1944. It had cost 297,248.61 of the Federal Government’s
dollars. Known as the DPC Mill, it was run by Domestic Manganese—successfully it would
seem—as an agent of the Federal Government. To insure that neither company would
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plunder the work force of the other, DMD’s wage and vacation schedules were the same as
those the WMC had established for ACMC.100
The DPC flotation mill was directly adjacent to the DMD nodulizing mill. Both were
dependent upon the other, and both were either surrounded by ACMC land or built on land
leased from ACMC. The storage of tailings was a problem, only partially solved by the
Government’s acquisition from ACMC of 7.28 acres of unimproved land in the general area
of the mills. From the Butte Reduction Works forward, this was well used ground.101
During its operating lifetime, until September 1944, the flotation mill treated approximately
69,000 long dry tons of crude ore, which were converted in the MRC nodulizing plant into
12,193 long dry tons of manganese nodules. In the meantime, ACMC also continued to
manufacture manganese to meet its contract with the Federal Government.102 None of the
various Government reports, including the DPC history, says anything about wastes.103
6.

ACMC and Metals Reserve Company Zinc

In addition to copper and manganese, ACMC was also actively involved in producing
zinc, also under Government contracts. Zinc, of course, is mixed with copper in making
brass--which is used for countless objects of warfare. The Government had a clear interest
in zinc, and it turned to ACMC to help produce it. The company had entered "the zinc
business," as Con Kelley once described it, in 1914. It was an expensive business, and
ACMC’s involvement with it grew only slowly until World War I provided better-if not
necessarily permanent—markets. Between 1916 and 1919, ACMC zinc output averaged
approximately 200,000,000 pounds per year.104 In the 1920s and ’30s ACMC zinc
%

production rose and fell according to the market, which meant that in 1921 it fell to almost
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nothing, rose in the mid ’20s to the 150,000,000 pound range and fell to absolutely nothing
in 1931, 1932, and 1938.105 Given the figure for 1938, ACMC, on its own, was not likely
to increase its zinc operations.
ACMC zinc, when the market allowed it to produce any, was of the high-grade
electrolytic variety needed for industrial—and war-purposes. There were only three such
electrolytic plants operating in the U.S. in 1940, and ACMC ran two of them. A fourth
facility was added in 1941, but this still left the nation short of high-grade zinc. In 1942,
under the aegis of the Metals Reserve Company, four new electrolytic zinc facilities were
built, the largest in Corpus Christi, Texas, and ACMC significantly increased its zinc
processing capacity at both its Great Falls and Anaconda operations. These new and
expanded facilities increased the nation’s capacity by 86,500 tons per year. 45,000 of those
increased tons (about 55 percent) came from ACMC operations, 15,000, or almost 18
percent from Anaconda. All of ACMC’s zinc, like ACMC’s copper, was under both the
Premium Price Plan and the Controlled Materials Plan, meaning that the Government
controlled both price and distribution.106
ACMC’s expansion came at a cost of about $1,500,000. It is ture that ACMC did
not seek any Federal funds to finance the expansion. It is also the case that had the
Government built the facilities from scratch, the cost would have been approximately five
times the $1,500,000 that ACMC paid.107 It is idle to speculate about why ACMC did not
seek Federal funding. Indeed, it did seek and accept Federal help in providing housing for
the 150 new employees that would be put to work producing Government zinc.108 The

important consideration is that with its new facilities-and the housing for the men to run it—
ACMC was able to meet the requirements of its contract with the Government.
That contract between MRC and ACMC was signed Christmas Eve 1941, less than
three weeks after Pearl Harbor. It was an interesting document. It began by identifying zinc
as a "‘critical’ material. . .as defined. . .by the President." As for the MRC, it was an
"Agency of the Government" with the responsibility of "acquiring and producing zinc
concentrates, zinc metal. . .and. . .duly authorized to have the same smelted and refined. . .
." That’s where ACMC came in; the MRC was going to acquire zinc concentrates, and
ACMC was going to stockpile and smelt and refine it into electrolytic zinc on the basis of a
toll contract. In other words, ACMC would deal with the MRC exactly as it would any
other "outside" owner of concentrates—except, of course, that the toll price for treating the
MRC zinc was not really open to negotiation. As noted, ACMC expanded its operations
under and in order to meet the terms of the contract—indeed, it was the "intention of this
Contract to provide new treatment facilities for zinc concentrates which Anaconda does not
now offer to treat because of its limited existing. . .facilities."109
MRC zinc would come to Anaconda from "Montana, Idaho, Washington, Utah, and
the Pioche District of Nevada." The contract stated explicitly that ACMC did "not believe
that additional capacity for the treatment of zinc concentrate in the territory described. . .will
be required after the termination of the existing emergency [but was] willing, nevertheless, to
provide additional treatment facilities at its said plants. . .and to return the resultant zinc
metal to Metals Reserve. . . . "

The reference, of course, is to the plant expansions

necessary to treat MRC concentrates in the volume anticipated. ACMC obviously doubted
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that those volumes could be commercially treated after the war. That being so, ACMC
wanted it understood that in expanding its facilities and treating MRC concentrates, it was
doing its duty and doing it as the Government had defined it.
ACMC treated zinc concentrates from three sources: its own mines, the mines of
other producers, and the MRC. Very little of the total output of its electrolytic plants came
from its own mines, in large measure because zinc miners were pulled out and put in copper
mines, in part because a large Butte zinc producer, the Emma, was being used for
manganese. The supply from other producers would diminish during the war as those
producers’ zinc went increasingly to MRC.110 MRC’s were the concentrates that fed the
ACMC smelters in Anaconda and Great Falls.111
The production figures clearly indicate the extent to which ACMC was storing and
treating the Government’s ore. Numbers for 1942 were not provided in the ACMC Annual
Report for that year "at the request of the U.S. Government, Office of Censorship," further
evidence of Government involvement in ACMC affairs.112 The next year the Censor
relented, and ACMC was able to tell its stockholders how much electrolytic zinc it had
produced and was producing and from what sources of supply. In 1942, ACMC produced
415.3 million pounds of electrolytic zinc, 142 million on toll. In 1943, those numbers were
514.8 million and 331.2; in 1944, 473.9 and 305.5; in 1945, 380.4 and 240.1.113 It may be
safely assumed that the vast majority of the concentrates treated on a toll contract belonged
to the MRC.
The story of ACMC’s zinc operations, like those of its copper and manganese, is one
of close partnership with Federal agencies and officials. That partnership had been in place
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for half a century but there can be no question that historically, at least, the Government was
clearly the dominant partner—as it had been during World War I as well.
Returning briefly to the management-labor model introduced earlier, it is manifestly
the case that the fundamental decisions driving ACMC operations were made by the
Government. The implementation of those decisions was occasionally left to ACMC
officers, but this does not appreciably affect the case for Government operational control.
What I find most interesting historically is that the Government, at the time, would not have
disputed this. The nation was at risk; there was a war to be won. As surely as it would not
be won by a private armed forces, neither would those armed forces be supplied by entirely
private industries left to their own devices. ACMC was particularly affected simply because
it produced copper, manganese, and zinc. Wars were won by materials such as these. The
United States believed that an imperiled nation could not leave the decisions on the
production and allocation of those materials in private hands. It acted on that belief.
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H.

Post-War and Beyond

The Cold W ar may or may not have been the predictable outcome of W orld W ar II,
but it certainly did not perm it the nation to relax its m ilitary preparedness—particularly as
cold wars turned hot in Korea and Viet Nam. It has been said that nations are always
fighting the last war; that, in other words, they prepare for future wars by studying past
wars. If this is even partly true, the military build up o f the Cold W ar era would resonate
with the lessons o f W orld W ar II.
Nowhere would this be more clearly the case than in the post-war m ilitary demand for
the stockpiling o f the metals necessary to fight the next war. The United States had been
caught off guard in 1938. It had a barely adequate knowledge o f where to get the metals of
war, and a hopelessly inadequate supply o f those metals. Even before W orld W ar II had
ended, m ilitary m en began to plan for the next conflict and to include in that planning a
system for the stockpiling and delivery o f those metals. John Davis M organ, a careful
student o f this issue, put it this way:
On 17 Septem ber 1943 the Joint Chiefs o f Staff notified the W ar Production Board
that they favored the maintenance of stockpiles o f strategic m aterilas (sic) after the
war in order to avoid future embarrassing shortage. . . . l
This was not the unanimous judgm ent at the time. The W ar M obilization Committee,
for example, believed that "sound public policy would com m end, if it were safely attainable,
a program that would m ean that at the end o f the w ar the governm ent would ow n no
stockpiles o f strategic m aterials."2 A comprom ise of sorts was reached betw een these two
positions when Congress passed the Surplus Property Act (SPA), calling for a tem porary
stockpiling o f strategic m etals. The Com m ittee, however, offered its opinion in January,
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1944; the Surplus Property Act was passed in June of that same year. As Cold War tensions
increased, the Committee’s became a distinctly minority opinion, and the SPA was seen as
insufficient.3
On July 23, 1946, President Truman signed into law the Strategic and Critical
Materials Stock-Piling Act. The law gave to the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Interior,
acting through the Army-Navy Munitions Board, the power to determine needs, quantities,
and amounts on hand. The Procurement Division of the Treasury Department was tabbed as
the purchasing agent, and a Strategic Materials Committee was added to the list of national
defense agencies.4 An obvious example of Cold War policy making, the Stock-Piling Act of
1946 authorized an initial copper stock level of 1.13 million tons, later raised to 1.9 million
tons-about twice the average yearly production of all U.S. mines.5
John Davis Morgan not only studied this issue, he was a determined champion of
stockpiling. Writing in 1948, he reported on the passage of the Stock-Piling Act with some
favor. But Morgan—and, it may be assumed, other Cold Warriors and spokesmen for
preparedness—wanted also to be sure that there was stock to pile. Morgan spoke directly to
the point:
The Federal Government and the various State Governments can do much in peace to
make the mineral industry more effective as a major source of national strength. By
spending money on exploration and research, by encouraging all forms of mineral
industries education, by wise use of the powers of taxation and regulation, by
intelligent tariff policies, and by subsidies to vital industires (sic), the mineral industry
can be made a . . .more effective supporter of the nation in war.6
The most remarkable aspect of that passage is its author’s apparent unawareness that
for more than 80 years State and Federal Governments had been following each of his
suggestions. Perhaps Morgan simply wanted them to pick up the pace. More Government
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aid, Morgan assumed, would translate into more processed ore for the Government to buy
and pile up. The Congress agreed, and, in 1950, passed the Defense Production Act (DPA)
designed to stimulate the discovery of strategic metals and, "without regard to limitations of
other laws," make them available for Government "use or resale."7
Stimulating discovery was a well practiced role for the Federal Government. It had
been playing it for more than a century. The script had changed slightly as the nation’s
needs changed. The emphasis after World War II was on exploration. As one Federal
mining official put it,
It was realized that World War II and the. . .Korean conflict had placed a severe
drain on the nation’s mineral resources, and that most industrial effort had been
devoted to production of minerals and metals, at the expense of exploration for new
sources of mineral supply.8
This being the case, it was "understandable that. . .the Defense Production Act, provided for
encouragement of exploration, development, and mining of critical and strategic metals."
Federal money--up to $2,000,000,000—was available to purchase metals; another $2 billion
as loans to finance finding and developing them.9 The chief administrative push for this new
program was provided by the Defense Minerals Administration (DMA), formed under the
DPA, accountable to the Secretary of the Interior, and "rely[ing] heavily on the Geological
Survey and the Bureau of Mines in carrying out its duties."10
In remarks made before the American Mining Congress in December 1950, James
Boyd, Administrator of the DMA, outlined his agency’s—and the mining industry’s—
responsibilities. Boyd’s comments were summarized:
COOPERATION PLEDGED TO MINERALS INDUSTRY. The domestic mining
industry was urged today to increase its efforts to provide the basic raw materials
essential to the defense program of the Nation. [There were to be] accelerated
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demands for strategic and critical metals. . . .The purpose of the DMA is to assure an
adequate supply of metallic. . . minerals for the national defense effort. . . .Dr.
Boyd. . . pledged the cooperation of the Interior Department and the DMA in keeping
mines, smelters and mills at maximum efficient operation. . . .n
Even with this Government support, "the mining industry has a Herculean task before it in
providing our domestic industry with the supplies needed for the production of military
material and essential civilian goods." Its problems, Boyd explained, "are threefold:
First, we must get the maximum production possible—every available pound—from
existing facilities immediately. Second, we must create new sources—to develop
known but unworked deposits—to meet the continuing expanded demands of a
mobilized economy. And third, we must make concentrated efforts to find additional
deposits of ore.12
He was confident that industry would meet the challenge. "You have done the job well in
two world wars," he told the gathered miners, "and I have faith that you will succeed in this
critical period of mobilization."13
But just to make sure, the DMA was there to provide four separate services:
guaranteed private loans; direct Government loans; procurement contracts; and accelerated
amortization for tax purposes. There was something new about this kind of Government aid.
Guaranteed loans, guaranteed markets, and tax breaks clearly spoke to a new level of
Government support. The stakes were high in 1950. The partnership between the
Government and the miners had taken on an added urgency.14
The DMA identified 13 minerals to be given "primary consideration" under the
Defense Production Act. ACMC produced at least six of them; three of them-copper,
manganese, and zinc—in appreciable quantities. Since the emphasis was on the discovery of
new deposits, ACMC did not borrow money from the Government to develop any of its
Butte or Anaconda properties.

But clearly—as it had been for decades—the Government was
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an interested partner in maximizing the production from those operations.15 The Cold War
i

reanimated that interest and reinvigorated the partnership.
In November 1951, the Interior Department closed down the DMA, replacing it with
the Defense Minerals Exploration Administration (DMEA). The major difference between
the two programs was that the DMEA was concerned solely with exploration, on the
assumption that plans for the procurement and stockpiling of ores had to await the finding of
them. The Bureau of Mines and USGS still had operational authority, and they were, as
usual, indefatigable in exercising it. For the eight years of the DMEA program, the
Government’s mining men dug exploratory holes, entered into contracts with private parties,
checked on their progress, worked with State agents, and generally performed the myriad
duties that went with direct Government involvement in America’s metal mines.
In that part of Montana drained by the upper Clark Fork River alone, the DMA
and/or DMEA worked with 50 different private mining companies and individuals in a search
for copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, cobalt, manganese, samarskite-columbite-monazite, and
uranium .16 Each of these metals was of national strategic significance, and the
Government’s involvement in finding them was clearly part of its Cold War responsibilities.
But "in addition to exploratory assistance rendered to the mining industry" in the Upper
Clark Fork, the DMEA also administered left-over DMA contracts designed "to encourage
and aid the establishment and growth of mineral processing facilities and of mining
operations on known mineral deposits."17 Add to this the fact that "stimulated by the
opening of purchasing depots for manganese carbonate ore at Butte and Philipsburg. . .in
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conjunction with the Federal stockpiling program, several smaller producers became
active."18
In 1958 the DMEA, in the language of its chronicler, was "terminated. . . .Mineral
exploration under the DPA was not considered justifiable. . . ,"19 The Korean War, of
course, was long over; Viet Nam had not yet begun, and, although tensions between the U.S.
and the Soviets were still high, it was thought possible to get the Government out of the
exploration business.20 There was still, however, ". . . a recognized need for discovery of
raw materials to meet an expanding economy." It was "to meet this need" that the Office of
Minerals Exploration (OME) was formed in the Department of the Interior. The OME was
run by the same people who ran the DMA and the DMEA, but there was one important
change in approach. Under the OME, money was made available for the "exploration of
some minerals,. . .including gold and silver, that had not been allowed under the previous
programs." Nineteen gold and silver miners—both individuals and companies—in the Upper
Clark Fork valley were involved in OME projects.21 The Government was still clearly fond
of its mining companies—as it had been since the first days of the Republic.
Metals still had much to contribute to the Government and that the Government knew
this and worked to maintain its historic partnership with the nation’s mining interests. It is
well to note that in this instance, as in all previous ones, the Government made no reference
to the disposal of wastes—including those left by its own agents from the Bureau of Mines
and the USGS.
In fact, there was one Government contract in which Anaconda was a direct party.
Late in 1964, General Astrometals Corporation, a wholly-owned Anaconda subsidiary,
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entered into a contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) "for
Design, Construction and Use of an Electrolytic Cell for Preparing Ultra-fine Beryllium
Powder." Most of the work would be performed on subcontract by faculty at the Montana
School of Mines, but Anaconda would provide the plant-the cell would be located in Room
34 of its General Laboratories Building in Anaconda. However, "performance of the work
. . .shall be subject to technical direction by the Chief, or his designee, Materials Research
Branch. . .NASA."22 The beryllium was to be used for rocket fuel; the process required
that the beryllium be oxidized and involved the use of mercury.23 In July 1967 the contract
was extended and NASA added a couple of items to the "Statement of Work."24
Nowhere in either of the contracts or in either of the supplemental agreements was
there reference to disposal, whether of wastes from the process or of the equipment in Room
34. And there was a considerable list of equipment, including a beryllium chloride
sublimation cell, a press for filtering quasi-amalgam, a mercury distillation unit, and two
mercury vapor detector/ monitors.25 In 1965, Anaconda, apparently on its own, had
"burried (sic) at slum ponds, 8 barrels and 2 sacks from lab 34 and flake metal plant." A
trench was dug, the materials were buried, and covered over by fill "pushjed]. . .over them
with a dozer. "26
By 1971 it had become obvious that this was "an extremely interesting but ill-fated
operation" and that it was time to dismantle it and dispose of the equipment and any
remaining chemicals. This would involve more than just a trip to the land-fill. Most of the
items to be disposed of were identified by Anaconda representatives as "contaminated,"
"very toxic," "dangerous," or "highly contaminated with mercury and beryllium and
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. . .hazardous to health.” The Government agreed, calling the material "a danger to public
health, safety, and welfare." An independent contractor was found, willing to take on the
task; the equipment previously buried in the slum ponds was "disinterred" and, together with
what was left in Room 34, brought from the ponds to the backside of Smelter Hill where all
was reburied, some of it "entombed in concrete." The Government paid half the costs.27
The DMA, DMEA, OME, and NASA were not the only Government agencies with a
post-war interest in the Anaconda Company or its "neighbors." Silver Bow Creek, that
sliver of a stream running through Butte and into the Warm Springs Ponds, also came in for
renewed attention. The last time the Federal Government had thought about Silver Bow
Creek was in the mid-1930s when it rip-rapped, channelized, and ran sewer lines into it. The
Government learned then that the State of Montana had some curious notions about the
stream-including some ambivalence as to whether it was a stream at all. For purposes of
the WPA sewer project, Silver Bow Creek was a primary sewage treatment facility.
So it remained during World War II. The WPB, WMC, MRC, and DPC were
intensely interested-and intensely involved-in almost everything going on with ACMC
operations in Butte and Anaconda.

The one area in which they and other Federal agencies

evinced no concern at all was the condition of Silver Bow Creek. The end of World War II
provided an opportunity to revisit that issue. Actually, the first interested parties were from
the State, understandably, given the fact that from the 1860s forward the Federal
Government had left the management of waterways almost entirely to local authorities.
In 1947 H.B.Foote, the Director of the States’s Division of Sanitary Engineering,
declared simply that
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Silver Bow Creek. . .is best used as a waste for the industrial plant discharges. The
health hazards do not appear to be too serious, even with the sanitary sewage
discharged to it. . .The mine wastes appear to be inevitable. . . .The water course
appears to be the only feasible exit for these wastes.28
The State Legislature agreed and wrote into the Water Pollution Law of 1955 what amounted
to an exemption for Silver Bow Creek: No waterway that has been "primarily and
continuously devoted to industrial waste use. . .for a period of thirty years. . ." and not the
sole water supply for more than one hundred people "shall be classified other than for
industrial waste use."29 Under this ruling, Silver Bow Creek became, in the language of
the State’s Attorney General, "an open sewer or disposal unit.'’30
«

In 1957 Butte applied to the U.S. Public Health Service for a construction grant for
the "Metropolitan Sanitary and Storm Sewer District. . .Silver Bow.31 Essentially, the city
wanted an "interceptor sewer to run along Blacktail Deer Creek. . . .Sewage from this
interceptor would be discharged into Silver Bow Creek. . . . "

The Public Health Service

was favorably disposed; it was the agency’s "position under Public Law 660 to approve these
projects. This they want to do. . . ." But "the project in Butte [was] a very unusual one."
Harry Hopkins could have told them that.32
The problem was the same Hopkins’ WPA had confronted in 1937. "The application
would have been eligible without question, if the sewage was treated before it entered Silver
Bow Creek."33 Butte and the State of Montana responded exactly as they had in 1937.
Dumping untreated sewage into Silver Bow Creek was permissible because Silver Bow was
itself a sewer, a "captive ditch," an "open drain," its "fish and wildlife possibilities . . .gone
forever." It had only one function: mixing its acidic wastes with the sewage, neutralizing it
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in the process, and the entire load of wastes to the Anaconda Company’s treatment plant at
Warm Springs ponds.34
It followed from this reasoning that Silver Bow Creek was not subject to control by
the State Board of Health. The effect of this on State policy was predictable. In 1961, to
cite only one particularly graphic example, Claiborne Brinck, the State Sanitarian, informed
a correspondent who had inquired about Montana’s requirements for conducting raw sewage
from an industrial slaughterhouse "directly into Silver Bow Creek" that the State had no
requirements, " . . . as [Silver Bow Creek] is considered an open sewer."35 After all,
Brinck explained ten years later, on an entirely different matter, " . . . it must be kept in
mind that there have been mine wastes discharged from the Butte area since the late
1800s."36
This was a lesson that the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration had also to
learn. It was not an easy lesson because the State’s tolerance of the use of Silver Bow Creek
had created a "dilemma," "horn #1" of which was Montana’s Water Pollution Law which left
the creek an open sewer and hence not subject to State regulation; "horn #2" of which was
the fact that "the Anaconda Company had sole water rights on Silver Bow Creek" and most
of its tributaries. Taken together it was clear that "actual or potential uses of Silver Bow
Creek for other than waste transport are practically non-existent." This was a dilemma that
permitted of only one solution: "The Regional Office has considered the problem thoroughly
and is of the opinion that the practical solution of the problem is to permit the continued use
of Silver Bow Creek for waste transport. "37 The Federal Government was clearly confused
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and troubled by Silver Bow Creek. It shouldn’t have been; its own policies were central to
making it what it was.
1.

The End of an E ra

In 1973, Salvadore Allende, the Chilean Marxist, nationalized The Anaconda
Company’s holdings in Chile. Anaconda never really recovered from this blow, and in 1977
it was bought by ARCO. In September 1980, squeezed by rising costs, falling markets,
labor unrest, and high costs of environmental compliance, ARCO was forced to close the
Anaconda Smelter. It kept skeletal crews on at its open pit mines in Butte, but by 1983 it
closed down all of those operations as well. In the last 12 years, ARCO has sold most of its
Butte holdings, but it retains a considerable property stake in the Butte/Anaconda area.
Three months after ARCO closed the Anaconda Smelter, on December 11, 1980, the
U.S. Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act. That Act arose from one of the most significant social movements of this
century. The emergence of a new environmentalism, different in both style and substance
from the earlier conservation movement, is one of the defining elements in modem American
history. Unlike other social movements, the beginnings of this new environmentalism can be
dated—if not with the absolute precision that attends the dating of an event—at least with a
measure of certitude.
In 1962, Rachel Carson wrote Silent Spring. Carson, of course, was a product of
the new environmental awareness as surely as its prophet. On balance, however, she was
less created by it than creator of it. The environmental movement would not be the same
after Silent Spring: neither would America. Carson wrote with passion and conviction on a
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variety of matters. Her particular wrath was directed at the use of DDT, but inferentially
she indicted every toxic contaminant, whatever the source of its release.
And by whatever agency released. Some of the most trenchant language in the entire
book is reserved for Federal Governmental policies. Read, for example, the damning
indictments of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s efforts to eradicate gypsy moths and
fire ants.38 Similarly, it is impossible to miss the anger when Carson writes of the U.S.
Forest Service’s 1955 spraying program on Montana’s Yellowstone River just north of
Yellowstone Park.
By the fall of that year, so many dead fish had been found in the. . .River that
sportsmen and Montana Fish and Game administrators became alarmed. About 90
miles of the river were affected. In one 300-yard length of shoreline, 600 dead fish
were counted, including brown trout, whitefish, and suckers. Stream insects, the
natural food of trout, had disappeared.39
My purpose in offering that citation is not to condemn the U.S. Forest Service. It was
killing insects it thought harmful to a valuable resource. In 1955 that was thought a
reasonable and prudent thing to do. It would not be thought that now—a point which leads
me to conclude this report where I began it.
2.

Conclusion

In one important respect this entire report has been an effort to indicate both the
extent and the continuity of Federal involvement with the American mining industry. There
has been a seamlessness to that involvement, to that continuous interplay of public and
private interests, that is historically striking. The mining of metals, particularly, gold, silver,
and copper, was not simply another form of American enterprise. It was thought absolutely
fundamental to the commercial and industrial growth and prosperity of the republic. Mining
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could not be left entirely to private interests for the compelling reason that its importance
was so indisputably public. And so the Government made itself an active and supportive
partner in seeking, developing, and processing ores.
That partnership took a variety of forms, from the passage of laws encouraging
mining to the refusal to pass laws limiting it—including laws limiting the means used to
dispose of mining and processing wastes. The United States Government permitted,
promoted, advocated, encouraged, inspired, invited, assisted, subsidized, sustained, and
sanctioned the full development of America’s buried treasure. It performed more useful
service to mining than to any other industry—with the possible exception of agriculture-and it
provided that service for a much longer period of time.

It did so not because it was the

hired servant of the mining interests but because it rightly conceived itself the servant of the
people.
A healthy, prosperous, and growing mining industry was central to the people’s
interests. In the 1840s, California gold filled the national treasury, solidified the national
currency, and helped jump start an industrial economy. After the Civil War, gold and silver
paid off the national debt and accelerated the industrial process. From the early 1880s
forward, copper carried the electricity that lit up the nation’s cities and drove its rapidly
expanding network of factories and manufacturing plants, large and small. Between 1917
and 1919 and again between 1941 and 1945, the red metal helped the nation fight and win
two world wars.
In its complaint against ARCO, the Department of Justice makes repeated reference to
"predecessors-in-interesf'-to those companies, most particularly ACMC, which ARCO came
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to own. DOJ is asking that ARCO be held responsible for ACMC’s actions, and ACMC
responsible for the actions of its alleged predecessors-in-interest. But lawyers are not the
only ones who deal with predecessors, successors, and liabilities. These are also the stockin-trade of historians. The historians’ emphasis, of course, is on predecessor and successor
generations rather than corporations-on what one generation of Americans inherits from
previous generations. As is the case with successor corporations, this inheritance includes
both assets and liabilities. This generation of Americans has historical predecessors-ininterest. Having assumed as its birthright all the assets which those predecessors in interest
bequeathed to it, fairness ought to require that it also help pay off its predecessor’s debts—of
whatever sort. We cannot in conscience accept one half of an historical legacy and evade all
responsibility for the other half. To do so is to ignore historically-imposed responsibilities
and to violate fundamental interests of fairness and equity.
In 1970 Richard Nixon, speaking for a proposed $10 billion federal clean water
program, said that it was time to ". . . make peace with nature and begin to make
reparations for the damage we have done to our air, to our land and to our water."
"Reparations" was the proper word. "We" was the proper assignment of responsibility.40
It is the historian’s task to trace this "successor liability," and to establish the general
historical context in which past generations paid the reparations they inherited from the
generations that preceded them. The emphasis can and will change depending upon the
historian’s specialization, but whether social, political, economic, diplomatic, military, or
corporate history, the whole of the historical record should at least be introduced that the
extent of shared responsibility might be understood.

300

Based upon my review of that historical record, I believe that ARCO and its
predecessors-in-interest relied on the Federal Government’s previous acts and representations
regarding their operations. This concept also comes easily to historians; it expresses
perfectly two ideas which they use almost instinctively. The first is that groups of people
(these groups could represent social classes, races, genders, the governed and the governing,
etc.) expect certain things of the other groups of people with whom they are involved. These
expectations are learned, often through inheritance. People act on their expectations. The
second holds that it is bad history to apply the values of 1996 to the actions of people in
1896. Historians have a responsibility to judge the past on the basis of its values and
representations, not on those of the present. This is not moral relativism run amok. It is an
acknowledgment that values are not static and that to use moral absolutes is to be
fundamentally ahistorical. There was a time when the Government and the people of the
United States liked what mining was doing for them and manifested their pleasure at every
opportunity. They did not think about where the wastes were going, anymore than the
Forest Service thought about the full effects of spraying to kill bugs.

In the last twenty

years, the Federal Govemment~or at least elements of it-have changed the nation’s
collective mind and decided that the historical record compiled over 130 years of mining and
processing ores is to be traduced and spumed. Ghanges of mind, however, when indulged in
by governments, mean changes of the basic rules of the game. What was once legal
becomes criminal; what was once good becomes bad; what was once encouraged becomes
merely tolerable and ultimately forbidden. There is a present-mindedness about all of this
that is deeply troubling to historians, deeply offensive to history.
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Whatever the Government’s motivation in forming its partnership with the mining
industry, the indisputable fact is that for almost a century and a half the American people,
speaking through that Government, thought that the mining of metals was of sufficient
importance to justify whatever environmental damage might result from it. Out of this belief
came policy; decisions were made--by both Government and the industry. If those decisions
are now thought to have been unwise, if a new set of assumptions now governs the proper
balance between mining and the environment, it must also be held firmly in mind that those
decisions were reached by Government as well as industry. The environmental damage to
the upper Clark Fork River basin was made with the full knowledge and collusion of the
Government.

The Government that was once "friend and brethren" to its mining partners

cannot escape its historical responsibility to share as well in the costs of finding and
implementing remedies.
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